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Captive Fates: Displaced American Indians in the Southwest Borderlands, Mexico, and Cuba, 1500-1800

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Captive Fates: Displaced American Indians in the Southwest Borderlands, Mexico, and Cuba, 1500-1800

by

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Chronology and organization have never been my greatest strengths, so it is fitting that I thank next the professors that ushered me into the study of history in the first place. Before I ever dreamed I might become a history Ph.D., I arrived at Stony Brook University in New York as a meteorology major. Brooke Larson changed all that, captivating me as an 18-year-old freshman in her survey of Colonial Latin American history. She engaged the moral questions of the past, told stories, pushed us to debate and question our interpretations—I only hope to be half the professor and scholar she is. Alix Cooper was another mentor for me at Stony Brook, teaching me not only about cultural encounters and environmental history, but also about research and writing. I am somewhat embarrassed (but immensely grateful) thinking back on the detailed comments she provided on my rambling essay drafts that were twice the assigned page limit. That she did so enthusiastically and without complaint is all the more remarkable.

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Captive Fates: Displaced American Indians in the Southwest Borderlands, Mexico, and Cuba, 1500-1800

Paul Timothy Conrad, Ph.D.

The University of Texas at Austin, 2011

Supervisors: James Sidbury and Jorge Cañizares-Esguerra

Between 1500 and 1800, Spaniards and their Native allies captured hundreds of Apache Indians and members of neighboring groups from the Rio Grande River Basin and subjected them to a variety of fates. They bought and sold some captives as slaves, exiled others as prisoners of war to central Mexico and Cuba, and forcibly moved others to mines, towns, and haciendas as paid or unpaid laborers. Though warfare and captive exchange predated the arrival of Europeans to North America, the three centuries following contact witnessed the development of new practices of violence and captivity in the North American West fueled by Euroamericans' interest in Native territory and labor, on the one hand, and the dispersal of new technologies like horses and guns to American Indian groups, on the other. While at times subject to an enslavement and property status resembling chattel slavery, Native peoples of the Greater Rio Grande often experienced captivities and forced migrations fueled more by the interests of empires and nation-states in their territory and sovereignty than by markets in human labor.

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Introduction: Captives in Unexpected Places

In the fall of 1802, the city council, or *cabildo*, of Havana, Cuba received repeated reports that a gang of runaway slaves was stealing livestock, breaking into homes, and setting fire to fields in the countryside northeast of the capital. Though the council had commissioned militia captain José Gavilan and twenty men to pursue and capture them, this *palenque*, as fugitive slave communities were often known in Spanish America, proved remarkably adept at eluding capture. In October, the governor and captain general of Cuba issued a new order that declared a bounty on the heads of the *palenque*'s leaders, "El Chico" and "El Grande." They were to be brought in dead or alive: 2,500 pesos dead, 3,000 pesos alive. By February of 1803, Captain Gavilan had killed "El Grande," cut off his head, and shipped it to the governor in Havana in a vat of brandy to claim his reward. El Grande's companions, however, remained on the lam.[1]

In a slave society like Cuba, it is not surprising that city council meetings might be occupied with the task of tracking runaway slaves or breaking apart *palenque*s that had set fire to haciendas. Social disorder stoked fears of larger uprisings—especially after the Haitian Revolution—and in the interests of maintaining their slave society, elites moved quickly (and often violently) to quell rumored insurrections and recapture slave runaways. What *is* striking about the Havana council's meetings in 1802 and 1803 is that the *palenque* they described as "of the highest concern" included escaped Apache captives from the North American West. El Grande and El Chico—two Apache men—had joined with runaway slaves of African descent to raid for livestock and pillage

[1] For documents regarding the Apache-led "palenque" and efforts to apprehend escapees see AGI-Cuba 1720, especially "Extracto del sumario formado por D. Joséf Lopez Gavilan comunicado por el S.or Presid.te Governador Capitan General a esta Junta en oficio de 9 de Febrero de 1803." See also AGN-PI, Vol. 238, f. 475.

ranches in the Cuban countryside.[2]

The story of an Apache-led *palenque* raises the central questions of this dissertation. What were American Indian captives from the North American West doing so far from home? What was their experience like in diaspora and how did captors and captives alike understand their social status? How do the fates of such Native captives fit into broader understandings of captivity and slavery in the Americas? This project traces the journeys of hundreds of Native men, women, and children like El Grande and El Chico who between 1500 and 1800 faced capture and exile from homelands in the North American West at the hands of their Spanish and Native neighbors. Though warfare and captive exchange predated the arrival of Europeans to North America, the three centuries following contact witnessed the development of new practices of violence and captivity fueled by Euroamericans' interest in Native territory and labor, on the one hand, and the dispersal of new technologies like horses and guns to American Indian groups, on the other.[3]

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[2] Ibid. For broader context of slavery and slave uprisings in Cuba see Matt Childs, *The 1812 Aponte Rebellion in Cuba and the struggle against Atlantic slavery* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2006). On Haitian Revolution and its implication see Laurent Dubois, *Avengers of the New World: the story of the Haitian Revolution*, 1st ed. (Cambridge Mass.: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2005).

[3] Studies of captivity in the North American West have emphasized continuity rather than change over time. In exploring the latter, I am influenced especially by Christina Snyder, *Slavery in Indian Country: The changing face of captivity in early America* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2010). For alternative approaches see James F. Brooks, *Captives & Cousins: Slavery, Kinship, and Community in the Southwest Borderlands* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2002) and "'This Evil Extends Especially...To the Feminine Sex': Negotiating Captivity in the New Mexico Borderlands," *Feminist Studies* 22, no. 2 (1996): 279-309; Ana Alonso, *Thread of blood : colonialism, revolution and gender in Mexico's Northern Frontier* (Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 1995); Ramón Gutiérrez, *When Jesus came, the Corn Mothers Went Away: Marriage, Sexuality, and Power in New Mexico, 1500-1846* (Stanford Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1991). On diffusion of European technologies see Pekka Hämäläinen, "The Western Comanche Trade Center: Rethinking the Plains Indian Trade System," *Western Historical Quarterly* 29 (Winter 1998): 485-513; "The Rise and Fall of Plains Indian Horse Cultures," *Journal of American History* 90 (December 2003): 833-862; "*The Politics of Grass: European Expansion, Ecological Change, and Indigenous Power In the Southwest Borderlands*," *WMQ* 67, 2 (April 2010), 173-208.

Examining shifting practices of captivity that characterized social relations in the North American West across three centuries could easily be a vast and unmanageable task. Thankfully, other scholars have already begun to cast light on captivity and slavery within the region commonly termed the "Southwest Borderlands." Their efforts have helped fuel a vibrant literature that has begun to fill in a continental portrait of the diverse forms of bondage characteristic of early modern North America. James Brooks' path-breaking *Captives & Cousins,* for example, examines the cross-cultural implications of captive exchange in the New Mexico Borderlands. As captives of war crossed ethnic divides, Brooks reveals, they interlinked individuals and families through relations of kinship, allowing for the exchange of needed resources through a "Borderlands slave system" that made long-term, if often painful, coexistence possible.[4] Historians have now begun to link this portrait of a political economy of captivity to broader regional dynamics of trade and diplomacy. Examining the Great Basin to the north of New Mexico, Ned Blackhawk has revealed the long-distance effects of slave raiding for New Mexican markets on Paiute and other peoples. He has shown how even groups who never saw Europeans were affected by colonialism indirectly as violence "spilled over the land" in waves.[5] Joaquín Rivaya Martínez and Juliana Barr have turned to present-day Texas, showing how the adoption of European technologies by Comanche Indians helped enable, first, their participation in long-distance slave trades and then, in the nineteenth

[4] Brooks' compelling work is what sparked my interest in captivity in the first place. See *Captives & Cousins*, "This Evil Extend Especially," and "Served Well by Plunder: La Gran Ladronería and Producers of History Astride the Rio Grande," *American Quarterly* 52 (Mar. 2000): 23-58.

[5] Ned Blackhawk, *Violence over the Land: Indians and Empires in the early American West*, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2008).

century, the adoption of captive laborers en masse for internal labor needs.[6] As part of broader studies of Spanish colonialism in neighboring areas to the south, Chantal Craumessel and Susan Deeds have addressed the recruitment of Native captives as laborers in Nueva Vizcaya and its surroundings. Craumessel's work in particular has shed new light on the demographics of Indian slavery there and its relationship to broader Spanish strategies of labor recruitment and coercion.[7]

This renewed scholarly interest in captivity and Indian slavery transcends the North American West or "Southwest Borderlands." Alan Gallay's *The Indian Slave Trade* examines the links between slave trading, diplomacy, and the rise of the English empire in the Southeast, for example. His work casts attention on the surprising demographic significance of Indian enslavement, the export of thousands of Native slaves from Charleston to the Caribbean, and the ways in which the commodification of war captives benefitted some Native groups at a devastating cost to others. Much as Brooks' *Captives & Cousins* served as a foundation for new inquiries into captivity in the Southwest, Gallay's work has sparked exciting new studies of Indian slavery in the Southeast.[8] Cristina Snyder has recently taken up the question of how contact with Europeans and enslaved Africans shifted Native practices of captivity over time. Through deft use of both archaeological and historical evidence, she reveals important changes in

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[6] Joaquín Rivaya-Martínez, "Captivity and Adoption Among the Comanche Indians" (Ph.D. Dissertation, University of California-Los Angeles, 2006); Juliana Barr, *Peace came in the form of a woman : Indians and Spaniards in the Texas borderlands* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2007), and "From Captives to Slaves: Commodifying Indian Women in the Borderlands," *Journal of American History* 92, no. 1 (June 2005): 19-46.

[7] Susan Deeds, *Defiance and Deference in Mexico's colonial North: Indians under Spanish rule in Nueva Vizcaya* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 2003); Chantal Craumessel, *Poblar la frontera: La provincia de Santa Bárbara en Nueva Vizcaya durante los siglos XVI y XVII* (Zamora, Michoacan, Mexico: El Colegio de Michoacán, 2006).

[8] Alan Gallay, *The Indian Slave Trade: The Rise of the English Empire in the American South, 1670-1717* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2002). See also Gallay, ed., *Indian slavery in colonial America* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2009).

practices of captivity from pre-contact chiefdoms, through the Indian slave trade to Carolina, to the rise of plantation slavery among some Southeastern Native peoples.[9] Paul Kelton, like Ned Blackhawk, has focused on the relationship between colonialism, captivity, and social change. Challenging the notion that disease devastated Native peoples in advance of sustained contact with Europeans, Kelton has instead shown how it was the intimate contact produced by Indian slave trades that fueled the worst demographic losses.[10]

This dissertation builds upon this literature in three key respects. First, as its title suggests, the project foregrounds an examination of captive experience, of "captive fates." In part because of the challenges of source material, scholars to-date have shed more light on "slaving" and "slave-trading" than on the experience of Native captivity or slavery itself. Deepening our understanding of how captors and captives alike understood their circumstances will help us better place Indian captivity within the broader practices of coerced labor and slavery that characterized New World societies.[11]

Secondly, it examines the long-distance connections that practices of violence, colonialism, and trade forged between the Southwest Borderlands and the wider world. While scholars have often referenced the circulation of Native captives south into New Spain or to the Caribbean, they have rarely pursued these connections through sustained research. Culminating especially in the final chapter, which examines the experience of

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[9] Snyder, *Slavery in Indian Country*.

[10] Paul Kelton, *Epidemics and Enslavement : Biological Catastrophe in the Native Southeast, 1492-1715* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2007).

[11] I thank James Sidbury for his insights into the distinction between "slavery" and "slaving." I am referring in particular here to long-distance captive trades, where scholars have revealed much about transport and exchange but been able to speak less to what ultimately happened to captives when they arrived at their destinations. See, for example, Brett Rushforth, "'A Little Flesh We Offer You': The Origins of Indian Slavery in New France," *William & Mary Quarterly* 60 (2003): 777-808; Gallay, *The Indian Slave Trade*. Spanish archival records appear to provide more insight into this question than the records of other colonial powers.

Apaches like El Grande and El Chico who ended up in Havana, Cuba, this dissertation uncovers as much as possible what happened to captives in diaspora and why. Attention to such long-distance connections maps the surprisingly significant incursions of imperial interests and the global economy into a region that has often been posited as somewhat isolated.[12]

Thirdly, I show how such incursions affected change over time in practices of violence, captivity, and slavery in the Southwest Borderlands, as in the North American Southeast. It was those areas most affected by empires and the globalizing economy that witnessed the greatest innovation in practices of captivity and slavery. South of the present-day U.S.-Mexico border in the Spanish kingdoms of Nueva Vizcaya and Nuevo Leon, for example, alternatives to "slavery" for Indian captives had emerged by the eighteenth century. Spaniards and their Native allies began to exile "enemy Indian" captives more systematically than ever before, as they transported more than 3,000 Native captives from regions straddling the Rio Grande to New Spain and the Caribbean between 1770 and 1810 alone. Casting light on this history reveals a mosaic of captivity and forced migration practices that warns against a homogenous conception of what Indian "slavery" was like in early North America.[13]

The contributions of this project build out of its distinct methodological approach. On the one hand, the dissertation is a study of captivity in a specific region, what I call the "Greater Rio Grande." Apaches or Spaniards in the 17th century

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[12] For references to captives being sent to Mexico and the Caribbean in studies focused on other issues See David J. Weber *Bárbaros: Spaniards and their Savages in the Age of Enlightenment* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2005), 150; Hämäläinen, *Comanche Empire*, 78; Barr, *Peace Came in the Form of a Woman*, 189; Alonso, *Threads of Blood,* 37-39.

[13] Juliana Barr makes a similar point about the multiplicities of captivity practices in the North American West in "Captives to Slaves." More than to emphasize diversity, however, my aim below is to identify broader themes and patterns that provides points of comparison to other North American contexts.

recognized the mountains, valleys, and waterways of the Rio Grande River Basin as a territorial mosaic divided between "their lands" and "ours." If the term is my own, I argue that because water was so essential to mobility and survival, the Rio Grande River Basin did interlink groups in ways that warrant analyzing it as a coherent region. Moreover, the concept of the "Greater Rio Grande" allows for an integrated analysis of terrain that is often artificially separated in historical inquiry. Scholars of "Southwest Borderlands" history, due in part to the links of this field to early U.S. history, have focused primarily on present-day California, New Mexico, and Texas. Scholars of Latin American history, in turn, have focused most on the region south of the modern border—present-day Sonora, Chihuahua, Coahuila, or Nuevo Leon, for example. Though both fields recognize that this division makes little sense in the period before the border was formed in 1848, work remains to be done to understand the relationships between Natives, Euroamericans, and Africans that cut across this traditional historiographical divide.[14]

[14] These two literatures have pursued distinct thematic interests as well. Much of the recent ethnohistorical work on Texas, for example, has been shaped by an interest in narratives that challenge the traditional view of the conquest and decline of Native populations and instead emphasize Native dominance and power. See Hämäläinen's *Comanche Empire*, Barr's *Peace Came in the Form of a Woman* and Gary Clayton Anderson, *The Indian Southwest, 1580-1830: Ethnogenesis and Reinvention* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1999). For an important exception see Maria Wade, *The Native Americans of the Texas Edwards Plateau, 1582-1799* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 2003). Latin Americanists have been less interested in spheres of Native dominance, but rather the relationship between missionization, labor, and landscape. See for example, Deeds, *Defiance and* Deference, Cramaussel, *Poblar la frontera,* and Cynthia Radding, *Wandering Peoples: Colonialism, Ethnic Spaces, and Ecological Frontiers in Northwestern Mexico, 1700-1850* (Durham: Duke University Press, 1997).

Map 1: Rio Grande River Basin[15]

Within this spatial focus on the Greater Rio Grande, my analysis hones in on the relationship between migratory Indian peoples and their neighbors, Hispanic, African, and Native alike. I pay particular attention to Athapaskan-speaking groups that came to be known by Euroamerican outsiders as "Apaches," though they referred to themselves as "Tinde," "Nde," or other variants of their term for "the people." Though Apaches are mentioned in almost every study of the North American West, their history before 1800 remains understudied, in part because of their diversity, lack of pan-tribal identity, and mobility. The proliferation of Spanish ethnic ascriptions—with new designations

[15] Map sourced from <http://www.riogrande-riobravo.org/Map/riograndemap.html> (Accessed by Author, 28 April 2011).

emerging and then disappearing sometimes within only a few years—has raised particular difficulties for historians to make sense of who "Apaches" were and their historical significance. Some scholars have gone as far as to suggest that "Apache" was more of a Spanish synonym for enemy than a referent to actual Indians. If the diversity and multiplicity of Athapaskan-speaking groups strains the meaning of the overarching category of "Apache" or "Apachean," I argue that these diverse groups warrant collective analysis precisely because their mobility, dispersal, and divisions helped make them such frequent targets for capture and enslavement. Though Apachean groups also took captives of their own—as I will demonstrate—their capture and enslavement by others was more important between 1500 and 1800.[16]

Map 2: General Location of Apachean Groups in the pre-1800 Southwest[17]

[16] Though historically Spaniards sometimes included Navajos among "Apache" groups, they became increasingly differentiated over time as they developed a pastoral lifestyle and I thus exclude them from the category "Apachean" in this analysis. I focus in particular on those Athapaskan-speaking groups that dwelled historically in territories in or adjacent to the Rio Grande River Basin, especially Jicarilla Apaches, Mescalero Apaches, and Chiricahua Apaches. On the diversity of Apache groups and their cultural traditions see relevant entries in Alfonso Ortiz, ed., *Handbook of North American Indians*, Volume 10 (Washington: Smithsonian Institution, 1978). For "Apache" as synonym for enemy see Sara Ortelli, *Trama de Una Guera Conveniente: Nueva Vizcaya y la sombra de los apaches, 1748-1790* (Mexico, D.F.: El Colegio de Mexico, Centro de Estudios Históricos, 2007).

[17] Map from Richard J. Perry, *Apache Reservation: Indigenous Peoples and the American State* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1993), 19.

A word on terminology is in order. I use the term "captive" below to refer broadly to detained outsiders. If Apachean groups do not appear to have developed distinct terms for "captivity" and "slavery," Spaniards elaborated multiple categories for detained persons and forced laborers that shifted over time. For them, a "*cautivo*" was a Christian person detained among pagans or infidels, while the terms "*prisionero*" and "*pieza*"—literally "piece" or "coin"—referred to "heathen" Indians captured during warfare. Especially in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, Spaniards commonly identified these "*piezas*" after sale as "*esclavos*" or "slaves," and residents attested to their possession of Indian slaves in legal documents like titles and wills. Over time, other terms came into existence to reflect shifts in the official legal status of Native *piezas*, especially the term "*criado*," meaning literally "one who is raised up." This term reflected the idea that through labor and the watchful care of one's captor, heathen Indians could be turned into productive, and "free," Christian subjects.[18]

The analytical category of "captivity" is useful because it allows for a consideration of Spaniards' shifting conceptions of Native status without privileging their understandings over those of detained Indians who likely saw their circumstances differently. Moreover, because it is a broad term that does not assume property status or forced labor, "captivity" allows for analysis of a variety of fates for detained Natives that often did not involve labor as the chattel of a single master, but rather long-term imprisonment, assignment to public works projects, escape, or death. While some historians have cast aside Spanish terminology as "euphemism" that sought to evade

[18] Dorothy Bray, White Mountain Apache Tribe., *Western Apache-English dictionary: A Community-Generated Bilingual Dictionary* (Tempe Ariz.: Bilingual Press, 1998); On Apache captivity practices see also Grenville Goodwin, *Western Apache Raiding and Warfare* (Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 1971). On Spanish terminology see especially Chapters 1 and 2 below and Alonso, *Thread of Blood*; Brooks, *Captives & Cousins*, especially 6-7.

shifting imperial views on the propriety of Indian slavery, I believe this issue warrants further attention. If sparked by legal concerns, over time distinct categories for Native captives may have "stuck," helping to fuel distinct fates for Indians captured in warfare and further engrain the association of "slavery" with African descent.[19]

If a focus on the Greater Rio Grande, captivity, and migratory Native peoples sets the general bounds of inquiry, I argue that the history of the Rio Grande cannot be understood without considering migrations and processes that extended far beyond it. In fact, movement is at the heart of this dissertation, posing both analytical challenges and the potential for new historical insights. In this regard, my guiding methodology is simple: I have endeavored to trace the subjects of my study, Native captives from the Greater Rio Grande, to wherever they might lead me—across gray areas of social status and geopolitical boundaries that still shape (and sometimes constrain) our historical inquiries.[20]

The primary source material for this study reflects this attention to long-distance movement and interconnection. For the long-distance transport of Native captive I have drawn especially upon newly available documents in the Mexican National Archives in Mexico City as well as the Cuban papers in the Archive of the Indies in Seville, Spain. For the local dynamics of interethnic social relations, I have relied upon regional archives like the Spanish Archives of New Mexico, the Parral Archives, the Presidio of Janos

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[19] On Spanish terminology as euphemism see Marc Simmons quoted in Gutierrez, *When Jesus Came*, 155. James Brooks similarly implies that Spanish descriptions of captive trading as "*rescate*" or "redemption" might be understood as an "artifice" see *Captives & Cousins,* 125.

[20] I am influenced here by the transnational methodologies of Atlantic and global history. As Thomas Bender has explained: "Again and again, we see that if one is willing to cross inherited historiographical boundaries, one's topic often extends beyond them. The point is not to begin with the global, it is only to allow it." See Bender in Jorge Cañizares and Erik R. Seeman, eds., *The Atlantic in Global History* (Upper Saddle River, NJ: Pearson Prentice Hall, 2007), xvii.

records, and the records of the *Provincias Internas*, either via the original manuscripts or microfilm copies. I was particularly surprised by the frequency with which I found testimony from Native captives themselves, especially in Spanish court records and investigations, which help shed some (admittedly refracted) light onto how they understood their circumstances. In the very least, Native testimony often provided me with especially descriptive detail about the nature of household relations and the logistics of captivity and transport.[21]

I present my findings in chapters organized into two roughly chronological sections, each of which identifies and examines a distinct era of captivity in the Greater Rio Grande. Part One, "Markets in Indian Slaves," considers the slave trades that developed after the arrival of the Spanish in the region in the mid-1500s. Native groups had long engaged in warfare, taken captives, and made decisions about what to do with these captives—varying from ritualized killing to adoption as kin. But Euroamerican settlement, and the close proximity of newly discovered silver mines central to imperial interests, produced new demand for labor and turned captives of war into valuable commodities.

Chapter 1, "Borderlands of Slavery," examines the ways in which pre-contact practices of captive exchange intertwined with Spanish labor demands to produce a trade in Apache captives from present-day New Mexico to urban centers in colonial Mexico in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. Challenging the "tension" scholars have posited between restrictions on Indian enslavement in the New Laws of 1542 and the widespread practice of slavery on colonial frontiers, I show how royal decrees and orders continued

[21] By "refracted" I mean the mediation of scribes and interpreters. In my critical approach to interpreting such narratives I draw especially from Irene Silverblatt, *Modern Inquisitions: Peru and the Colonial Origins of the Civilized World* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2004).

to allow clear exceptions to the slavery prohibition well into the seventeenth century, buttressing long-distance trades in Native captives throughout Spanish America. Rather than a "tension," the relationship between local and imperial views of Indian slavery is best seen as an ongoing negotiation between official decrees, customary practices, and local concerns of governance.

Chapter 2, "The Infamous Traffic," shows how slavery and forced migration were of course not solely Spanish or Euroamerican practices. As Comanches overran Apache villages in present-day Colorado and Texas, they carried captives of war to trading fairs in New Mexico and the Louisiana borderlands. The value of Apachean captives acquired during the early 1700s fueled further Comanche expansion by providing access to horses and guns that helped them establish a vast trading complex in the South Plains over the course of the eighteenth century, displacing many of the region's former inhabitants—and especially Apachean groups—in the process. I argue that Spaniards' continued willingness to participate in Apache captive trades reflected the limits of Spanish jurisdiction and sovereignty in an increasingly Comanche-dominated world north and east of the Rio Grande, more than a voracious demand for slave labor within colonial New Mexican society. The slave trade and Comanche power went hand in hand, as Comanches offered up Apache captives to Spanish and French buyers, demanding and receiving the horses and guns that gave them the decisive advantage over competitors as they gained control over much of the plains between New Mexico and Louisiana by mid-century.

While markets in Indian slaves were significant in the Greater Rio Grande, they were not universal or unchanging. The second part of the dissertation, "When Indians

Were Not Enslaved," considers why alternatives to Indian enslavement emerged amidst Native challenges to Spanish sovereignty and renewed efforts to expand the empire territorially in the late-seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. After the Pueblo Revolt successfully expelled Spaniards from New Mexico between 1680 and 1692, and Native rebellions flared south of the Rio Grande as well, some Spanish governors and residents of the region argued that residents should not auction or enslave Indian captives as they had in the past, but instead exile them to places from which they could never return.

Chapter 3, "To Islands Overseas," pursues a case study of one such context in which a coalition of migratory Indian groups that Spaniards had sometimes enslaved in the past—the "Tobosos"—faced alternatives fates to enslavement. The capture and exile of Toboso groups emerged not to fulfill market demand for slave labor, but rather as an attempt to achieve security and sovereignty in a region that remained highly contested in the late-1600s and early-1700s. As Tobosos combined talk of "peace" and "obedience to his majesty" with raids of Spanish settlements and participation in Nativist rebellions that swept across the region in the 1680s and 1690s, Spanish residents and their governors explained that such mobile Indians impeded the progress of Nueva Vizcaya and threatened its "ruin" and "depopulation." They argued that removing Natives "to islands overseas" thus represented the only means to bring lasting peace and prosperity to their contested kingdom. If new legal restrictions on Indian enslavement may have played a role in this decision, the central impetus was not imperial but local, as persistent interethnic violence had convinced some Nueva Vizcayans that traditional means of interacting with Natives, including enslavement, would be fruitless. Several hundred captives were in fact exiled in the 1720s to Mexico City and the Caribbean. Civil officials

distributed them at no cost to residents, other than solemn promises to feed and clothe them, Christianize them, and treat them well. This history served as a precedent for later forced migrations of Apache captives to the Caribbean.

Chapter 4, "Intimate Enemies," brings Apachean groups back to the foreground of analysis in order to examine their efforts to escape violence and captivity in-between the Comanche and the Spanish, and adapt through mobility, diplomacy, and armed struggle of their own in the eighteenth century. Challenging the notion that Apache migrants initiated devastating raids in Nueva Vizcaya and Coahuila after midcentury, the chapter highlights relatively peaceful trade between Apaches and mission Indian communities along the Rio Grande and areas to the south in Nueva Vizcaya and Coahuila through the 1760s. It was only after some royal officials chose to target Apache groups for participation in what was in fact a multi-ethnic livestock rustling economy that reciprocal violence escalated, and residents of the Greater Rio Grande faced the age-old question of what fate war captives should receive.

Chapter 5, "To Put the Sea In-Between," explains how Spaniards drew upon a now well-established custom in choosing to displace hundreds of Apache captives from the Rio Grande to central Mexico and the Caribbean between 1770 and 1816. It highlights how—ironically—captives' harrowing resistance to forced migration fueled Spanish decisions to send them ever farther away, as Apaches threw themselves to the ground and refused to march, escaped and returned north to homelands in the Rio Grande, and even jumped into the sea before being embarked to Cuba. As one Spanish official put it, experience led them to the conclusion that the only sure solution was to "put the sea between" Apaches and their homelands. As the case of an Apache *palenque*

in Cuba reveals, however, even this solution proved far from sure. This analysis highlights both change and continuity over time in the fate of Native captives exiled from the Greater Rio Grande. If New Mexican merchants had once carried them south to New Spain to sell for significant sums, now Spanish administrators directed the capture and transport of Apaches and issued regulations for how they should be housed en route, what they should be fed, and where they should be taken. If such fates stretch conventional understandings of "slavery," slavery may have remained an important category through which individuals understood Apache labor in certain contexts. In a slave society like Cuba, for instance, residents drew upon familiar referents in petitioning to receive an Apache "slave" or by recording their deaths and baptisms in the ledgers of "*pardos* and *negros*."

The dissertation concludes with an epilogue that considers what the mass exile of Apaches and neighboring groups meant for kin left behind in the Greater Rio Grande. Attention to the ubiquitous displacements of the late-1700s and early-1800s provides an essential context for understanding the emergence of peace agreements between some Hispanic and Native groups at the end of the colonial period. As Apaches witnessed men, women, and children being sent into exile, and as Spanish military officers threatened to send away their imprisoned kin if they did not agree to lay down their arms, some chose to enter into alliance with Spaniards and aid them in military campaigns against other Apachean groups. By tracing the story of one Apache man who lived through these years, the analysis concludes by highlighting the diversity of captivity and forced migration practices that continued to characterize life in the Greater Rio Grande at the dawn of the nineteenth century.

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The startling image of an Apache *palenque* in the Cuban countryside provides an entryway onto a much broader history. From enslaved war captives sent from Mexico to the Caribbean for auction in the sixteenth century, to "prisoners of war" exiled from the Greater Rio Grande in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, Native captives like El Chico and El Grande appear in the chapters below in unexpected places and circumstances. While at times subject to an enslavement and property status resembling chattel slavery, the Native peoples of the Rio Grande often experienced captivities and forced migrations generated more by the interests of empires and nation-states in their territory and sovereignty than by markets in human labor. Uncovering these dynamics of captivity and their effects on Apachean groups and their neighbors serves to better integrate American Indian and Borderlands histories into central narratives of colonial North American scholarship. As long as the presence of Indians beyond the borderlands and frontiers of early America remains startling or unexpected in its own right, work on this front remains to be done.[22]

[22] On the continued project of integrating Native peoples into the central narratives of American history I draw from Philip Deloria, *Indians in Unexpected Places* (Lawrence: University of Kansas Press, 2006) See also Daniel Richter, *Facing east from Indian country a Native history of early America* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press,, 2003) and Blackhawk, *Violence Over the Land*.

PART ONE

Markets in Indian Slaves

Map 3: New Spain and the Greater Rio Grande (Arrows Signal Captive Trade Routes)[23]

[23] Map adapted from <http://www.csub.edu/~jreyna/maps.htm> (Accessed by Author 28 April 2011). I use this map with reservation, as it should be noted that it includes Spanish settlements that had not yet been established before the eighteenth century.

Chapter 1
Borderlands of Slavery: American Indian Captivity in the Greater Rio Grande in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries

In 1672, the president of the *audiencia*, or high court, of Guadalajara wrote to the Spanish monarch to complain that residents of his jurisdiction traded in Indian slaves. "The enslavement of Indians is very common in these provinces," he noted, "especially for Chichimecas, Sinaloas, and Indians from New Mexico." Such slave trading, in his opinion, flew in the face of the sovereign's wishes, as "nothing has been more prohibited since the beginning of the conquest…than Indian slavery." Given recent news from across the empire, this report regarding Northern New Spain may have hit a particularly raw nerve with the Spanish crown. Whether responding to concerns about Native captives bought and sold in public auctions in Nuevo Leon, transported by the dozens from New Mexico to New Spain, or held in service against their will in Venezuela and Chile, Queen-regent Mariana directed a series of *cedulas* across the Atlantic in the early 1670s that sought to reform the practices of her subjects and liberate Indians and "Chinos" alike from slavery. Officials who did not comply with these orders faced permanent banishment from the Indies, and a fine of up to 2,000 pesos.[24]

Forty years later, Indian "liberty" was still not a universally accepted principal,

[24] For royal decrees or orders prohibiting slavery for indigenous groups in both the Americas and the Phillipines in the 1660s and 1670s, see AGN-Reales Cedulas Vol. D30, Expedientes 14, 45, and 1309 [hereafter cited as AGN, RC, Vol. #, Exp. #]; Richard Konetzke, *Colección de Documentos para la Historia de la Formación Social de Hispanoamérica, Volumen II, Segundo Tomo, 1660-1690* (Madrid: Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Cientificas, 1953), 492-3, 497, 591-593, 597, 612 [Hereafter cited as Konetzke, *Colección*, Vol. #, p. #]. Quote from president of the *audiencia*, or high appeals court, of Guadalajara is from a letter to the King dated 20 March 1672, in Archivo General de Indias, Seville, Spain, Ramo Guadalajara, Leg. 12: "No hay cosa más prohibida desde el principio de la conquista de las Indias que la esclavitud de los indios que sin embargo en estas provincias es muy frecuente el venderlos y tenerlos por esclavos, especialmente a los indios chichimecas, sinaloas y los del Nuevo México y del Nuevo Reino de León." I was pointed to this letter by a citation in Chantal Craumessel, *Poblar la frontera: La provincia de Santa Bárbara en Nueva Vizcaya durante los siglos XVI y XVII* (Zamora, Michoacan, Mexico: El Colegio de Michoacán, 2006), 187.

however. In 1714, Governor Flores Mogollón called for the baptism of Apache captives sent to "distinct parts" from the kingdom of New Mexico. He explained that this order was rooted in his experience in the ports of the West Indies, where priests boarded vessels to baptize African slaves before they disembarked them for sale. Fearing for the eternal well being of Indian children that might die en route to their destinations, the governor argued that since Christianization was the reason the King "tolerated" the trade in Native captives, New Mexicans should draw upon the example of the trans-Atlantic slave trade and baptize Apaches. "The Reverend Fathers should do to them as is practiced and I have seen done in the seaports with the loads of Negros," he reiterated, and mandated that public criers make his order heard "in all the Jurisdictions of this Kingdom."[25]

Such contradictory understandings of Indian captivity beg for explanation. On the one hand, scholars have long noted a tension between slavery prohibitions in the Spanish empire after the early sixteenth century and the common practice of enslaving Natives captives on colonial frontiers like New Mexico. The "persistence" of Indian slavery despite legal prohibition has been explained as a uniquely "frontier" phenomenon that reflected ongoing wars with Native groups and the relative weakness of royal authority far from colonial centers. In this analysis, Governor Mogollón's order might be understood as illustrating the *audiencia* judge's earlier lament: Indian slavery was "very common," despite the fact that "nothing was more prohibited."[26]

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[25] Order of Governor Flores Mogollón, 26 September 1714 in Spanish Archives of New Mexico, microfilm copy on file at the Benson Latin American Collection, Austin, Texas, Reel 4, frame 1102-1106. This order is also transcribed in David M. Brugge, *Navajos in the Catholic Church Records of New Mexico, 1694-1875* (Window Rock, Navajo Nation: Research Section, Parks and Recreation Department, The Navajo Tribe, 1968), xx.

[26] On the tension between legal prohibition and social practice, see especially Rick Hendricks and Gerald

By contextualizing Indian slavery in the sixteenth and seventeenth century Greater Rio Grande within the broader Iberian Atlantic World, this chapter questions the tension that scholars have often posited between the illegality of Indian slavery and its practice. As recent scholarship in early modern legal history has highlighted, placing social customs in opposition to royal decrees and orders reflects a somewhat anachronistic conception of the "law." "*Derecho*," or justice, was pursued through negotiation between formal legal decrees, long-standing social customs, and local concerns of governance. In this vein, Mogollon's 1714 order is illustrative. It is striking that he cast himself as the agent of royal will, and in a public decree that could easily have come to the attention of metropolitan authorities, he stressed the king's "toleration" rather than prohibition of a trade in Indian captives. Mogollón believed that the king shared his understanding that it was preferable for Natives to be baptized and sold into forced labor in exile, rather than retain their liberty among kin and face eternal damnation. The "eternal" concerns of the soul, in other words, overrode the "temporal" concerns of the present-life.[27] In fact, as this chapter will illustrate, the Spanish crown

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Mandell, "The Apache Slave Trade in Parral, 1637-1679," *The Journal of Big Bend Studies*, 16 (2004): 59-81. For others works that conceptualize the "persistence" of Indian slavery in the North American West as reflecting distance from metropolitan authorities see Susan M. Deeds, "Rural Work in Nueva Vizcaya: Forms of Labor Coercion on the Periphery," *The Hispanic American Historical Review* 69, 3 (Aug. 1989), 425-449; José Cuello, "The Persistence of Indian Slavery and Encomienda in the Northeast of Colonial Mexico, 1577-1723," *Journal of Social History,* 21, 4 (Summer 1988), p. 683-700; James F. Brooks, *Captives & Cousins: Slavery, Kinship, and Community in the Southwest Borderlands* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press 2002).

[27] Order of Governor Flores Mogollón, 26 September 1714 in Spanish Archives of New Mexico, microfilm copy on file at the Benson Latin American Collection, Austin, Texas, Reel 4, frame 1102-1106; On Spanish ideologies of slavery I am influenced here by Malcolm K. Read, "From Feudalism to Capitalism: Ideologies of Slavery in the Spanish American Empire," *Hispanic Research Journal* 4, no. 2 (June 2003): 151-171. On the legal history of Northern New Spain, and the litigiousness of early modern peoples more broadly see Charles R. Cutter, *The Legal Culture of Northern New Spain, 1700-1810* (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1995); Lauren Benton, *A Search For Sovereignty: Law and Geography in European Empires, 1400-1900* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009) and *Law and Colonial Cultures: Legal Regimes in World History, 1400-1900* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002); Brian P. Owensby, *Empire of Law and Indian Justice in Colonial Mexico* (Stanford: Stanford University

commonly sanctioned the enslavement of particular Native groups in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries: those taken in "just war," purchased from other Indians, or sentenced for criminal or rebellious acts. In other words, the *audiencia* of Guadalajara and the governor of New Mexico were both correct in their own way: prohibitions against the mass enslavement of Indians and "toleration" for enslaving particular Native groups had coexisted since Columbus's arrival in the Caribbean in 1492.[28]

Attention to such legal pluralism in the context of Native enslavement helps explain why Indian captive trades in sixteenth and seventeenth century New Spain were far from clandestine, as individuals drew upon legal practices like titles, transfers, bills of sale, and wills to secure sizeable investments in Native servants and slaves. In fact, Indian and African captivity intersected in households from Northern New Spain to Mexico City, where even the viceroy and his wife entered into a dispute over Apache and Plains Indian captives in the 1660s. The long-distance circulation of Native captives was not unique to New Spain either, as similar trades developed in the Caribbean, Venezuela, Argentina, Chile, and elsewhere.[29]

While Indian captivity was a significant practice throughout Spanish America during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, Spaniards explained the status of Natives

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Press, 2008); Christopher Albi, "Contested Legalities in Colonial Mexico: Francisco Xavier Gamboa and the Defense of Derecho Indiano," (Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Texas at Austin, 2009).

[28] For a chronological overview of Indian slavery in colonial Mexico see Silvio Zavala, *Los Esclavos Indios en La Nueva España* (Mexico City: Colegio Nacional Luis González Obregón, 1967).

[29] Recent studies addressing the circulation of captives in the North American West have not paid significant attention to legal practices within the Spanish colonial sphere, in part reflecting their focus on the exchange of captives between Native groups and Hispanic residents on the periphery of colonial settlement. See James F. Brooks "'This Evil Extends Especially...To the Feminine Sex': Negotiating Captivity in the New Mexico Borderlands" *Feminist Studies* 22, 2 (1996): 279-309 and *Captives & Cousins*; Juliana Barr, "From Captives to Slaves: Commodifying Indian Women in the Borderlands," *Journal of American History* 92, 1 (June 2005); Joaquín Rivaya-Martínez "Captivity and Adoption Among the Comanche Indians, 1700-1875," (Ph.D. dissertation, University of California Los Angeles, 2006). For long-distance captive trades elsewhere in Spanish America see Konetzke, Colección, Vols. 1-2.

differently over time. During early colonization, the legal status of "slavery" was ascribed similarly to both African and Native captives: it was a life-long condition that individuals passed on to their descendants. By the seventeenth century, however, Indian "slavery" had become a legally "temporal" condition, usually a ten to twenty year-term of servitude that individuals purchased with the understanding that Native captives would be emancipated at the end of the term. After 1670, Indian enslavement became more restricted than ever before as "slavery" became almost exclusively the status of captives of African descent.[30]

While taking such legal shifts seriously, this chapter aims to understand how shifting Spanish understandings of "slavery" influenced the lives of Native captives over time. To what extent, for example, did the divergence in legal statuses for Natives and Africans translate into distinct experiences of captivity? In this regard, the evidence is mixed. Emancipated Indian slaves often remained in the same households as before, and life experiences often depended more on the individuality of masters than on the legal status of laborers. At the same time, however, legal changes had the power to disrupt the economics of slave markets, as questions about legal status made buyers unwilling to pay the sizeable sums they had in the past for Indian captives. Perhaps most importantly, "liberty" clearly mattered to those Natives who gained enough knowledge of the law to petition for their freedom, even if the range of choices available to them as "free"

[30] On the intellectual history of slavery in the Iberian Atlantic, and in colonial Mexico more specifically, see María Elena Martínez, "The Black Blood of New Spain: *Limpieza de Sangre*, Racial Violence, and Gendered Power in Early Colonial Mexico," *The William and Mary Quarterly,* 61, 3 (July 2004); Anthony Pagden, *The Fall of Natural Man: The American Indian and the Origins of Comparative Ethnology* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982), and Herman L. Bennett, *Africans in Colonial Mexico: Absolutism, Christianity, and Afro-Creole Consciousness, 1570-1640* (Bloomington, Ind.: University of Indiana Press, 2003); Zavala, *Los Esclavos Indios*.

laborers in colonial society remained circumscribed.[31]

The Law of Indian Slavery

In his classic study of the incorporation of Aztecs under Spanish rule, Charles Gibson suggested that significant changes in Mexican history "rarely occurred as a consequence of law." As he saw it, law represented "an approximation of historical happening, or a commentary upon it." In the case of Indian slavery, an analysis of the outpouring of royal decrees and trans-Atlantic correspondence from early Spanish colonization through the mid-seventeenth century serves twin purposes. First, legal discussions cast light on Spanish ideologies of slavery and the common acceptance of Native enslavement by the Crown and its subjects for particular indigenous groups. Second, such discussions often also reveal historical practice and illustrate how qualified legal sanctions facilitated the enslavement of Natives in the years after early colonization, whether in Northern New Spain and the Greater Rio Grande or within the wider Iberian Atlantic World.[32]

Declarations of Indian liberty and slavery coexisted from early colonization. Less than ten years after Columbus arrived in the West Indies in 1492, Queen Isabella and King Ferdinand had formally approved “liberty” for Indians. Echoing this sentiment, Charles V affirmed in 1520 that "the Indians [are] free, ought to be treated as such, and

[31] I am suggesting here the need for further research on the ways that captors and captives understood their own circumstances, motivations, and intentions in the colonial North American West. While trans-historical definitions of slavery are useful for comparative purposes, we must be careful that theory not supplant the particularities of distinct contexts. For a useful example of a historically grounded approach to “liberty” as a concept in eighteenth century New Spain, see Ownesby, *Empire of Law and Indian Justice*.

[32] Charles Gibson, *The Aztecs under Spanish rule: a history of the Indians of the Valley of Mexico* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1964), 235.

induced to accept Christianity by the methods Christ had established."[33] In the early-1500s, however, Natives were in fact taken as slaves in large numbers, circulated on the mainland and in the Caribbean, and even transported back to Iberia. One cleric on Hispaniola, for example, explained the he often saw boat captains disembarking "great quantities" of Indian slaves transported from New Spain and Panuco. These slaves carried the royal brand and Spaniards "sold them publicly." In 1536, the Queen explained that "many people passed from the Indies to Spain carrying Indians." She lamented that even those that were not slaves, were sold as such. If such practices occasionally represented subversions of the law, they more often reflected the fact that royal officials declared the liberty of Indians while simultaneously carving out distinctions between Native groups and granting slaves to reward the actions of loyal subjects. Thus Charles V might have qualified his statement that "the Indians [are] free," by explaining that those who resisted Spanish authority, did not listen attentively to the friars, or were among especially "barbarous" nations, might be (and were in fact) enslaved.[34]

Three key traditions shaped Spaniards' early practices of slavery in the Americas. First, drawing lines of religious difference, they took slaves on the basis of Just War against infidel peoples. This first principle was tied to conquest, as Natives who refused to accept Christianity or pledge obedience to the Catholic monarch—as mandated in the famous *requerimiento*—were subject to enslavement. Secondly, drawing especially upon

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[33] Lewis Hanke, All Mankind is One: A Study of the Disputation between Bartolomé de las Casas and Juan Gines de Sepulveda in 1550 on the Intellectual and Religious Capacity of the American Indians (Dekalb, Il.: Northern Illinois University Press, 1994), 11.

[34] On Indians in Iberia and the Queen's declaration see Kontezke, *Colección*, Vol. 1, 46: "muchas personas que pasaban de las Indias a España llevaban indios y no siendo sus esclavos los vendían como si lo fuesen." See also Zavala, *Los Esclavos Indios*, 47. Regarding importation of slaves to Caribbean: See Zavala, *Los Esclavos Indios*, 108. Luis de Morales (clerigo) noted that "estando en la isla Española vio venir muchas veces gran cantidad de indios por esclavos en naviós procedentes de Nueva España y de Pánuco, entre otras partes; los indios se vendían públicamente, herrados con el hierro del rey."

past relations with Muslims in Iberia, Castilians justified the "*rescate*," or "redemption," of slaves held by infidels or pagans as a means to save them from eternal damnation and to instruct them in Catholicism. This custom proved crucial to Spanish participation in Native trading fairs, where they might "redeem" the heathen slaves brought by Indians to sell to them. Finally, it was generally accepted that criminals, "apostates" or "rebels" might be enslaved as punishment for their actions against God and King. In fact, enslavement under these circumstances was understood as a sign of the benevolence of the monarch, a commutation of the sentence of death that these actions warranted. This motive became more influential as time passed and some Natives appeared to have rejected the opportunity to accept the gospel and pledge obedience to the Catholic monarch, or persisted in their "idolatry" or mobile ways of life.[35]

The way early modern Spaniards categorized Native groups illuminates practices of enslavement. Ethnic ascriptions like "Carib," "Chichimeco," and later "Apache" were amorphous designations that reflected Spanish perceptions of the cultural traits and character of a given group more than the self-designation or "identity" of particular Native men or women. The distinction between bellicose Natives and allegedly "meek" Indians receptive to Catholic instruction also buttressed distinctions between "free" and "slave" Indians. In 1511, for example, King Ferdinand issued two cedulas regarding the enslavement of Natives in the Caribbean. The first sought to stem what he perceived to be early abuses in the enslavement of peaceful Natives. The second distinguished between the Indians who had listened to the friars who had preached to them about "our Catholic

[35] For a rich primary source explication of these justifications see correspondence between Governor Henrrique de Avila y Pacheco and the Audiencia of Gudalajara in AGN Tierras 3286. For scholarly discussions see Craumessel, *Poblar La Frontera*, 186-188; Hanke, *All Mankind is One*; Pagden, *The Fall of Natural Man*; Brooks, *Captives and Cousins*, especially 31-36.

faith" and a group of Natives—the "Caribs"—who had not listened nor agreed to enter into the service of Spaniards. Instead, the Caribs had resisted by killing Christians, making war against Spaniards and their new Indian allies, and capturing them "to eat." Moreover, they had convinced other Native groups to join them. On the island of San Juan (Puerto Rico), Indians had "diabolically" and "treacherously" killed Don Cristobal de Sotomayor, his nephew, and other "many" Christians, "rising up" and "rebelling against our service." Importantly, Caribs had come to the aid of these rebels, arriving in canoes by the dozens.[36]

What was to be done with people that had received the "requerimiento" that compelled them to become Christians, join with the faithful, and pledge obedience to the Catholic monarchy of Castile, but had refused and violently resisted? How were Spanish subjects to respond to Natives who, like the Caribs, compelled recent converts to rise up and make war against Spaniards? The King granted license to any and all persons to go to the islands of the Caribs and the surrounding mainland, make war against them, and "capture and take them away to wherever they please." Moreover, they could "sell them and make use of them without any penalty," and without paying the customary royal fifth in taxes. In fact, the only restriction was that these Carib slaves not be taken out of the Indies, and it is apparent that Spanish residents could interpret the cedula broadly, as the category of "Carib" and thus "slave" might be applied to any resistant group in the region, including the allegedly "diabolical" Natives that Caribs had aided on the island of

[36] Konetzke, *Colección,* Vol. 1, 32-33. On broader Spanish practices of ethnic ascription see Craumessel, *Poblar la Frontera,* 212-219, William L. Merrill, "Cultural Creativity and Raiding Bands in Eighteenth-Century Northern New Spain," in *Violence, Resistance, and Survival in the Americas: Native Americans and the Legacy of Conquest*, ed. William B. Taylor and Franklin Pease G.Y. (Washington, DC: Smithsonian Institution Press, 1994); Sara Ortelli, Trama de Una Guerra Conveniente: Nueva Vizcaya y la sombra de los apaches, 1748-1790 (México, D.F.: El Colegio de México, Centro de Estudios Históricos, 2007), especially 85-96.

San Juan.[37]

When Spaniards moved to begin new conquests, they revealed the importance of existing Caribbean slave trades while articulating the desire to enslave new captives on the mainland. Hernan Cortés and his men, for example, petitioned the King in July 1519 for permission to bring their Indian slaves from the Antilles. Anticipating war with Natives in the process of conquering new lands, they also requested that they be able to take and distribute war captives as slaves, "as is customary in the land of infidels, being a just thing." These slaves they branded, and the royal fifth was taken from their sale. This practice was affirmed in June 1523, when a *cedula* noted that "if *requeridos* the Indians did not submit, they could be enslaved," though the King noted that this license should not be abused, given the potential incentive it might give Spaniards to incite Indian violence solely for the purpose of capturing Natives as slaves.[38]

In the early years of conquest and settlement in and around Tenochtitlan, the Aztec capital, the Crown sought to negotiate these Iberian customs of slavery with concerns that “gentile” Indians warranted special protection so that they might be instructed in Christianity. If the case of the Caribs and the enslavement of Nahuas in the conquest illustrated the doctrines of "just war" and enslavement as punishment for rebellious act against the King, the Crown also condoned *rescate*, in this case the ransom of slaves that Nahuas had incorporated through trade or warfare. While sanctioning the use of the brand as a physical mark of legal status, royal decrees noted that it was to be kept by a civil official of good repute, and that a distinctive brand was to be applied to distinguish slaves taken in war from those obtained through *rescate*. In October 1522, a

[37] Konetzke, *Colección*, Vol. 1, 32-33.
[38] Zavala, *Los Esclavos Indios*, 1-4.

cedula affirmed that citizens and settlers of New Spain were just in "rescuing Indian slaves and taking them in for however long was the will of the king." Suggesting the early importance of slavery as an institution, a January 1527 order designated Antonio Cordero as the constable to recover runaway slaves around Mexico City, noting that "masters would pay him 5 pesos in gold for every black; half a peso for every Indian slave; and one peso for every beast." Note that Indians slaves were valued less than beasts and far less than African slaves, perhaps due to their ubiquity.[39]

Reports of "abuses" did not take long to cross the Atlantic. A *cedula* titled "may the Natives of New Spain not be Slaves nor branded," dated 9 November 1526, for example, did not in fact prohibit slavery, but instead noted that no *free* Indian should be taken as a slave or branded as such. It explained that individuals were branding and thus unjustly enslaving Indians not taken in just war, sentenced to slavery by the crown for rebellion, or ransomed as slaves from other Indians. Such "abuses" may have in part reflected attempts by early conquistadors, who had been granted Indian towns in encomienda, to overcome the limitations imposed on them by that system by branding encomienda Indians as slaves.[40]

Royal officials responded by seeking to monopolize branding, which provided the visual and legal marker that distinguished "free Indians" from slaves. In August 1528, and January of 1532, new decrees noted that, since residents of New Spain were branding free Indians on the face, as if they were slaves, the brand was to be kept locked in a chest

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[39] Ibid., 5-11. On branding see also Konetzke, *Colección*, Vol. 1, 130.

[40] Under the *encomienda* system Native groups were "entrusted" to a Spaniard who in exchange for their tribute and labor was in theory to provide for their material and spiritual well-being. See Inga Clendinnen, *Ambivalent Conquests: Maya and Spaniard in Yucatan, 1517-1570* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1987), p. 38. Recipients of encomiendas were usually conquistadors or soldiers that had participated in conquest. For 1526 royal order see *Konetzke*, *Colección,* Vol. 1, 87. For other *cedulas* discussing branding and the treatment of Indian slaves see Ibid., 103, 107, 109-112, 113-120.

with two different keys, one to be held by Bishop of Mexico, and the other by the civil official of the jurisdiction. Indians were thus only to be branded in the presence of the highest religious official of New Spain, and no Indian was to be branded without royal consent, under penalty of loss of possessions. Correspondence from elsewhere in the expanding Spanish empire certainly influenced such decrees, as subjects in Peru requested and were granted authorization to buy slaves from Native *caciques* or headmen via rescate, Guatemala was authorized to take war captives as slaves in 1533, and news arrived that merchants had sold 300 Indian men and women from Brazil in a public auction on the island of Hispaniola.[41]

No linear trajectory away from slavery and towards "liberty" is evident in the early to mid-1500s, but rather a differentiation of statuses for Native groups. A February 1534 *cedula*, for example, sought to clarify the terms of slavery for Natives. First, it noted that captives taken in just war could be enslaved, with the stipulation that those taken on the mainland could not be taken to sell in the Caribbean islands. Second, it noted that "neither the women taken in war, nor the children fourteen years or younger could be seen as captives (and thus slaves)," but permission was given for governors and captains to capture them and utilize them for service, giving them to homes as "*naborias*," free Indians who labored indefinitely without wages.[42]

By the 1530s, distinct statuses of Indian laborers had developed: encomienda Indians, who were subject to short-term labor for their encomenderos and paid tribute; Indian slaves, who as property could be traded, transported, and whose children were also slaves; and "naborias," Indian servants who worked in households or workshops

[41] Ibid., 109, 138, 141, 142, 175, 339.
[42] Konetzke, *Colección,* Vol. 1, 153.

permanently without wages but whose status was not inherited. Royal cedulas had thus begun to differentiate between Native and African women and children by restricting the enslavement of the former while sanctioning permanent slave status for the latter. In the short term, the distinction in experience between a slave African woman and an Indian "naboria" was negligible, but for future generations such distinction in legal status would not be meaningless, and would serve to solidify associations of Africanness with slave status. At the same time, if new laws sought to change contemporary practices, they did so by commenting on the persistent enslavement of Native women and children. In February 1541, for example, a *cedula* noted that "Indios Naborias" were not to be sold or transported like slaves, indicating that residents of New Spain were in fact circulating them as such.[43]

The New Laws of 1542 weigh large in discussions of Indian enslavement in the Spanish empire, and in comparative accounts of European colonization in the Americas. These orders of King Charles V "for the governance of the Indies and good treatment and conservation of the Indians," included a declaration against Indian enslavement, a statement clarifying that all Natives were "free persons," and the gradual abolition of the forced labor system of encomienda. In this vein, restrictions on Indian slavery are noted to be a case of Spanish exceptionalism, as no comparable prohibition emerged in British, Dutch, or French colonial projects, especially at such an early date. The Latin American historiography often references this effort to reign in the power of *encomenderos* as the moment when the mass enslavement and circulation of Indians ended, manumission occurred, and Indian slavery began to be confined to the margins. It is when "slavery"

[43] Ibid., 200. For a cogent analysis of broader understandings of race, "purity of blood," and gender in Colonial Mexico see Maria Elena Martínez, *Genealogical Fictions*: *Limpieza de Sangre, Religion, and Gender in Colonial Mexico* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2008).

becomes an African, rather than Native, story.[44]

Taking the long view, however, the New Laws appear less transformative than incremental in impact regarding Native captivity. Concerns about protecting Indian populations emerged out of existing intellectual and legal traditions: the Spanish crown had declared the "liberty" of Indians soon after 1492, and Indian freedom was part and parcel of the Royal Bull of 1537 that affirmed Iberian sovereignty over the New World. Cedulas and decrees also had already begun to elaborate a gendered distinction between Indian men and women that sought to reserve "slavery" for male war captives, rebels, or slaves redeemed from Native masters.[45]

Looking forward, it is apparent that the New Laws did not produce a blanket prohibition on Indian slavery either. While many Indians successfully sued for their freedom in the 1550s, and even the practice of "naboria" was revoked in 1550 in an order that noted that "no form of involuntary labor" was allowed for Indians, the reality of exceptions by royal decree and by Indians' "character" continued. Merchants continued to transport Native men and women from Brazil to Hispaniola and sell them in public auctions for 25 pesos each, they transported six thousand Indian captives from Central American to Peru around 1550, and soldiers carried more than two hundred Tepehuan Indians from Nueva Vizcaya to Durango to sell in 1604.[46]

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[44] Note that by 1545 restrictions on encomienda—including the stipulation that such grants could not be hereditary—had been rolled back. See J.H. Elliott, *Empires of the Atlantic World: Britain and Spain in America, 1492-1830* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2006), Alan Gallay, ed., *Indian Slavery in Colonial America* (Lincoln, NB: University of Nebraska Press, 2010), especially Gallay's introduction; Colin A. Palmer, *Slaves of the White Gods: Blacks in Mexico, 1570-1650* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1976); Maria Elena Martínez, "The Black Blood of New Spain"; Hanke, *All Mankind is One*.

[45] Hanke, *All Mankind is One,* 11, 21; I draw here from Hanke in viewing the New Laws in a broader perspective, if the reading of shifts in Indian slavery in the primary source context is my own.

[46] Konetzke, *Colección,* Vol. 1, 260, 339. Gibson, *Aztecs Under Spanish Rule*, 77, 154, 221, 244; Craumessel, *Poblar la Frontera*, 189.

If anything, new decrees against Indian enslavement in 1553 and 1563 speak more to the persistence of "abuses"—the enslavement of Indians that were not war captives, rebels, or redeemed slaves—than they do to a consensus that *no* Indians should be enslaved. In this vein, the relationship between law and practice in Chile is illustrative. In 1608, for example, a *cedula* had permitted that Indians taken in war in Chile be given as slaves. It noted that both men "older than ten and a half" and women "older than nine and a half," whether taken by Indian allies or by Spaniards in war, could be had as their slaves to serve them, and they could be "sold, given, or disposed of as they please." It noted that younger children could not be enslaved, but could be taken out of the rebellious zones and transported elsewhere, and given to persons who they would serve until they were 20 years old, "to indoctrinate them and be instructed in our holy Catholic faith as was done with the Moriscos of Granada." Once these Indians stopped rebelling, however, slaves could no longer be taken from them.[47]

Like the condemnation of Caribs 100 years before, this order reflected the fact that "rebellious" Indians who resisted Christianization and the King's rule could be sentenced to slavery as punishment. Unlike that earlier order, however, it demonstrated concern to restrict who was subject to this sentence, distinguishing between adults and children, for example, while placing a clear limit on when they could be taken: only as long as they were rebelling. Furthermore, as in Mexico, Chileans branded these slaves, but some questioned whether they should be branded on the face. Both in the order of 1608 and in a subsequent debate over branding, the source of the practice was explicitly

[47] On 1553 and 1563 cedulas see Konetzke, *Colección*, Vol., 315, 404-5, 410; For Chile see Konetzke, *Colección*, Vol. 2, Tomo 1, p. 140-142. On the broader question of Indian liberty versus personal service and forced labor see Brian P. Ownesby, *Empire of Law and Indian Justice in Colonial Mexico* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2008), especially Chapter 5, "Liberty not Servitude."

evoked. "As was done with the Moriscos of Granada," noted the King, and those who wanted to brand Indians on the face explained "it was the general custom in all the provinces of Europe."[48]

Between 1632 and 1635, this debate played out in missives between local officials, the viceroy in Peru, and the Council of the Indies in Spain. One the one hand, some argued that they should not brand Indians, both due to past legal precedent (the 1532 decree against it in New Spain) and due to the fact that Indians were responding in kind: they were branding Spaniards that they captured in retaliation. On the other hand, the governor of Chile argued that it was a custom and consequence of slavery "since its beginnings," and that the law of 1532 concerned "more domesticated Indians, less rebellious, and those who were being branded who were free." The ability to brand slaves was crucial to motivating the troops, he argued, noting that "the soldieries of the army would lose morale in noting that their catch would be uncertain, without the security of the brand on the face, especially since these are people who easily flee back to their lands."[49]

The distinction the governor made between "domesticated" Indians and the rebellious ones of his jurisdiction was indicative of broader ideologies of Indian slavery, whether Natives in Chile who branded Spaniards and fled easily back to their lands, or Caribs who "ate men," or, as we will see, Apaches in the Greater Rio Grande who "had always been in rebellion against Spaniards." The flexibility of the Council of the Indies to local concerns is noteworthy in this respect. They returned this case of Indian branding, for example, to the Viceroy of Peru and ordered that he decide what he saw fit,

[48] Konetzke, *Colección,* Vol. 2, Tomo 1, 140-142.
[49] Ibid., 349-353.

suggesting that perhaps a brand on the hand would be "enough for security, and leave privileged the face, so esteemed by men...without defect." The subtext of this opinion, undoubtedly, was the underlying hope that Indians in their reciprocal violence would again imitate Spaniards, this time by branding the hand and not the face, or refraining from mutilating Spanish bodies altogether.[50]

Slavery in the Greater Rio Grande

As Spaniards travelled north into the mountains and valleys of the North American West, the emergence of new slave trades reflected these broader processes of conquest and colonization. Everywhere Spanish settlers, soldiers, and friars travelled, they negotiated perceived labor needs with the customs and practices of local populations. In central Mexico, the enslavement of local Natives declined in part because coercion was not essential. Accustomed to the demands of the Aztec empire, nearby indigenous groups proved willing to supply the rotational labor drafts Spaniards needed to construct their capital atop Tenochtitlan and drain the boggy lakes of the central Valley. In Northern New Spain, labor recruitment proved more difficult. Here Spaniards encountered much more migratory and fragmented Native populations, a reality shaped in part by the effects of epidemic disease preceding Spanish settlement. In Nuevo Leon, for example, ranchers and farmers turned to both the enslavement of migratory Indian groups and to innovative forms of seasonal captivity. In this vein, residents captured and chained Native family groups, brought them in to labor on a harvest, and then set them free to return to the mountains until they captured them again the next season. In Nueva Vizcaya, slavery also proved an important institution, initially for all labor tasks, and then

[50] Ibid., 352-353.

for domestic service, especially after successful missionization had provided a pool for the seasonal labor drafts of *repartimiento*.[51]

The emergence of long-distance trades in Indian slaves was not simply a Spanish imposition, however, but tied to pre-contact Native captive exchange practices. When Spanish conquistador Francisco Vazquez de Coronado traveled into the North American West in 1541, for example, he found little gold, but a vast network of trade in everything from pottery and jewelry to meat and pine nuts. His party observed Plains Apaches exchanging bison hides, deerskins, and pemmican for maize and blankets to the Pueblos of the Rio Grande, and found Pawnee and Wichita Indians living as slaves in Pueblo communities. One of his captains brought back two such slaves—Ysopete and El Turco—to their camp for Coronado to interrogate. It was El Turco who, by signs and in the little Nahua he knew, stoked Coronado's fantasies with tales of a rich Plains civilization. As Coronado and his men later recalled, he had described the land of Quivira, "ruled by a great lord who traversed lakes in boats with golden oar locks." Calling these grand visions into question, Ysopete had from the beginning articulated his doubts that Coronado would in fact find "the richest prize in the Indies," as he and his men hoped.[52]

Coronado never found Quivira, but his expedition did take new captives, including at least one Plains Indian woman who had already lived as a slave among the Pueblo. These early encounters hint at the roots of what James Brooks has called the

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[51] Gibson argued in *Aztecs Under Spanish Rule* that pre-contact labor precedents help explain why "Spaniards did not need any mass enslavement of Indians in the valley of Mexico (221)." On missionization and the labor history of Nueva Vizcaya and Nuevo Leon see Deeds, "Labor Coercion on the Periphery," and Cuello, "The Persistence of Indian Slavery."

[52] Brooks, *Captives & Cousins*, 46. See Also Richard Flint and Shirley Cushing Flint, eds., *Documents of the Coronado Expedition, 1539-1542* (Dallas: Southern Methodist University Press, 2005).

"Borderlands slave system," a cross-cultural political economy centered on the exchange of captives that was based in indigenous and Iberian traditions. Both Native and Hispanic cultural groups allowed for war captives to gradually shed their status as slaves and become full, if sometimes subordinate, members of adopting groups. Whether through concubinage and intermarriage or institutions like *compadrazgo*—god parenthood—captives within Spanish society could forge kin relations with their captors. The tradition of *rescate*, discussed above, also had familial implications, as captives ransomed from "non-believers" were to be *criado* or "raised up" by their new families in exchange for domestic service. Many Native groups also adopted war captives, and after periods of ritualized cleansing and forced labor they too might incorporate outsiders as full members of society. Navajos, for example, might initially label war captives as "yisná," reflecting their servile status, but through customs of adoption they often assimilated these captives as kin. Members of certain groups tended to face longer-term servitude, however, illustrated by the fact that the Navajo term for Paiute (báyodzin) had become synonymous with slave by the late-nineteenth century.[53]

In Brooks' analysis, this resonance in cultural practices between Spaniards and Natives had important long-term implications, as the widespread circulation of captives forged new trade linkages and alliances. The mutuality of exchange and the possibility of coexistence in a violent world centered on the fact that the "Borderlands slave system" extended the obligations of kinships to new groups "as the groups incorporated one another's women and children." While women and children were captured through acts of violence in "men's contestations for power," Brooks argues that violence was

[53] See Brooks's introduction to *Captives & Cousins* for an anthropological essay that succinctly summarizes these dynamics. For a detailed discussion of Navajo captivity practices see Brooks, 242; Brugge, *Navajos in the Catholic Records*.

assimilated into "reproductive exchange relations." Over time, this political economy of slavery blurred cultural boundaries and fostered "the interpenetration of cultures" in the Southwest Borderlands still evident today.[54]

As in other regions of the Americas, however, some Native groups proved vulnerable to forms of captivity distinct from the mutually productive system described by Brooks. Six years before Coronado observed Native captive exchange complexes in present-day New Mexico, for example, another quixotic wanderer-explorer encountered a practice of enslavement that proved highly influential in the decades to come. It was in present-day Sinaloa in 1536 that after four years of wandering, Alvar Nuñez Cabeza de Vaca finally came across a group of fellow Spaniards who stopped and marveled at him, dressed as he was in Indian clothes. Mercifully for Vaca, he had managed to wander his way into the hands of Spanish slave hunters.[55]

Slave hunting expeditions were part and parcel of early Spanish entrees into the Greater Rio Grande, as soldiers and settlers conducted raids for slaves from early settlements, especially around the mining town of Santa Barbara.[56] Historians studying Nuevo Leon and Saltillo have noted similar dynamics there, and José Cuello has argued that "the conquest and early colonization of Saltillo and Monterrey was characterized by wholesale slave-hunting."[57] From the headwaters of the Rio Grande in present-day

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[54] Brooks, 40, 364.

[55] On Cabeza de Vaca see Andrés Reséndez, *A Land So Strange: The Epic Journey of Cabeza de Vaca* (New York: Basic Books, 2007).

[56] The definitive history of early colonization in this region is Chantal Craumessel's *Poblar La Frontera*. See also Edward H. Spicer, *Cycles of Conquest: the Impact of Spain, Mexico, and the United States on the Southwest, 1533-1960* (Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 2nd edition, 1967); Susan Deeds *Defiance and Deference: Indians Under Spanish Rule in Nueva Vizcaya* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 2003.

[57] Cuello, "Persistence of Indian Slavery," 687; See also Cuello, "Saltillo in the Seventeenth Century: Local Society on the North Mexican Frontier," (Ph.D. Diss., UC-Berkeley, 1982); Eugenio del Hoyo, *Historia del Nuevo Reino de León (1577-1723)* 2 vols. (Monterrey, 1972), and Andrés Montemayor, "La congrega o encomienda en el Nuevo Reino de León desde finales del siglo xvi hasta el siglo xviii," *Humanitas* 11

Colorado, to its tributaries in present-day Chihuahua, to its delta on the gulf, Native peoples of the Greater Rio Grande served as an important labor source for new Spanish settlers in the late-sixteenth century. In 1578, for example, the Franciscan visitor Diego Rangel returned from the Cuenca del Florido scandalized by what he had witnessed in terms of slave hunting. "From Parras to Santa Barbara," he explained, "the native population is terrorized by Spanish highway robbers." In San Bartolomé he had seen "a great multitude of Indians chained one to the other," guarded by forty Spaniards.[58]

By the 1580s, the mines of Santa Barbara had become "a great slave market," as Spaniards captured Natives from around the Rio Grande, allegedly in retaliation for their own raids, and marched them south. In 1581, for example, visitors to La Junta, an important Native settlement on the Rio Grande, found that Indians were afraid of them and described previous slave raids, explaining that "invaders had taken their kinsmen, wives, and children captive and carried them away in chains." In fact, in 1587, Bartolomé Hernandez claimed to have enslaved 1000 Indians in recent years, and had received blessing for his action from Governor Antonio de Acelga. In practice, actions that sought to "punish" or "pacify" in fact generated retaliation, fueling new acts of violence and enslavement. While the precise genesis of hostilities between particular Native groups and Spaniards is murky in the early contact period, historians have long pointed to slave raids as a contributing factor. The long-distance circulation of Native captives that began as a result of Spanish settlement proved to strain diplomatic relations between Spaniards and some Native groups—especially Apaches—rather than forge "mutually

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(1970): 539-575.

[58] AGI, Guadalajara 65, "Relación de fray Diego Rangel (1578)," as cited in Craumessel, *Poblar la Frontera*, 188.

reproductive" kinship relations.[59]

Downstream on the Rio Grande, early settlers of Nuevo Leon also engaged in captive-taking and slave trading. A band of Basque and Portuguese slave-hunters led by Alberto del Canto, the founder of Saltillo and Santa Lucia (later Monterrey), went on an expedition in search of Indian captives in 1577. Months later, Canto was on the run from the Audiencia of Guadalajara, which had issued a warrant that charged him with enslaving "peaceful" Indians. This warrant did little to prevent future slave hunting, however, as the founder of Nuevo Leon, Luis Carvajal, led a large group of men into the Lower Rio Grande in 1582, scouring an area from Saltillo to the Gulf Coast in search of captives. This case drew the viceroy's attention, who ordered the liberation of the Indian slaves taken by Carvajal's army and arrested him for his crimes in 1588. In fact, when Viceroy Villamanrique had arrived to take over the government of New Spain in 1585, he had found that across the Northern frontier, soldiers that were supposed to be "pacifying" Native populations were in fact enslaving them.[60]

As in other contemporary discussion of Indian slavery, however, the key concern the viceroy raised was the enslavement of "free" Indians—peaceful Natives whose actions had not warranted slavery. While Villamanrique sought to stem these abuses by prohibiting the enslavement of any Indians in the frontier wars, it is noteworthy that he substituted a bounty for each hostile Native captured or killed and ordered that women

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[59] On the "great market" see George Hammond y Agapito Rey, *Expedition into New México Made by Antonio de Espejo, 1532-1538 as Revealed in the Journal of Diego Pérez de Luján, a Member of the Party* (Los Angeles: The Quivira Society, 1929) and Craumessel, 188. On slavery and the genesis of violence in the early contact period, see Forbes, *Apache, Navaho, and Spaniard* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 2nd edition, 1994). Juliana Barr has made a similar warning against extrapolating Brooks's view of slavery as productive process in the New Mexican Borderlands to the North American West as a whole. See her article "From Captives to Slaves" (as cited above) which examines the circulation of Apache women to Louisiana.

[60] Cuello, "Persistence of Indian Slavery," 687.

and children be "sold into a type of encomienda to respectable persons in New Spain in order to compensate the captors." Just as the Crown had sought to regulate "abuses" during the conquest of the Caribbean and Mexico, the interventions of royal officials in Northern New Spain in the sixteenth century highlighted false justifications for enslavement rather than slavery itself as the primary cause for concern.[61]

The capture of local Indians had initially supplied slave markets in Santa Barbara, Nuevo Leon, and Saltillo. In the Northeast, Spanish residents even paid up to one hundred pesos for licenses from local officials to go out in search of Native groups and bring them into local settlements to "civilize" and "Christianize" them. Such expeditions led to the legal enslavement of some of these captives, "in order to reward the participants in the expeditions as well was the authorities who sanctioned them."[62] As missionization in Nueva Vizcaya began in earnest, however, mission towns there began to serve as bases for the labor drafts of *repartimiento* and the enslavement of local Indian groups may have diminished to some extent.[63] Missions did not end slavery at the local-level altogether, however, as criminality or "rebellion" intertwined with the tendency to treat Native "nations" as collectivities to justify the capture and sale of neighboring men, women, and children. When one or two men stole livestock, it brought the fidelity and "obedience" of all their kin into question. In 1621, for example, Indians who labored on an estate near the Rio Florido—likely Conchos Indians—killed a Spanish captain and fled to the mountains. The Governor responded by initiating a war "by blood and fire" against those responsible for having "broken the faith and word they had given to God

[61] Cuello, "Persistence of Indian Slavery," 687.
[62] Ibid.
[63] Deeds, "Labor Coercion on the Periphery."

and King." As a result, he ordered that captives between the age of 14 and 16 be taken as slaves "for a just time" and the young children be distributed in Spanish households. That those over sixteen were not mentioned suggests that they were not captured, but killed. Rebellion, or claims that Indians had "risen up" could thus generate mass enslavement. Following the Tarahumara rebellion of 1649, for example, Spaniards claimed to have captured and sold four hundred Indian men, women, and children.[64]

Over time, the capture and transport of distant Native groups may have become more significant than the enslavement of locals, however. Key to the rise of long-distance slave trades was the Spanish conquest of New Mexico. If rumors of Quivira or hopes of finding another Mexico drew Juan de Oñate north in the 1590s, he also took with him the spoils of earlier conquests and conflicts, just as Cortez and his men had done in taking Caribbean slaves to Mexico. Oñate noted that he had more than 40,000 pesos to his name before he departed, including "slaves—negroes and Chichimecos, male and female—clothing, silverware and many other items."[65]

By the late-1500s, "slavery" in the Rio Grande was both a Native and African experience. The category of "Chichimeco," like "Carib" earlier in the 1500s, was a broad term that cast the "rebellious" Indians of Northern New Spain as enslavable. Oñate not only possessed Native slaves, but also Africans who had already made a long journey through Africa's internal slave trades, across the Atlantic, and into the heartland of New Spain. Scholars have often made the connection between the "liberation" of Indian slaves

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[64] Craumessel, *Poblar la Frontera*, 188-189; On the Tarahumara Rebellion see Archivo del Hidalgo de Parral, microfilm on file at the Benson Latin American Collection, Austin, Texas, rl. 1649a, fr. 220-231 [hereafter cited as AHP, rl. #, fr. or p. #].

[65] Juan de Oñate declaration is in *Historical Documents relating to New Mexico, Nueva Vizcaya, and Approaches Thereto, to 1773,* Volume I, Charles Wilson Hackett, ed. (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Institution of Washington, 1926), 423.

in the mid-1500s and the importation of Africans. Bartolomé de Las Casas, the foremost Indian advocate, supported the enslavement of Africans as an alternative to Indian slavery, until he changed his mind later in life. In practice, however, as illustrated above, the "liberation" of Indian slaves was not universal. In fact, in regions like Northern New Spain, distant from major ports, African and Indian slaves often toiled in equal numbers.[66]

Oñate proved no luckier in finding Quivira than Coronado. But he did manage terrifying violence, as he and his men massacred 800 Indians at Acoma, sentenced captives over the age of twelve to twenty years of forced labor, and severed one of the feet of all men over age twenty-five.[67] If Nueva Vizcaya and Sonora possessed actual silver and gold, one friar later declared that New Mexico's silver and gold were slaves, and nearly every governor of New Mexico during the seventeenth century participated in the sale of Native captives.[68] Indian slavery in New Mexico, as elsewhere in early America, was a significant source of domestic labor and a sign of social status, as non-Pueblo slaves represented more than twenty-percent of New Mexican subjects by the late-1600s.[69] It did not take long after Oñate's conquest of New Mexico for Spanish merchants to also discover the potential rewards of transporting New Mexican and Plains Indian captives south to towns in Nueva Vizcaya and New Spain. A malleable source of capital, they could be sold for substantial sums, used to pay for debts or purchases, or

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[66] On early African slavery in colonial Mexico see Palmer, *Slaves of the White God*, Bennet, *Africans in Colonial Mexico*; on Las Casas see Hanke, *All Mankind is One*. For relatively equal numbers of Native and African slaves see Craumessel, *Poblar La Frontera,* 200-203.

[67] Ramón Gutiérrez, *When Jesus Came the Corn Mothers Went Away* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1991), 54.

[68] For New Mexico governors' participation in captive exchange see Forbes, *Apaches, Navahos, and Spaniards*, Gutiérrez, *When Jesus Came*, Brooks, *Captives & Cousins*, AGN Tierras 3268, 3283, and 3286.

[69] For comparative context see Gallay, ed., *Indian Slavery in Colonial America*. On demographic significance of Indian slavery in New Mexico see Brooks, 92.

gifted to relatives and friends as symbols of affection.[70]

In sum, if Spaniards did not initiate the practice of captive exchange and slavery in the Rio Grande, their settlement in the region quickly tied pre-contact practices into the trade and transportation networks of New Spain. If captivity in New Mexico could be a short-term experience that might end with one's ransom and return to loved ones, transportation south of the Rio Grande posed the threat of breaking captives' ties to natal communities. In fact, Apache and other Indian captives responded to the dislocation of long-distance forced migration by taking great risks to journey hundreds of miles back to their homelands. If some captives traded locally in New Mexico were, as Brooks notes, able to carve out a place for themselves as cultural intermediaries, for most adult captives carried south into New Spain, captivity hardly proved to be an opportunity.[71]

The Apache Slave Trade to Northern New Spain

It was in 1629, according to legend, that Juan Rangel de Biesma picked up a rock on La Prieta Hill north of Santa Barbara, licked it, and declared, "there is a mineral deposit here." Within two years, he had struck silver, and settlers began to amass in a boomtown christened "San José del Parral." Though Spaniards had transported Indian captives from the lower Rio Grande and the area around present-day El Paso to Nueva

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[70] For Indian slave sales and prices see AHP 1646A, fr. 357b-379a; 1649C, fr. 1481-1486; 1649D, fr. 2145-2174; 1653A, fr. 221-226; 1653B, fr. 1090-1100; 1654B, fr. 778-789; 1657B, fr. 479-485; 1660C, fr. 1278-1284, 1660C, fr. 1375-1387.

[71] On natal alienation as a defining characteristic of slavery see Orlando Patterson, *Slavery and Social Death: A Comparative Study* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1985). For recent critiques that have emphasized that "social death" was an existential problem more than a lived condition see Stephanie E. Smallwood, *Saltwater Slavery: A Middle Passage from Africa to American Diaspora* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2007), and Vincent Brown, *The Reaper's Garden: Death and Power in the World of Atlantic Slavery* (Harvard University Press, 2008). On captivity as an opportunity for some Native captives see James F. Brooks, "'This Evil Extends Especially...To the Feminine Sex': Negotiating Captivity in the New Mexico Borderlands," *Feminist Studies* 22, no. 2 (1996): 279-309.

Vizcaya before, the demand for household labor in Parral, and the continued market for Indian captives beyond Parral, established a new opportunity for Spanish merchants, civil officials, and even friars to participate in the long-distance captive trade. If shifts in the volume of Indian slave trafficking over time are difficult to measure, extant records produced in Parral after its founding do allow for a closer examination of the experience and practice of slavery in the Greater Rio Grande in the seventeenth century.[72]

Indian slave trades "to the mines of New Spain" are frequently referenced in Borderlands literature, but only recently have scholars begun to uncover the logistics and demographics of such trades through systematic study. Chantal Craumessel, for example, has examined baptismal records in order to provide some indication of the demographic significance of Indian slavery over time. In 1650, for example, Apaches represented twenty-percent of baptisms in the Parral parish registers, and more than thirty-percent between 1660 and 1670. Suggesting the dispersal rather than congregation of captives, parish records reveal that 128 Native women who gave birth to children after arriving in Parral in the 1660s had been distributed to eighty-seven different homes. Surveying data from across the seventeenth century, Craumessel has estimated that there were around 1,000 Indian slaves in the Parral district by the mid-to-late 1600s. In comparison, there were approximately 1,100 black slaves in Parral around 1650, and a similar number of free Indians and Hispanic residents.[73]

How did these captives make there way to Parral? If in the late-1500s, Spanish

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[72] On the legend of Biesma see <http://en.academic.ru/dic.nsf/enwiki/187060> (accessed by author 8 November 2010), see also Craumessel, *Poblar la Frontera,* 101.

[73] Craumessel, *Poblar la Frontera*, 200, 203. As Craumessel mentioned to me in a personal conversation, it is important to note that baptismal records do not represent a complete record of all imported Indian slaves, as it is not clear that all captives were baptized upon arrival, in part because individuals did not want pay the required fees to the priests. Andrés Reséndez is also investigating the slave trade to Parral in a forthcoming monograph.

"slavehunting"—or offensive military campaigns—produced the bulk of Indian slaves, by the mid-1600s, *rescate* appears to have been most important. Spaniards discussed the "crude, civil wars" waged between Native groups in New Mexico, and explained that they "ransomed" the resulting captives in order to instruct and Christianize them. If the Spanish presence did not initiate warfare between Navajos and Puebloans, or Plains Apaches and Pawnees, Native groups likely recognized the particular demand for women and children that existed within Spanish communities, and shaped their captive-taking practices accordingly.[74]

Warfare between Native groups beyond the Spanish sphere is not easily accessible in archival records, but fragmentary references in correspondence make it is possible to hypothesize the journey of an Apachean captive from New Mexico south to Parral, Santa Barbara, or Durango. Descriptions of these individuals note the presence or absence of smallpox scars, reflecting the incursion of epidemic disease into their home communities. Having survived illness, they had perhaps already been out on their first raid, or danced in the puberty ceremonies that signaled entrance into adulthood. Then Mansos Indians stormed their villages, seized them, and carried them south to their camps near El Paso. In El Paso the captives waited, or perhaps labored, until the next wagon train carrying goods between Santa Fe and Parral passed by. When the Spaniards arrived, the Mansos put Apaches on display, knowing they could glean substantial payment in exchange: hides, meat, blankets, pots, pine nuts, slaves—all could be bought

[74] See Hackett *Historical Documents III*, 130 and 186; AHP 1646A, fr. 357b-379a; 1649C, fr. 1481-1486; 1649D, fr. 2145-2174; 1653A, fr. 221-226; 1653B, fr. 1090-1100; 1654B, fr. 778-789; 1657B, fr. 479-485; 1660C, fr. 1278-1284, 1660C, fr. 1375-1387. See also Rick Hendricks and Gerald Mandell, "The Apache Slave Trade in Parral."

or exchanged at trading fairs in the New Mexican borderlands.[75]

Loaded into wagons, likely chained one to each other, captives might have imagined or discussed where they were headed and what their fates would be. Perhaps they saw their captors come back from visits to the New Mexican governor, carrying the *traspasos* or "transfers" that granted them legal title to carry Indians out of New Mexico to sell. Whether they had heard about Spanish practices previously, they certainly could have drawn upon familiarity with how their own kin handled captives in order to try to make sense of their circumstances. Chiricahua Apaches, for example, generally saw the enslavement of war captives as a "temporal" condition before they incorporated them on a continuum from dishonored outsider to kin. Like Spaniards, they understood violence and enslavement in gendered terms. When Chiricahuas captured a warrior in battle, for example, they interrogated him to glean useful information. "If he won't give it," one Apache later explained, "they usually kill him right there, or else they take him back to camp for the women to kill." Mature men, they reckoned, were simply too dangerous, and unlikely to adapt to Apache ways of life. Chiricahuas thus preferred young boys who, as one man explained, "becomes a real Chiricahua and later marries into the tribe." Describing the process of adoption, he further noted that "at first they have to act as servants. They have to eat as servants. Some escape after a while." But after this period of subservient status ended, "it is taken for granted that they belong in the group…the

[75] Ibid. The "Mansos," possibly an Athapaskan group, were particularly important in trade between Parral and New Mexico, both because their lands contained an important mineral for mining silver—salt—and because of their role in capturing and trading in Apache slaves. Meaning "tame," in Spanish, the term "Manso" reflected the sense among Spaniards that this group was receptive to embracing Christianity and allying with Spanish interests. In particular, Mansos proved their potential loyalty—from the Spanish perspective—by capturing women and children from neighboring Apache groups and trading them to merchants passing along the royal road between Santa Fe and Parral. On Mansos as Athapaskans see Jack D. Forbes, "Unknown Athapaskans: The Identification of the Jano, Jocome, Jumano, Manso, Suma, and Other Indian Tribes of the Southwest," *Ethnohistory* 6, 2 (Spring 1959).

feeling of captivity wears off in time." Apache captives thus may have understood that they would face potentially punishing forced labor, even if they might have expected that this experience would not be permanent.[76]

Apache women—among the most common of captives sold in Parral—may have had particular fears. If both Apaches and Spaniards demonstrated a particular fondness for children over adults, Chiricahuas later distinguished their rejection of female captives from the practices of Hispanic groups. As one Chiricahua man noted, "when Chiricahua men are on the raid or warpath and they capture Mexican women…they don't do anything to them. They are afraid to have sexual intercourse with them, for they say, if they do, their luck will be spoiled." If Apaches "[couldn't] do it" due to cultural taboos, Hispanic men, he claimed, "did it every time they got Indian women."[77]

Not all Apachean groups demonstrated this same gendered distinction in their understanding of captive-taking and slavery. Western Apaches, for instance, incorporated male and female children and adult women. As in the case of other Native and Hispanic groups, "youths and grown men were commonly slain," but as one informant later explained, "children and sometimes maidens and grown women were brought home and adopted and either placed in the captors' family or given to another." While children "stood a fair chance" of achieving equal social status, Western Apaches deemed adults to be too set in their ways to integrate fully into the community.

Western Apaches' clan practices suggest that some adult captives may have expected that, among outsiders, they could expect to be treated as a distinct and possibly dishonored clan or group. On the one hand, young captives were generally raised by the

[76] Morris Edward Opler, *An Apache Life-Way: The Economic, Social, & Religious Institutions of the Chiricahua Indians* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, Reprint, 1996), 349-351.
[77] Ibid.

captor's family and became affiliated with the clan of the individual who owned or raised them. As John Rope explained, "If I capture a girl in Mexico, she takes my clan because she is my property. Her children will take my clan also." But for adult female captives, "the taint of alien blood" remained "as long as their ancestry was remembered." Particular clans came into existence for the purpose of incorporating such adult captives: "born from above downward people" or "enemies born one after the other people," designations that reflected these captives retention of "alien" status.[78]

Whether fearing sexual violence, pondering a future of forced labor, or imagining escape, captives arrived in Parral aboard wagons to await sale—sometimes for the second or third time. In the decades after the founding of Parral, local residents had learned how to purchase an Indian captive. On the one hand, one need only inquire with an acquaintance that participated in the New Mexican trade, who might either have an Indian in his possession or be able to locate one. On the other hand, some residents knew to approach recently arrived wagon trains and inquire there. Or, on occasion, one could even visit the town square, where in public auctions, Indian labor was sold to the highest bidder.[79]

This slave trade often generated only brief references in the historical record, but on occasions where perceived abuse or "excess" garnered the attention of local officials, judicial records provide a closer window onto the ways it functioned. In March 1649, for example, an investigation began after an Indian man named Francisco appeared before a magistrate in Parral to allege that Spanish merchants were holding some of his kinsmen

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[78] Greenville Goodwin and Keith H. Basso, ed., *The Social Organization of the Western Apache* (Tucson, Arizona: University of Arizona Press, 1969), 96, 106-111.

[79] For references to logistics of slave sales see note 70 above; see also AHP 1655A, fr. 102-106 for a public auction of an Indian woman and child.

against their will.[80] He explained that the eighteen Mansos recently arrived in Parral were "experiencing a nightmare" because they had witnessed merchants sell three Indians against their will and they feared that they too might be sold. Francisco also noted that four of the Mansos had said they were in Parral involuntarily and that they wanted to return to their country. Participation in the captive trade clearly represented a mixed blessing for some Mansos, who could themselves fall victim to Spanish slave trading.[81]

Additional testimony shed more light on both recent events and the broader logistics of the Parral slave trade. A week and a half earlier, Antonio de Villalengua, a Parral resident, had received word that Andres de Gracia, who was in charge of the wagons that traveled to the Rio Grande to gather salt, had returned with some Indian boys and girls. Villalengua Gracia and his companions had met Tomas, a mulato, and Sebastian Muñoz outside town where their wagons were camped. He talked to them about buying Indian girls, and Andres and Tomas showed him three, who he guessed were seven or eight-years old. After haggling about the price—they were asking 100 pesos each—Villalengua asked them about the titles, which allowed for their transport and sale. They responded that they had no titles. "Recognizing the risk" of buying Indian girls without this legal guarantee, Villalengua went on his way, and explained to the court that he did not know what had happened to the girls in the days since. Around the same time, Pedro de Andrade had similarly received word about the arrival of a wagon train from New Mexico. He also traveled with a group of men a league out of town to where the wagons were camped, and spoke to Andres de Gracia and Tomas about whether they had brought Indians to sell. Andrade recalled that Andres took out a little Indian girl, "9

[80] This case can be found in AHP 1649D, fr. 2145-2174.

[81] Ibid.: "le an dicho que estan con pesadunbre por que le dijeron que los dhos carreteros Havian vendido en este rreal un Indio llamado Zuma y una India y un muchachuelo…"

or 10 years old," and Tomas brought out two more of the same age, repeating the offer they had made earlier to Villalengua to sell the captives for 100 pesos a piece. Andrade offered sixty, and asked about the titles to be able to sell them. This time they said that for one of them they did have a title, but for the other two they did not. Andrade testified that they had not actually shown him any titles, and that he had therefore went on his way.[82]

The initiation of proceedings against Tomas and Andres centered on concerns that they were doing so "without titles" and possibly transporting "free" Mansos Indians against their will. As a result of these concerns, Tomas and Andres were apprehended and asked to explain their actions. Their testimony highlighted important characteristics of the slave trade that other witnesses had also noted: the role of New Mexican merchants, the significant cost of Indian slaves, and concern about legal title. Andres testified that he had bought two Indian girls from Captain Lucas Montaño, who had purchased them from the Mansos Indians near El Paso. They were Apache Indians, one named Lucia and the other Ines. He had paid 80 pesos, and Captain Montaño had given him titles for both so he could sell them as slaves. He sold one of them to Juan de Santa Cruz, a miner in Parral, for 85 pesos, and the other he had given, without any interest (so presumably for 80 pesos) to Captain Juan Gomez Fernandez, because he had a previous debt to him. He explained that he had lied to Villalengua about not having titles because he did not want to sell the girls for the low price he had offered.[83]

Tomas similarly testified that they had operated within widely accepted customs of Indian slavery. He explained that in the Rio del Norte he had redeemed from the

[82] Ibid.: "Reconociendo el rriesgo q. de Conprar las dhas indiçuelas tiene sin titulos."

[83] Ibid, for contemporaneous discussions of varied labor categories and slave prices in Parral see AHP 1649c, fr. 951-970; fr. 1411-1421; AHP 1652b, fr. 943-944

Mansos Indians an Indian girl of about ten years old that the they had captured from the Apaches in war, and since the governor of New Mexico had granted permission to sell such Indians, he had received a title and sold her to Pedro de Salvatierra for 85 pesos. He also noted that in the wagons of Sebastian Muños they were served by eleven men that received salary, five Manso men and four Manso women that worked without salary but voluntarily, and six Indian women [not Mansos] with salary. Such testimony highlighted the diversity of labor categories that existed in Parral, from Indian and African slaves to unsalaried "voluntary" workers, to free wage labor.[84]

In deciding the case, civil officials in Parral reviewed legal precedent, including a recent *cedula* that had noted that no Indians that were *not* taken in just war should be sold or gifted in Nueva Vizcaya, as well as a recent order from the governor, likely issued in response to the *cedula*, noting that many Indian children were being sent south from New Mexico and sold by individuals who "said they were slaves…without really being able to do so by law." The governor, while on the one handed mandating that anyone holding a slave needed to "show the title" and prove they held that slave legitimately, also ordered that no "barbarian Indian" be enslaved in the future, until the King ordered something differently. For merchants, then, this 1648 decree seems to have represented something of a contradiction: On the one hand, the governors of New Mexico produced documents that testified to the fact that Apaches warranted enslavement, either through just war or rescate. On the other hand, in Nueva Vizcaya, questions had arisen about the propriety of this practice, and a public crier had announced that no "barbarian Indians" should from

[84] Ibid., for broader labor history of Nueva Vizcaya see Craumessel, *Poblar la Frontera*; Deeds, *Defiance and Deference* and "Labor Coercion on the Periphery."

that point forward be enslaved.[85]

Such dueling messages reflected a much longer tradition: declarations of Indian liberty coexisting with permission to enslave Natives under particular circumstances. Andres de Gracia claimed to have never heard any order against Indian slavery, for example, and instead cited customary practices of enslaving and issuing titles for enemy Indians. In New Mexico, he explained, the Apache nation "had always been and continued to be common enemies," and for the "conservation of the province," Spaniards and Christian Indians alike made war on them. Governors issued legal titles for the Apaches to be taken out of the province "and given in deposit for 15 years of personal service and sold for the amount this labor appears to be worth." In the end local officials largely accepted such explanations: they freed Andres and Tomas on bond to help aid in the transport of a new governor and group of friars to New Mexico, and no records of them ever being further prosecuted for Indian slavery appear in the Parral archives. It certainly also helped their case that the Mansos Indians allegedly being held against their will testified that they had come to Parral willingly, though they had since decided that they did in fact "want to return to their country."[86]

The sale of Apachean captives under similar terms continued in the 1650s. Don

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[85] "Bando" dated 6 February 1648 in Ibid.: "vienen muchos indizuelos y indizuelas que los rremite el Govern.or de aquellas prov.as…vienen en los dhos carros y otras personas con animo de venderlos en este rreal contra toda rraçon y leyes de su Magstad por deçir son esclavos y por otras rraçones fribolas sin q. lexitimen. poderlo haçer conforme a derecho."

[86] AHP 1649D, fr. 2145-2174: "en la dicha probencia del nuebo mejico la nacion de yndios apaches de nabajo sienpre ansido y son enemigos comunes"; "sujetos por bia de deposito a serbicio personal por quince años y los bendan y se dan por la cantedad q. les pareciere por paga de su trabajo por q. desta manera no tendran tanta ocacion de q. siendo mayores se bayan a su tierra…"; On the Mansos wanting to return to their country: "mediante el dho interprete y lo que ellos por señas dieron a entender Dixeron que Voluntariamente Havian venido con el dho andres de gracia y que del no havian rrezivido agravio, ni les devian cossa alguna y que querian Volverse a sus tierras en dhos carros…" For other examples of the language of "depósito" see AHP 1646A, Fr. 357b-379a; 1654B, fr. 778-789; 1654B, fr. 992-993; AHP 1660C, fr. 1375-1387; AGN Tierras 3268, 3283, and 3286.

Juan Manso petitioned in 1653, for example, to be able to sell six Apache boys he had ransomed from Manso Indians in New Mexico, noting that Apaches were "the nation at war with all of the Kingdom of New Mexico," and that the governor of New Mexico, Don Juan de Samaniego y Azaca, normally dispatched titles for them so that they might be taken out of New Mexico and sold "*en depósito*" to Spanish households, a fact that additional witnesses corroborated. It was because Manso had not been able to return to Santa Fe to request titles that he was now requesting written permission from the governor of Nueva Vizcaya to sell the captives.[87] By 1658, Juan Manso had in fact sold a number of Apaches in Parral for 100 pesos each, including twenty-four year old Margarita "of robust body with a scar on the left side of her face," seven year old Sebastian, "with big eyes and smallpox scars," and 28 year old Marzela, "tall and marked with lines (*rayada*)."[88]

"Temporal" Slavery in Parral

The fact that Parral residents routinely described Indian captivity as temporary "depósito" or "storage" in Spanish households warrants closer scrutiny. On the one hand,

[87] AHP 1653A, fr. 221-226. While Hendricks and Mandell have suggested that governors knew that their actions were plainly "illegal," in doing so they underestimate the importance of just war, "rescate," and the enslavement of criminals as sanctioned justification for Indian slavery. A number of witnesses corroborated Mansos' claims by drawing upon similar language: "dixo que lo que save es que la nacion apache que rreside en el reino del nuevo mexico siempre aestado alçada y rrevelada contra la rr.l corona Por lo qual los governadores de aquel rreino siempre les an echo guerra valiendose de los yndios y naciones amigas y fieles Pronunciando sentencias de muerte contra los enemigos y dando en su comformidad en deposito las piezas Pequeñas…"

[88] AHP 1660C, fr. 1375-1387; Descriptions of Indian slaves: "margarita que es de Resgate y tiene por señaz Robusta de cuerpo y tiene un lunar pardo en la cara en el lado ysquierdo y Junto al dicho lunar una señal de herida y agujeradaz entran las orejaz y sera al Parezer de beynti y cuatro años de edad poco maz o menos…"; "Sebastian que es de Resgate y tiene por señaz toda la cara con señalez de birguelas, y los ojos grandez carra aguileño no esta cristiano y sera al Parezer de siete años de edad Poco maz o menos y es de los contenidos en dicha sentenzia"; "Marzela que es de Resgate y tiene por señaz alta de cuerpo y una Raia por ensima de la nariz asta el mismo labio de arriba y la boca borada y trez Rayaz sobre la barba…y todos los pechos y brazos borados y un lunarsito de lo mismo ensima de las narizes y una señalita redonda de herida ensima del dicho lunarzito…"

in comparison to forms of chattel slavery characterized by hereditary property status, the trade in Apache captives to Parral during the mid-1600s might seem more a form of indentured servitude than a "slave trade." On the other hand, however, if theoretical definitions of slavery are useful for comparative context, understanding how captors and captives alike understood their own actions and circumstances must remain at the heart of historical analysis. To impose theoretical categories upon the past risks obscuring Parral residents' historically specific understandings of categories like "slave" and "servant."[89]

Cross-referencing court testimony with other types of archival records allows for some insight into the relationship between ideology and practice. Wills and testaments, for example, provide another means of accessing how residents may have understood their Apache captives in relation to the African slaves also present in Parral households. In October 1653, for instance, Captain Geronimo de Vega—the chief magistrate of Parral—received word that Antonio Rodriguez had "passed from this life." In order to execute Rodriguez's last will and testament, Vega traveled a few weeks later to his ranch a few miles from town. The ranch consisted of several houses along the Parral River that faced a silver mine. Among other possessions, Vega found several dozen mules, forty or so mares, a thirty-year old black slave, Juan Francisco, a forty-year old Apache Indian

[89] Scholars studying the North American West have drawn upon the language of "slavery" to describe situations that historical actors described otherwise. See Barr, "From Captives to Slaves," Brooks, *Captives & Cousins*, and Gutierrez, *When Jesus Came*. This approach reflects in part the assumption that the highly restricted nature of Indian slavery in Spanish America generated efforts to skirt the law by calling what was in fact "slavery" by other names. "*Rescate*," both Gutierrez and Brooks explain, was an "artifice" designed to justify profiting off of the sale of Native captives by labeling them with the euphemism "criado"—meaning literally "one who is raised up"—in order to provide a Christian pretext to the exploitation of Indian bondspersons. The fact that this type of reading against the grain of the archival record is not applied to laborers of Hispanic or African descent who also were referred to as "criados" appears to reflect, at least implicitly, the idea that the illegality of Indian slavery produced a context ripe for deceit and thus warranting special scrutiny. As I have sought to illustrate above, however, the illegality of Indian slavery as an explanation for Spanish behavior has been overdrawn, and further research into sixteenth and seventeenth century understandings of labor, liberty, and "slavery" is warranted.

women "in deposit" named Ines, and an Apache boy of about fourteen named Pedro.[90]

In observing Rodriguez's household, Vega immediately distinguished between his black slave and the Apaches "en depósito." That phrase—"in deposit" suggested a significant ideological distinction that distanced Indian captives' status from African slavery in religious terms. It remains difficult to determine what this distinction meant to Rodriguez or his Native and African laborers, however. He specified in his will, for example, that he had bought his black slave, Juan Francisco, from Capitan Pedro de Andrade, as demonstrated by the bill of sale in his records. He also declared "an Indian woman of the Apache nation, a slave, named Ines, with a two-year-old son that I bought from Francisco de Lima as slaves." As with his black slave, he noted a document that would testify to the sale, in this case "a letter of deposit." By invoking both the language of slavery and the law, Rodriguez stressed that he saw his Indians as possessions, "as slaves," whose possession was secured through legal documentation.[91]

What did Parral residents like Antonio Rodriguez mean when they described Indians in their households as "slaves"? First and foremost, slavery was a legal status, justified by capture in just war, "rescate" from infidels, or a criminal sentence. Through purchase, the holder of an Indian slave was entitled to their labor for a specified period of time, even if this labor was "against their will," or if the Indian might want to "return to their lands." In decrying the abuses of *repartimiento*, the labor draft system common in Nueva Vizcaya in the seventeenth century, individuals—including Indians themselves—

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[90] AHP 1653B, f. 1090-1100.

[91] Ibid.: "Ytten declaro por mis vienes una yndia de nasion Apache eslava llamada Ynes con un hijo de hedad de Dos años Poco mas o menos los quales conpre a francisco de lima por tales esclavos como consta de la carta de depossito…"; "Ytten Declaro Por mis vienes un Yndisuelo de nasion pache llamado Pedro el qual compre del dho francisco de lima por esclavo como consta del dePossito que tengo entre mis Papeles…"

might explain that they were being "treated like slaves." This common metaphor shed light on what both "liberty" and "slavery" meant, as Spaniards (and many Natives) contrasted slavery with Indian's liberty "to work for who one wishes." "Liberty" was also defined by the ability to return to one's home, and enjoy a more limited workday. Thus while *repartimiento* could be extremely harsh—and some Indian advocates declared it was worse than slavery in its effects on Native demographic decline—it was not understood to be the same thing as slavery.[92] What defined Apache captives in Parral as "slaves" to contemporaries was their sale, forced labor, and exile from their homelands—not permanent, hereditary bondage. This was true in surrounding regions as well, including Nuevo Leon, where men were sentenced to up to twenty years of slavery and women and children to between ten and fifteen years. In fact, children represented a large proportion of Indian slaves, in part because their term of "temporal slavery" did not begin until the age of twelve or fourteen and was thus more valuable. A six or seven-year old might labor for a total of twenty or more years before, at least in theory, receiving her manumission.[93]

The "temporal" nature of Indian slavery may help explain the price differential evident in both Nueva Vizcaya and Nuevo Leon between Indian and African slaves. In the late-1500s, for example, the price for Indian slaves averaged approximately seventy-five pesos in Nuevo Leon. In Nueva Vizcaya, it was not uncommon—as noted above—for an Indian woman to fetch between seventy-five and 100 pesos in the early-to-mid seventeenth century. Though such sums were significantly less than the 300 to 500 pesos

[92] I draw here upon primary sources as cited in notes 70, 83, and 86 above and also on Brian Ownesby's discussion of how metaphors of slavery revealed Indian and Spanish ideas about liberty in 17th century Native petitions for redress of grievances. See Ownesby, *Empire of Law and Indian Justice*, especially Chapter 5. On temporal slavery see also José Cuello, "The Persistence of Indian Slavery."
[93] Ibid.

that an African slave might bring, an Indian slave was nonetheless a significant investment, a fact that is illustrated by owners' concerns over legal title, and attention to identifying slaves through physical markings. In December 1654, for example, a Quivira Indian woman, with a blue line down her face and nose and both hands painted with lines, "seven or eight years old" and "not a Christian" was transferred to Doña Antonia de Alarcon Faxardo, the legitimate wife of Juan Lorenzo Bernardo. She then transferred the title to Don Andres de Fargo, *regidor* and citizen of Mexico, who gave her 100 pesos.[94] On the July 11th of that year Francisco de Lima transferred legal title to the personal service of an Apache Indian woman named Gracia, "thirty-seven years old more or less," and a little Indian boy, seven or eight years old named Domingo Niculas to Bartolomé Hernandez for 100 pesos. Lima noted that Gracia had "three marks, one in the middle of the face and one on each cheek." Domingo Nicolás had a sign made on his stomach "with fire." In light of practices carried out elsewhere in Spanish America, especially the debates in the 1630s and 1650s in Chile over branding Indian slaves, such descriptions in Parral slave slaves suggests that exported New Mexican Indians may also have been branded.[95]

Legal status, price, and bodily markings go only so far in understanding slavery in communities like Parral, however. African, Native, and "Chino" laborers in Parral demonstrated a wide range of life experiences, whether "slave," "servant," or "free." When miner Juan Fernandez de Carrión, for example, acquired five or six Indians from the salt fields around El Paso in 1667, the three Native captives that worked with mercury in his mine died within four years. On the opposing end of the spectrum, Native children

[94] AHP Parral 1654B, fr. 992-993.
[95] AHP 1654B, fr. 778-779; On Chile debates see Konetzke, *Colección*, Vol. 2, Tomo 1, 349-353.

were the most likely to learn Spanish, receive baptism, and upon reaching adulthood, labor for wages, though it is difficult to track the degree to which slavery was in fact a "temporal" condition for them. Especially for Native adults, the meaning of "liberty"—if they in fact received it after 10 to 20 years of labor—was certainly qualified by stipulations that Apaches "never be allowed to return" to New Mexico. If in theory Indian slaves were distinguished from African slaves in the emphasis on their "good treatment" and "Christianization," in practice there does not seem to have been significant divergence in treatment, and both were baptized and expected to attend mass. In some cases, slaves and servants exercised significant freedom of moment, in others they were kept cloistered in the household.[96]

Criminal cases and investigations allow for further insight into household relations. Contrary to the common assumption that Indian captives were "sold into the mines," few seem to have been assigned to labor in actual mines. In September 1655, for example, two Indian slaves were implicated in a ring of petty thefts. Juan Cortés, an "Apache Indian Slave," and Nicolás Bargas "a Mulato Slave" both helped manufacture bars of silver at one of Parral's silver smelters. In the process, they had apparently stolen "many pieces of silver on different occasions," or so alleged Captain Valerio Cortés, Juan's master. In subsequent investigations, Juan admitted everything, saying that he had stolen pieces of silver seven times and that Nicolás, the mulatto slave, had done so another four times. They took the silver pieces to various merchants and pawn shops around town, where they received a few pesos for each. One of the merchants that had bought silver from Juan explained his reasoning--it was simply an old custom to buy little

[96] On Carrión and Indians working with mercury see Craumessel, *Poblar la Frontera*, 196. For the permanent exile of Apaches see AHP 1660C, fr. 1278-1284: "los cuales en ningun tiempo Puedan bolver a este dho Reyno."

pieces of silver from poor workers.[97]

This trial suggests some of the tasks that Indian and African slaves performed in Parral, in this case less onerous work than many *repartimiento* Indians performed. Though Juan and Nicolás both had to remain in Parral indefinitely, unlike draft laborers, they exercised relatively free movement within the town and slipped pieces of silver into their pockets to peddle for a few pesos to local merchants. In fact, it is tempting to even find in this case hints of a world of camaraderie between an Indian, African, and "Chino" slave, who testified to his interactions with Juan and Nicolás but denied involvement in the theft of silver. Such a reading is complicated, however, by the fact that these slaves testified against one another and Juan's insistence on Nicolás' role led him to face torture. While Nicolás's owner vigorously defended him against the charges of Juan, both were in the end sentenced to terms of *mortero*, a harsh form of convict labor, as punishment: Juan for two years, Nicolás for one.[98]

If Indian and African men seemed to have enjoyed some opportunity for mobility and even personal gain, some female slaves lived more cloistered lives. In March 1671, for example, Nicolás Valderrama notified authorities that an Apache woman that he had in his service had hung herself. When a Parral magistrate journeyed to his house to investigate, he explained that in a corral he viewed an Indian woman, who appeared to be dead, with a rope tied around her neck and blood seeping from her mouth.[99]

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[97] AHP 1655B, f. 823-882: "Es costumbre en los r.s de minas y en este lo ha sido desde que se descubrio el comprar plata los mercaderez a qualquiera genero de gente que la llegan a bender aun que sean esclavos." For a similar case of collusion between Indian and African slaves see AHP 1672b, f. 1291-1323. On "sale into the mines" see for example Pekka Hämäläinen, *The Comanche Empire*,

[98] Ibid. A sentence to "mortero" meant physically demanding labor: public works projects or ore processing, for example.

[99] AHP 1670b f. 878-883: Niculasa testified that "lo q. save y pasa es que anoche v.te y tres del corriente estando en la cocina y casa de su amo a la ora de dormir como otras muchas noches la encerro su amo

In the ensuing investigation, both African and Indian slaves testified about her state of mind and the circumstances and conditions of labor in Valderrama's household. A "Mulata" slave named Niculasa, for example, explained that the past night, "like many nights before," she had been chained to a pole in the kitchen, where she slept next to an Apache Indian woman named Francisca and two others named Magdalena and Mariquita. They fell asleep, but Francisca was not feeling well, and before dawn she had left the other women. In the morning, upon rising, Elena, "*la negrita*," unchained her and she began to prepare chocolate for her masters, "as she had done other times," and going to give a little stew to Francisca, she discovered her dead, noting that she had hung herself. Asked if her masters had whipped her, or how they treated their servants, "whether slave or free," she noted that she was chained because she had tried to escape once after being whipped. Her master and mistress lashed her and the other servants frequently, "both the Apaches and the blacks." Manquita, an Apache Indian woman, similarly noted that she had been enclosed in the kitchen with the other servants the night before and explained that her mistress lashed all of them frequently but they had not lashed Francisca the night before because she was sick. She also explained that an Indian woman named Jazinta had died from a whipping several years ago.[100]

The testimony generated in this case provides a stark, if fragmentary, view of what one household in Parral was like—Indians and African slaves sleeping side by side in a kitchen, facing frequent lashings, one of them chained to a pole. It also illustrates how slavery in Parral was characterized by labor in households and workshops that often contained both Indian and African captives. Residents bought Native men, women, and

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estando aprisionada y la amarro con una cadena a un palo q. esta dentro de la cocina echandose en un candado."

[100] Ibid.

children transported from New Mexico and the South Plains as "temporal" slaves and drew upon legal practices to secure their investments. Occasionally, decrees sought to rein in "abuses" of widely accepted customs of Indian enslavement, but such decrees often clarified particular categories of Native that could be enslaved, rather than expressing any blanket prohibition.

Correspondence between the governor of Nueva Vizcaya, the *audiencia* of Guadalajara, and the Crown in response to one such order in 1659 illustrates well the ways in which local residents understood Indian slavery by the mid-1600s. After a public crier had announced that all Indians that had been taken as slaves in recent years in Nueva Vizcaya, Sonora, and Nuevo Leon should be freed, local residents brought forward forty-seven Indian slaves that had been captured in the wars of Nueva Vizcaya's previous governor. Writing to the court in Guadalajara, however, the present governor explained that the order had generated widespread confusion. As he explained it, there were Indian captives of several different "conditions" in his jurisdiction, and he had doubts about whether they too should be freed.[101]

Governor Pacheco's "doubts" illustrate both contemporary practices and how local residents understood their actions to be justified. First, he inquired about the Indians captured in New Mexico in "just wars" and exported with titles issued by New Mexican governors. There were "many of this type" in Nueva Vizcaya and some were also passed on to New Spain, he explained. Asking if they too should be set free, he also inquired about whether the buyers should be allowed to request the sale prices from the

[101] Correspondence between King Philip IV and Audiencia of Guadalajara begins with phrase "Tocante a la libertad de los naturales," 15 April 1660, AGN Tierras 3286: the King here was summarizing the correpondence of Governor Pacheco, noting that "por aber otros [Indios] de diferente calidad osabia paresido consultar a la dha mi audiencia sobre su estado."

original sellers. This "doubt" stressed legal practices—just war, titles—and clearly indicated that local residents had not interpreted the royal order to encompass their New Mexican slaves.[102]

Secondly, Pacheco inquired about Indians that had committed crimes in the province and had received sentences of forced labor in local mines or workshops, given that lashings or banishment "were not sufficient punishment." Reflecting the tradition of temporary slavery for convicts, this doubt intertwined with Pacheco's third point of confusion: what to do with the women and children captured in the lands of Indians who had "risen up in rebellion" after local officials had caught them "in the act of stealing horse herds." Indicating how contested sovereignty in Northern New Spain intertwined with questions of captivity and slavery, this third doubt also spoke to the long-standing question of whether Native women and children could be enslaved.[103]

In response, an *audiencia* judge in Guadalajara explained that the first category, Indians transported from New Mexico, should be set free, and buyers could request a refund from the original sellers. The second practice—the enslavement of Indian criminals—was deemed acceptable as long as trials for the crimes had been conducted in accordance with the law. Finally, in regards to the third category, the audiencia noted that cases should be brought against Indian aggressors who stole the horse herds, but that women and children should be allowed to live "in their barbarous way of life in their lands." The fiscal explained—incorrectly, it must be noted—that since none of these Indians had received the opportunity to be baptized or had pledged obedience to the royal

[102] Ibid: "de los quales abia muchos en esa prov.a por donde pasavan otros a mi nueba españa."
[103] Ibid.: que se aria de los que abiendo cometido delitos en esa prov.a y no meresiendo por ellos pena Capital ni siendolo p.a dhos yndios bastante la de destierro…o alotes."

crown, they needed to be brought into the Spanish sphere "through love, not force."[104]

Like occasional cedulas in preceding years that sought to mitigate the worst "abuses" of the Indian slave trade, the 1659 decree did not restrict Indian slavery altogether. Both Pacheco's "doubts" and the Audiencia of Guadalajara's response illustrate acceptance of the idea that some Native groups warranted capture and "temporal" slavery or "permanent" exile. One the one hand, the order challenged the circulation of Indian slaves as a result of "just war," but on the other hand, it sanctioned the "temporal" enslavement of criminals and male "rebels." In this vein, a decree the next year mandated that Apache rebels be shipped out of the region "to make their return more difficult." If it produced the emancipation of some Indian slaves, then, the 1659 *cedula*, and the surrounding discussion of it, also illustrated and responded to contemporary practices: in particular, the circulation of Native slaves beyond the Greater Rio Grande.[105]

The Circulation of Indian Captives Beyond Parral

For a surprising number of Natives, the experience of displacement did not end in Parral. Spanish residents sold more than two hundred Tepehuan Indians in Durango in 1604, friars in New Mexico lamented that governors there sent "many" Indians to Mexico, and residents in Nuevo Leon reportedly exported Indians from that region from early settlement into the mid-1600s.[106] While references to such long-distance displacements often provide only tantalizing hints rather than descriptive detail,

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[104] Ibid: no alla por donde puedan ser conprehendidos dha chusma de mujeres y muchachos ygnozentes y que se contienen en su modo barbaro de bibir en sus tierras sin aber meresido en la gua del bautpismo ni aberestado nunca en la obediencia de nra R.l corona que a estos mas por amor que por Rigor se an de reducir al gremio de la s.ta fe catholica."

[105] Ibid. and AHP 1660C, f. 1278-1284.

[106] See Craumessel, *Poblar la Frontera*, 189; José Cuello, "The Persistence of Indian Slavery"; Zavala, *Los Esclavos Indios*.

occasionally records do provide some indication of the circumstances under which some captives were sent to Mexico City and other urban centers. In 1652, for example, Spanish soldiers captured a Toboso Indian woman named Isabel and her two-year-old son. In front of Parral authorities, Isabel explained that she had escaped from a convoy of Indian captives bound for Mexico City. This shipment was rooted in recent campaigns by Spanish soldiers and Native allies against Tobosos who had alleged engaged in livestock rustling. The captain of these efforts had reportedly killed 300 Tobosos and managed to capture 180 women and children in one autumn campaign in the mountains. As they had done in the past, the soldiers sold some of these captives in Parral, while attempting to transport others further south—in this case to Mexico City.[107]

On the way to Mexico, however, some captives had escaped, including Isabel. Asked to explain the motives for her escape from the convoy bound for Mexico, Isabel noted that neither she nor other captives had "[wanted] to take their children to Mexico." Carrying her two-year-old child, she had gone in search of her relatives in "her country," and had unfortunately crossed paths with Spanish soldiers who re-captured her. On the 7th of June in 1652, a public auction for Isabel and her son proceeded, with "many citizens and miners" present. Juan Andres, the town crier, asked in a loud voice if "any one wants to buy this Indian and her son," specifying that the son's ten years of temporal slavery "would not start counting until he was 14." Captain Juan Leal, a citizen and miner in Parral, offered 100 pesos—a typical sum—and since no one exceed his bid, he received title to the two captives.[108]

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[107] For the campaign against the Tobosos see AGI Guadalajara 29 (1652), AHP 1652B, fr. 301-620; Case of Isabel is in AHP 1655A, fr. 102-107.

[108] Ibid.: "salio en publica almoneda en la plaza deste R.l la dha Yndia con su hijo contenida en el y en pre.a del S.or Gov.or y de otras personas vezinos y mineros, se pregono en altas Bozes por voz de Ju.o andres

Isabela and her son's experience reflected local practices of Indian slavery while hinting at the circulation of Native captives beyond Parral to central New Spain. Captured and transported far from her homeland in Greater Rio Grande, she had attempted to escape "to keep her son from being sent to Mexico." While journeying home in search of kin, she had been recaptured and sold in a public auction for a sizeable sum. Her sale was understood to be "temporary" and she was supposed to be instructed in Catholicism and "treated well." For both her and her son, the "crimes" of their kin served as a legitimate justification for slavery; a two-year old child, who clearly had made no contribution to the decision to rebel or flee a mission, or steal livestock, or kill Spaniards, thus faced more than twenty-years of forced labor.[109]

But what of the other Toboso, Tepehuan, or Apache captives sent to central New Spain? Power struggles between ecclesiastical and secular elites occasionally produced documents that shed further light on what the broader experience of Native captives sent beyond Parral may have been like. One of the most vivid conflicts of mid-seventeenth century New Mexico was the Inquisition trial of Governor Bernardo de Mendizabal. Governor Mendizabal had from the beginning of his term run into conflict with the head of the Franciscan missions that dominated religious life in the province by asserting secular over religious authority, and intervening in ecclesiastical affairs. Supported by Santa Fe's cabildo, or town council, he had irritated many local residents by raising the daily wage for Native laborers from ½ to 1 real and requiring that they be fed. Of even greater concern to the Franciscans, he had proved remarkably tolerant of Native religious

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yndio Ladino, quien quisiere comprar esta Yndia, con su hijo por diez años de Serv.o cada uno, spezificando en dho pregon q. los diez años de serv.o del Yndiesuelo ande empezar a correr desde edad de catorze años…"

[109] Ibid: "dixo que por no llevar sus hijos a mexico se huieron…"

rites, and had allegedly encouraged them to perform the Katsina dance, which the friars had long associated with the work of the devil. Eventually, the friars built up enough complaints to initiate an inquiry by the Holy Inquisition, based on his heretical statements, lack of religiosity, and even possible Judaism.[110]

The dispute between Mendizabal and the custodian of the Franciscan missions sparked discussion of the enslavement of local Indians and their transport out of New Mexico. Custodian Juan Ramirez explained to the viceroy in 1661 that recent governors of New Mexico, including Mendizabal, had demonstrated "very great covetousness," by sending squadrons of men to capture heathen Indians in order to "send them to the camp and mines of El Parral to sell." He argued that this slave trade sowed "mortal hatred for our holy faith and enmity for the Spanish nation." In response to these serious charges, Mendizabal countered that it was in fact Fray Juan Ramirez who had seized large numbers of heathen men and women, "who due to their suffering from hunger, had entered the Christian pueblos in quest of succor." He explained the Ramirez took "forty-three of those in this condition, sold and disposed of them, and charged the deed to the accused." In fact, Ramirez admitted to these actions in part, though he cast them in benevolent terms. He explained how the friars had "rescued some boys and girls from the empire of the devil and now have them as gentle, peaceable Christians, and wholly free." It was because he did not allow the governor to sell them in Parral that "the governor so abominates the religious." Clearly, if the friar and governor differed in rhetoric, both accepted the potential utility of Indian captivity more generally.[111]

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[110] AGN Tierras 3268, 3283, 3286; AGN Inquisicion, Vol. 502; For the broader context of this case see Gutierrez, *When Jesus Came*; Frances V. Scholes, *Troubles Times in New Mexico, 1659-1670* (New York: AMS Press, 1977).

[111] "Case of the fiscal of the Holy Office against Bernardo López de Mendizábal," in Hackett, *Historical*

Subsequent investigations revealed that Mendizabal had in fact sent seventy captives to sell in Parral, and recently sold another group of Natives for more than 1,000 pesos in Sonora. If he had perhaps looked forward to his post in New Mexico—such assignments generated opportunity for financial gain—by November 1662 all had gone terribly wrong. A new governor, Diego de Peñalosa, had arrived in Santa Fe to begin a customary review or *residencia* of Mendizabal's term in office. He found that Mendizabal had abused his power, forcing Christian Indians to labor for him against their will, initiating military campaigns against peaceful Native groups, and generally taking great care to make profit for himself rather than secure the peace and prosperity of New Mexico. Meanwhile, Fray Ramirez continued to build an impressive case against Mendizabal, amounting to more than thirty charges in all. Not only had Mendizabal captured "peaceful" Indians and sent them to New Spain to sell, but he had allegedly declared himself the "universal head" of New Mexico with authority over all religious affairs. He claimed that "only Jesus Christ could be a better governor than him" and last but not least, he and his wife Doña Theresa had attended religious services quite irregularly, and were often late when they did arrive. This was enough for the Mexican Inquisition to embargo the couple's possessions, arrest them, and send them south to Mexico City to face trial.[112]

The attention of the Inquisition shed light on Native captives in New Spain—dozens sent by Mendizabal and his allies to sell, others "gifted" by Peñalosa or Ramirez to their acquaintances, and others accompanying Mendizabal and his wife. In fact, during 1663, the Holy Inquisition distributed a number of Native captives that had arrived in

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Documents, Vol. 3.

[112] Gutierrez, *When Jesus Came*, 125-127.

Mexico City amidst the turmoil in New Mexico. Taking advantage of the situation in Santa Fe, for example, Peñalosa had seized a large number of Mendizabal's Indian domestics and had begun "gifting" these to acquaintances in Mexico City. Whether Peñalosa's practice was innovative or echoed a longer tradition is unclear, but in March 1663, residents of Mexico City began to petition that Peñalosa's "gifts," which the Inquisition had embargoed, be released to them. Carlos de Siguenz noted that Peñalosa had sent him a gift of "a little Chichimec girl" for him to teach how to work and instruct in the doctrines of the Catholic faith, as well as a chest with a dozen drawers and some pine nuts. Don Francisco Alfonso de Valdes noted that Peñalosa had sent him a gift of a "little Chichimec boy and two little Chichimec girls" as well as a carpet "of the type of that land" and some pine nuts. A letter enclosed for his wife noted that the little Indian girls should serve Doña Juanica. Peñalosa's letter and gift to Doña Francisca de Alzate was perhaps most descriptive. Not only was he sending pine nuts, the letter explained, but a ten-year old Apache Indian girl named Ana. This present "of angelical beauty in the form of an Apache" was intended to show "his best wishes" to the "deserving" Doña. He noted that Ana even had some early grasp of "our language."[113]

Meanwhile, in April 1663, Indians that had been in the service of Mendizabal and his wife began to arrive as well. These captives soon gained the attention of the Viceroy of New Spain and other local elites. Traveling out to the Pueblo de Guadalupe where the Inquisition was housing the Indian women and men, the viceroy ordered that they be shown to him, and that since they were "free" and "because they could not be sold" he suggested that they be donated to the royal palace. The inquisitors granted this request,

[113] AGN Tierras 3283: For gifting language, "si a medida de mi desear y su merezer de vmd ubiera de Proporsionar la yndiesuela q. remito solisitara una angelical hermosura en forma de apachi de cuia nasion es ana de 10 años cristiana y con algunas prinsipios de nuestro ydioma…"

and Michaela, Isabela, and Ines—all fourteen or fifteen years old—traveled with the viceroy into Mexico City.[114]

The language used to discuss Native captives echoed recent royal decrees generated at least in part in response to the practices brought to light in the trial of Mendizabal. Elites involved in the circulation of Natives increasingly spoke of them as "gifts" and testified to their "complete liberty." Even Mendizabal, for instance, explained to the Inquisition that he had only sold Native captives "when it had been permitted" and that those in his service were entirely free and "without any charge of slavery."[115]

Attention to the fate of captives "gifted" or distributed by the Holy Inquisition in Mexico City qualifies the significance of "free" status for Native captives sent hundreds of miles from their homelands, however. As in Parral, assimilation into society was most possible for the youngest of captives. As noted above, both Native and Hispanic groups desired young captives in part because they viewed them as the most able to adapt—and the most likely to provide useful long-term labor. Thus Captain Toribio, for example, petitioned the Inquisition to be returned Juanchillo Toribio, "a heathen of seven or eight years-old," noting that he had rescued the boy from "the civil wars that the Natives of New Mexico had with each other." Having "raised him," the Captain feared that the boy was sick, naked, and heartbroken in his absence.[116]

Other Mexico City residents petitioned to receive adults, providing the formulaic

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[114] Ibid.: "per no ser bienes vendibles."

[115] Ibid.: See Mendizabal, for example, on his captives: "y le remitio mucha cantidad de hacienda, y de pieças de Indios de Apaches de empeño, quando estaba corriente, y era permitido"; de las quales piesas unas fueron adquiridas por bia de rresgate y otras eran dadas de rregalo por aglunas perss.as a la dha su muger y todas las tenia Para su serv.o sin cargo de esclavitud."

[116] Ibid.: "Digo que entre las cosas que enbargaron fueron dos Indias havido de Rescate de guerras sibiles que unos tienen con dhos que el uno de ellos se llama Pedro y es de edad de dose años y el otro se llama Ju.o y por otro nonbre toribio de eda de ocho o nuebe años y este ultimo esta depositado en fran.co maldonado dueño de carros y como es muchacho el dho Yndio y le e criado se alla desconsolado y enfermo y desnudo."

promise "to instruct them and indoctrinate them," but clearly also hoping that they might fulfill immediate labor needs. Doña Ana Muñez de Rojas, for instance, petitioned in June 1663 to receive "a Chichimeca to teach and indoctrinate." While she promised to pay the Indian girl one peso per month, she returned a month later and explained that since Maria was naked, it was necessary to buy her clothing, and she also had to pay for a blanket for her to sleep on. Moreover, until she was further "instructed" her service was not worth anything, and she thus hoped that the inquisitors would see fit to relieve her of having to pay Maria for the next six months. They granted this request, and a year later Doña Ana returned again with the same request—to not have to pay Maria because of the cost of clothing her. This time she noted that "she had baptized her, and set to work on instructing her in Christian doctrines."[117]

For an Apache Indian like Maria, the line Spaniards drew between "free" status and "slavery" must have been ambiguous. Sleeping on a blanket, unpaid, and compelled to perform domestic service, perhaps she found some meaning in baptism and Christian instruction; unfortunately, her understandings are not recorded in the historical record. In the end, religiosity did shape the course of her life in Mexico City, as Doña Ana entered into the service of the Viceroy, took Maria with her to the royal palace, and left her behind. What happened to Maria is revealed in the Doña's later petition to be relieved of any obligation to pay her one peso per month salary, which she seems to have succeeded in avoiding from the beginning. The Inquisition's investigation revealed that Maria "Apache" had spent years in the service of the viceroy, but he had later sent her to a nunnery. In 1672, almost ten years after arriving in Mexico City, Maria had died there of

[117] Ibid.: "obligandosse, a enseñar a Doctrinarla, Yndustriando la en nra Sancta fee Catholica…"; "se me deposito Una Chichimeca yamada maria la qual baptise e yndustrie a que supise la doctrina xtiana como se me mandó…"

smallpox.[118]

This Apache woman's experience in multiple households was characteristic of that of other Native captives in Mexico City. Recall that the Viceroy had received three other Indian women in 1663: "fourteen to fifteen year old" Michaela, Maria, and Ines. By 1665, however, the Inquisition had returned these captives to Doña Theresa de Aguilera, Mendizabal's widow. This had not prevented the viceroy's wife from wrangling to get them back, however. In fact, in January 1666, Doña Theresa presented serious allegations to the office of the Inquisition regarding the (now former) viceroy. She explained that he had scaled the walls of her estate, entered through the back corral, and stolen her three Indian servants: "Maria Quivira, Michaela Quivira, and Ines Apache." She demanded that they be returned to her, and that the perpetrators of this "grave" plot—the Count and his wife, Doña Maria de Cordova—be given punishment fitting the severity of their crime. In the days to follow, the Inquisition heard testimony that Doña Maria had tried to lure the Indian women into her service by relaying promises of better treatment through her African slaves, who spoke with Maria, Michaela, and Ines while collecting water from the neighborhood well. When the women vanished one evening, Doña Theresa had initially entertained the possibility that they had committed suicide, but rumors of Doña Maria's wrangling for their labor had convinced her that kidnapping was more likely. It was at this point that Doña Theresa decided to turn to the Inquisition for redress, since it was that office that had returned her servants to her in the first place.[119]

The ultimate fate of Maria, Michaela, and Ines is unclear, as the outcome of the

[118] AGN Tierras 3283.

[119] AGN Tierras 3268: "haviendo hablado los criados de dho s.or conde con ellas antecedentemente segun he tenido not.a con q. con evidencia se convence el haver cometido el dho delicto grave…"

petition is not extant in the records of the Inquisition. Whether they were "kidnapped," had chosen to flee to a new household, or had sought to escape Mexico altogether, their life stories reflect surprisingly common experiences of captivity and slavery in the Greater Rio Grande. As "Quiviras"—likely Wichita Indians—Maria and Michaela had probably been captured by Plains Apaches who often raided Wichita villages near present-day Kansas. Apache men carried the spoils of these raids, including buffalo hides and captives, hundreds of miles west to trading fairs in New Mexico. For Ines "Apache," captivity had perhaps begun at the hands of a Pueblo warrior or Spanish soldier who captured her in the retributive warfare that characterized Apache relations with some Pueblo and Spanish communities by the mid-seventeenth century. Whatever these women's precise places of origin, by the late-1650s they had ended up in the possession of the governor of New Mexico, Bernardo Lopez de Mendizabal, only to become unwitting captives to his troubles with the Holy Inquisition that sent them hundreds of miles south to Mexico City. It was years later, long after Mendizabal had died in prison and the Inquisition had exonerated him of his alleged heresies posthumously, that these Native women became objects of a new dispute between Mendizabal's widow and a former viceroy over their labor. Whether captives, slaves, or possessions of the Holy Inquisition, they had traveled through multiple social worlds since entering into captivity, from their home villages or mountain encampments, through the Borderlands trade, and eventually into the towns and urban centers of New Spain.[120]

[120] Ibid. For a recent account of the circulation of Indian women from Texas to Louisiana that similarly emphasizes coercion over agency see Juliana Barr, "From Captives to Slaves."

The Borderland Between Slavery and Liberty

By the 1670s, royal decrees had narrowed possibilities for Indian enslavement, and Spanish elites from New Mexico to Parral to Mexico City spoke of "gifting" free Indians to their acquaintances "without any charge of slavery." Such language reflected the ongoing dialectic between local power relations, customary practice, and royal decrees. If labels other than "slavery" came to dominate discussions of Indian captivity after the 1670s, it is clear that legal prohibitions did more than just produce changes in the way individuals *talked* about the captive trade. In fact, Parral residents freed 202 Indian slaves during 1671, and evidence also suggests that new prohibitions affected the potential financial rewards of trading in Indian captives. Questions about legality posed risks to the security of one's investment, and while an Indian girl with legal title had been worth as much as 100 pesos in the mid-1600s, by 1718, a man could explain in his will that he was paying a debt of "a few pesos" with a little Indian girl. Subsequent references to the sale of Indians in kind or via barter suggest the collapse of a lucrative market in Native slaves in Nueva Vizcaya.[121]

What did "liberty" mean for Indian slaves living through these legal and cultural changes? In April 1673, Governor Joseph de Garcia de Salzedo noted that he had received word that merchants had conducted a number of Apache captives south from New Mexico and sold them. Salzedo ordered that residents manifest all of these to local officials, and that they tell them that they were not slaves. Public criers read this order in San Bartolomé, San Francisco de Oro, San Diego, and in Parral, and local residents brought forward a number of Apache Indians, most of them quite young children.

[121] AGN Tierras 3283; AGI Guadalajara 12; Gutierrez, *When Jesus Came*, 152-153.

Captain Cristobal Ponce, for example, presented Francisca, a six-year old girl, while Domingo de la Puente brought forward Thomas, a six-year old boy. Juan de Oropessa manifested Joseph Antonio, a five-year old Apache child. While officials explained to them in Spanish that they were not slaves, they did not return them to their kin in New Mexico, but rather allowed them to remain in the possession of their previous masters, facing no apparent alternative to a life in domestic service.[122]

Some captives did come to understand the law and seek to use this knowledge to their advantage. Maria of the Conception, a native of New Mexico, appeared before the Mexican Inquisition in 1673 to petition for her freedom. She explained that as a child, she had entered into the possession of Diego de Peñalosa during the time he was governor of New Mexico. After the Inquisition had apprehended him, they had placed her in the care of Don Francisco Baldes, a citizen of Mexico City. Life in his house had "not been to her convenience," however, and she had recently escaped. Now Baldes "was after her," and she feared that he intended to "force her to serve him against her will." Describing her own understanding of the law, she noted that she should not be subject to bondage for any longer than "ten years." She had served this and much more, however, and pleaded that the inquisitors "grant her the freedom she should enjoy." A month later, the Inquisition decided that Maria should not be freed, given that their case against Peñalosa, her former master, was still pending.[123]

The image of a Native woman from New Mexico on the run from a Spanish elite

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[122] AHP 1671B, f. 1290-1312

[123] AGN Tierras 3283: "por no ser dha Cassa de mi convenençia me sali della y dho Capitan Don fran.co de baldes anda en mi busca y quiere forzarme a que le sirba contra mi voluntad…por que con forma a zedulas de su Mag.d no debo ser obligada a serbidumbre mas que por tiempo de dies Años los quales y muchos mas estado sujeta a ella como es publico y nott.o hecho el computo del tiempo que ha que se prendio el dho Don Diego de peñalosa y el que anteseedentemente le avia servido con que allegado el caso, de dever gossar de mi libertad…"

in Mexico City hints at practices of captivity and slavery that accompanied Spanish colonization throughout the Americas. Well into the seventeenth century, royal sanction for the enslavement of captives taken in a "just war," purchased from non-Christian Indians, or sentenced to criminal acts buttressed long-distance trades in Native captives. Contrasted with hereditary chattel slavery, the "temporal" nature of Indian slavery in Spanish America by the seventeenth century suggests a greater possibility to, in the very least, eventually choose to labor in a household that was, as Maria put it, "to one's convenience." In practice, however, for Indian captives—as for free and enslaved Africans, women, and non-elites more generally—life choices in the early modern world remained constrained by unequal power relations that often made the boundaries between slavery and liberty hazy indeed.[124]

The proliferation of statuses for Indian captives—"*esclavo*," "*naboria*," "*criado*"—casts light on religious motivations that for some Spaniards justified their exploitation of "heathen" Indian captives in distinction to slaves of African descent. If in some contexts, such terminology may have emerged as a means to subvert legal restrictions, the tension between law and social practice often cited in literature on Indian slavery has been overdrawn. If concern about the enslavability of Indians was evident from early colonization, so too were clear cases under which Natives could be legally enslaved: just war, *rescate*, and rebellion or criminality. The idea that hard labor and Christianization could go hand in hand had long been present in European societies' interactions with "non-believers," and transcended changes in legal categories over

[124] Ibid.

time.[125]

Debate over whether such legal messiness indicates that Native American captivity and slavery in New World societies was "less harsh" or "more benevolent" than chattel slavery in the end rings hollow. Scholars of African American slavery have revealed a diversity of labor regimes and slave experiences that varied based on climate, crop, and the peculiar individuality of masters and overseers. This diversity was also true for Native captives, who often labored alongside free and enslaved Africans in varied settings. At the same time, however, the distinct legal history of Native captivity as a practice within Euroamerican societies should not be disregarded as empty rhetoric. The actions of Native captives themselves are revealing in this regard. However constrained her power, however difficult her labor, Maria clearly saw some benefit to the promise of "liberty" that she believed she should legally enjoy. Her story is one of many, as in the coming century hundreds of Native captives would face similar challenges negotiating the borderlands of slavery far from homelands in the Greater Rio Grande.[126]

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[125] On the link between labor and Christianization, and European interactions with "non-believers" in the context of forced labor, see especially Robin Blackburn, *The Making of New World Slavery: From the Baroque to the Modern, 1492*-1800 (London: Verso, 1997), Chapter 1; Steven W. Hackel, *Children of Coyote, Missionaries of Saint Francis: Indian-Spanish Relations in Colonial California, 1769-1850* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2005), Chapter 7.

[126] For question of whether Native slavery was less harsh or more benevolent than African chattel slavery see Alan Gallay, ed., *Indian Slavery in Colonial America* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2009). On Maria's case see AGN Tierras 3283.

Chapter 2
"The Infamous Traffic": Markets in Apachean Captives in the Eighteenth Century

In the 1680s and 1690s, Indian rebellions in New Mexico and Nueva Vizcaya highlighted the precariousness of the Spanish presence in the Greater Rio Grande. As a severe drought strained the region during the 1670s, Spanish tribute and labor demands intertwined with a resurgence of Nativist spirituality to spur Puebloans to rise up against Spaniards in 1680. From Taos Pueblo, the medicine man Popé sent messengers to Puebloans across New Mexico, instructing them to return to past spiritual practices and cast out the Spanish invaders. Within months, the rebels had killed nearly 400 of the 2,500 Hispanic residents of New Mexico and sent survivors fleeing south to El Paso where they would remain for the next twelve years. In Nueva Vizcaya, similar concerns, and perhaps awareness of the Puebloan success, sparked several thousand Tarahumaras to join together to cast friars out of their mountain villages as well in 1690 and again in 1697. Such violence fueled some Spaniards to fear that all their kingdoms on the Northern frontier might be at risk of loss. Though armed Natives did not eliminate Spaniards from Nueva Vizcaya as they had in New Mexico, soldiers spent years "pacifying" the Tarahumara pueblos at great cost in life for both sides.[127]

In these late-17th century conflicts, migratory indigenous groups, including Apaches, Sumas, and Tobosos, played an important role. They had their own grievances, related especially to the regional captive trades in which enemy Native groups and

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[127] On Pueblo Revolt see Ramón Gutiérrez, *When Jesus came, the Corn Mothers Went Away: Marriage, Sexuality, and Power in New Mexico, 1500-1846* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1991), 130-140; James F. Brooks, *Captives & Cousins: Slavery, Kinship, and Community in the Southwest Borderlands* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2002), 52-57. On Tarahumara Rebellion see Susan Deeds, *Defiance and Deference in Mexico's Colonial North: Indians under Spanish Rule in Nueva Vizcaya* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 2003), 93-103.

Spaniards bought and sold their kin. In fact, the violence of the 1680s and 1690s proved a significant turning point in the history of slavery in the Greater Rio Grande. By disrupting the access of Nueva Vizcayan residents to captives from New Mexico, and leading some Hispanic residents to reevaluate long-standing practices of "temporal" Indian enslavement, the rebellions of the late-1600s helped bring a close to the lucrative market in Native slaves in Parral and its surroundings. Chapter 3 will examines this turn away from Indian enslavement south of the Rio Grande. First, however, another distinct market in Indian slaves warrants further analysis, as the Pueblo Revolt did not bring an end to slavery in the New Mexico borderlands, but helped set in motion geopolitical shifts that ultimately sparked new long-distance trades in Apachean captives at the hand of Comanche slave traders.[128]

Even as the Spanish crown issued new restrictions on Indian enslavement, Comanche Indian traders began arriving in newly resettled New Mexico with captives for sale. It was no coincidence that the Comanche emergence followed relatively soon after the end of Puebloan rebellions; Native groups had circulated the horses that Spaniards had abandoned during the Pueblo Revolts widely, and the "kumantsi"—as the Utes referred to people "who were considered related yet different"—had found distinct advantages in equestrianism. Because a horse could carry four times as much as a large dog and cover twice the distance in a day's travel, the Comanche were able to transport

[128] On the participation of mobile Native groups in rebellions in New Mexico see Brooks, *Captives & Cousins,* especially 52-53, and for Nueva Vizcaya, AHP-1684C and William H. Griffen, *Culture Change and Shifting Populations in Central Northern Mexico* (Tucson: Univerrsity of Arizona Press, 1969). On Comanche expansion see Gary Clayton Anderson, *The Indian Southwest, 1580-1830: Ethnogenesis and Reinvention* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1999); Brian DeLay, *War of a Thousand Deserts: Indian Raids and the U.S.-Mexican War* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2010); and Pekka Hämäläinen, *The Comanche Empire* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2009).

more trade items and hunt for prey over a much wider range than before. As Pekka Hämäläinen has explained, "their reach of trade was multiplied, as was their ability to wage war, plunder, and defend themselves."[129] For some, including the Utes, Comanches would initially be useful military allies; for others, especially Apachean agriculturalists in the Arkansas Valley, they would be a formidable, and ultimately insurmountable, enemy. It was during visits to these groups in present-day Colorado in 1706 that Spaniards received some of the first reports of the broader geopolitical changes underway on the South Plains.[130]

As Comanches overran Apache villages, they carried captives of war to trading fairs in New Mexico and the Louisiana borderlands. The value of Apachean captives acquired during the early 1700s fueled further Comanche expansion by providing access to horses and guns that helped them establish a vast trading complex in the South Plains by midcentury, displacing many of the region's former inhabitants—and especially Apachean groups—in the process. Spaniards' continued willingness to participate in Apache captive-trades reflected the limits of Spanish jurisdiction and sovereignty in an increasingly Comanche-dominated world north and east of the Rio Grande, more than a voracious demand for slave labor within colonial New Mexican society, however. The slave trade and Comanche power went hand in hand, as Comanches offered up Apache captives to Spanish and French buyers, demanding and receiving the horses and guns that gave them the decisive advantage over competitors as they gained control over much of the plains between New Mexico and Louisiana. Euroamericans, in other words, were not

[129] Hämäläinen, *Comanche Empire,* 24-25.

[130] On early Spanish awareness of Comanche, see especially Alfred Barnaby Thomas, ed., *After Coronado: Spanish Exploration Northeast of New Mexico, 1696-1727: Documents from the Archives of Spain, Mexico, and New Mexico* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1935).

alone in forging far-reaching trades in war captives in the North American West.[131]

Slavery in the "Asylum of Barbarity"

Violence and forced labor were not foreign to the Jicarilla Apache groups that Comanche encountered as they migrated south and east. Like other groups in the region, the Jicarillas raided enemy groups, obtaining booty and human captives in the process, especially from the Pawnee. Modern Athapaskan dialects do not distinguish between "captives" and "slaves," and historical evidence corroborates a certain fluidity in captives' experiences as outsiders within Jicarilla camps.[132] Following the final Pueblo revolt of 1696, for example, members of the Picuris pueblo had fled north to Apache villages in present-day Colorado rather than submitting again to Spanish rule. Though the original nature of this arrangement and the precise nature of interactions between the Picuris and the Apaches escape the historical record, by the early-1700s, the Picuris were reportedly requesting aid from Spaniards in New Mexico in order to rectify a situation gone awry. The fact that they were unable to escape on their own suggests a degree of coercion on the part of Apaches that illustrates that if the Picuris had originally joined with the Apache as allies, they now considered themselves to be captives.[133]

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[131] Hämäläinen discusses the role of the captive trading in fueling early Comanche expansion, but I pay greater attention to the Apache context and to understanding the fate of captives after sale in the ensuing pages. See his *Comanche Empire,* especially Chapter One, "Conquest." For the Louisiana context I draw from Juliana Barr, "From Captives to Slaves: Commodifying Indian Women in the Borderlands," *Journal of American History* 92, no. 1 (June 2005): 19-46. I also, however, question her broad conceptualization of "bondage" as a category for understanding Apache captives' experience.

[132] Dorothy Bray, White Mountain Apache Tribe., *Western Apache-English dictionary : a community-generated bilingual dictionary* (Tempe Ariz.: Bilingual Press, 1998); On Apache captivity practices see also Grenville Goodwin, *Western Apache raiding and warfare* (Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 1971); Morris Opler, *An Apache life-way : the economic, social, and religious institutions of the Chiricahua Indians* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1996). Alfonso Ortiz, ed., *Handbook of North American Indians, Volume 10* (Washington: Smithsonian Institution, 1978).

[133] Documents related to the Picurie case and resulting Spanish expedition are in Thomas, ed., *After Coronado*, 53-80. Hereafter cited as Ulibarri Expedition, p #.

In 1706, a Spanish expedition travelled north from New Mexico to Apache lands in present-day Southern Colorado to answer the Picuris' requests for aid. The governor of New Mexico, Don Francisco Cuervo y Valdez later explained his understanding of the situation to the king: the Picuris had foolishly chosen apostasy over Christian labor. By seeking refuge from Spanish labor demands "in the asylum of barbarity," the Picuris had found "labor twice as great as that which they had endured [in New Mexico]." Once they had arrived in Apache villages, the Apaches had made them captives and held them "as slaves." They had thenceforth been "obliged to do all kinds of work," or at least this is how the governor explained the story in his after-the-fact, dramatized account.[134]

In juxtaposing Spaniards and Apaches, it is unsurprising that a New Mexican governor would favor the former, and conclude without needing to see for himself that the Picuris were slaves and must be suffering harsh labor "twice as great" as they had in New Mexico. But if the 1706 expedition was influenced by a redemptive mission—to save Indian apostates that had strayed "into the asylum of barbarity"—it had other aims as well. In addition to redeeming the Picuris from captivity, its commander Juan de Ulibarri was to explore the "unknown land" of the Native peoples of the plains and to "take possession" of it in the name of the Spanish monarch. His entrée north from New Mexico signaled the expansionary spirit of the Spanish in the Greater Rio Grande in the early 1700s after the Pueblo and Tarahumara rebellions, even as it revealed Apache cultural practices and places of residence. By uncovering evidence of long-distance captive trades and the looming attacks of new migrants to the region, the Comanche, it

[134] "Don Francisco Cuervo y Valdez to his Majesty, Santa Fé, October 18, 1706," in Charles Wilson Hackett, ed., *Historical Documents Relating to New Mexico, Nueva Vizcaya and Approaches Thereto,* Volume 3 (Washington D.C.: Carnegie Institution of Washington, 1937), 383-384.

also provided early signs of shifting geopolitics on the Plains.[135]

Ulibarri set off in July 1706 with twenty-eight soldiers, twelve militiamen, and a group of about 100 Puebloan Indians. As they travelled north, the members of the expedition encountered a number of Apache groups Ulibarri called by the names of "Penxayes, Flecha de Palo, Lemitas, Nementina, Xicarilla, Carlanas." Such designations appear to have referred to the headmen or location of Apaches' matrilocal villages. The descendants of these groups would call themselves "Tinde"—the people. In the first Tinde villages Ulibarri encountered, he found men and women busy sowing corn, frijoles, and pumpkins. Echoing Spaniards general association of agriculture with civility, he declared them to be "very good people," and presented them with tobacco, knives, and biscuits while asking them to keep some worn-out horses for him to pick up upon his return.[136] In the following days they reached other Tinde camps, noting that on the banks of the Santa Ana River, "the heathen Apaches of the tribe called Penxayes have much land planted to corn, frijoles, and pumpkins." This group, though wary of the Spanish soldiers, eventually came down off the mesa and into the canyon to speak with Ulibarri. They were pleased that Ulibarri "permitted no injury to be done to their fields."[137]

In fact, Tinde agricultural villages may have reflected a broader shift among Apachean groups in the Arkansas River Valley towards farming over the course of the seventeenth century. As the Tinde had shifted towards semi-sedentary agricultural economy, they had come to rely on access to well watered fields along rivers like the Arkansas. The Comanche, in allying with the Utes and migrating onto the Plains were

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[135] Ibid. For Spanish ceremonialism and understandings of power in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries see Alejandro Cañeque, *The King's Living Image* (NewYork: Routledge, 2004).
[136] "The Diary of Juan de Ulibarri to El Cuartelejo, 1706," in Thomas, ed., *After Coronado*, p. 59-77 [quote on p. 64]; Hereafter cited as Ulibarri expedition, p #.
[137] Ulibarri expedition, 64.

making a shift in another direction: they were becoming nomadic bison hunters and long-distance traders. They too needed river valleys, however, to water and feed their horse herds. This was a conflict over natural resources that gave the Comanche a decided advantage. While the Apache could seek safety in numbers, their agricultural villages made easy targets for attacks by swift-moving Comanches on horseback. Moreover, as Comanche forged trading ties with Wichita and Caddoan peoples to the east and gained access to guns, powder, and shot from French traders, Apaches faced a new era in which they were outmatched technologically and strategically disadvantaged.[138]

Though he was unaware of this larger context, Ulibarri described the drawbacks of Apaches' relatively newfound attachment to the land. After breaking camp on July 28th, a Tinde man, two women, and three little boys had caught up to Ulibarri and his men. The man informed them that he was traveling to join the rest of his nation "in order to defend themselves together from the Utes and Comanches, who were coming to attack them according to the information of the rest of his tribe." The next day, they came across an Indian woman with a little girl gathering cherries who repeated the same news. While the relative proximity of Tinde villages allowed them to gather together to defend themselves, in doing so, they became even easier targets for their new enemies: the Utes and Comanches.[139]

After reaching the Arkansas River near present-day Pueblo, Colorado, the Spanish expedition learned that the Utes and Comanches represented only one of the new threats the Tinde were facing in 1706. After the party had lost their way, wandering off trails that

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[138] Waldo Wedel, *Central Plains prehistory: Holocene environments and culture change in the Republican River Basin* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1986), especially 135-151; Hämäläinen, *Comanche Empire*, 31-33; Delay, *War of a Thousand Deserts*, 10-13.

[139] Ulibarri expedition, 65.

Apaches marked with hummocks of grass, Ulibarri had sent some men to try to relocate the path. These men had wandered into another Tinde village and brought its Native headman back to speak with Ulibarri. He explained that four days prior, the Apache had killed a white man and his wife, scalping the woman and taking from them "a large gun, a kettle, a red-lined cap, and the powder which he carried." Though the Tinde man did not identify them as "French," further Spanish interrogation suggested to them that this couple were in fact French travelers from the East.[140]

In the ensuing days, Ulibarri sought to learn more about this French presence while continuing to track down the Picuris captives. Led by the Apache man who had first told them the story of the white man and his wife, the group journeyed together to the village of Tachichichi. As they approached, residents came out to meet them with "much bison meat…roasting ears of Indian corn, rejoicing, showing pleasure upon seeing us in their country." Much to the relief of the Spaniards, some Apaches also arrived with Picuris captives. Soon, the talk of diplomacy began, as "the whole day was spent in talking of peace and of the good relations which we were desirous of entering into with the Apaches."[141]

From the Tinde perspective, the Spanish presence may have seemed fortuitous, as they faced a rumored Comanche attack, other strange invaders—the French couple from the east—and more conventional worries, "the enmity which they have with the barbarous tribes of the Pawnees and Jumanos," as Ulibarri recorded their concerns. This situation likely shaped their generally friendly reception to this Spanish military expedition. If the Apache perhaps hoped for a temporal alliance among equals, however,

[140] Ibid., 66-67.
[141] Ibid., 68.

Ulibarri demonstrated his commitment to "take possession" of the Tinde lands. In one early ceremony of possession, for example, he renamed their village, calling it "Nuestra Señora de los Angeles Porsiuncula."[142]

As Ulibarri continued his journey through Tinde Country, he reached the largest settlements yet at El Cuartelejo, where men and women came "without arms, very happy and kindly disposed" to greet him. They brought buffalo meat, Indian corn, tamales, plums, and shared plentiful food for all to eat. Suggesting just how well the Tinde understood how to show hospitality to Spaniards, they had also set up a cross on a hill at the outskirts of their village. Together, the Spaniards and the Puebloans in the expedition went forward to kiss, adore, and worship the cross. Ensign Don Francisco de Valdes then carried it in procession through the village at the foot of the hill. It was just as these ceremonies concluded, Ulibarri noted, that the Picuris Indians emerged out of the huts "or little houses" within the village. He remembered that "after they understood everything, they cried for joy" aware that their redemption from captivity might be near.[143]

For Ulibarri, this was the culmination of his visit: enacting power through ceremony. The priest on the journey took the cross in his hand, beginning to recite the *Te Deum Laudemus*. Ensign Valdes then began to speak: "Knights, companions and friends: Let the broad new province of San Luis and the great settlement of the Santo Domingo of El Cuartelejo be pacified by the arms of us who are the vassals of our monarch, king, and natural lord, Don Philip V—may he live forever." Asking if there was anyone to contradict this action—there was not—he finished with chants of "Long live the King! Long live the King! Long live the King!" Valdes cut the air north, south, east, and west

[142] Ibid.
[143] Ibid., 68-69.

with his sword and signaled for guns to be fired. Everyone through their hats in the air, "made other signs of rejoicing, and the ceremony came to an end."[144]

The Tinde leaders and Spaniards now began negotiations for the ransom of the Picuris, but only after Ulibarri had renamed the rest of the villages at El Cuartelejo: "Nanahe" became "the Rancheria de San Agustin," "Adidasde" became "St. Joseph," and "Sanasesli" became "Nuestra Señora de Guadalupe." If the Tinde went through the motions of such ceremonies, they continued to push Ulibarri and his men to address their more practical concerns. They wanted the Spanish to go with them to attack the Pawnees and they wanted to be left a gun. After debating the matter, Ulibarri explained to them that they could not go to attack the Pawnees because they had made this visit only to retrieve the Picuris and their horses were too tired to go out for a battle. If the Apaches accepted this explanation, they nonetheless proved to be in no rush to satisfy Spanish demands.[145]

While Ulibarri waited for the Tinde to bring forward their Picuris captives, he observed the Tinde and their villages further. He was particularly struck by the fact that many Apaches wore crosses, medals, and rosaries around their neck that he could tell were very old. They explained that they wore them because "for many years they traded and had commerce with the Spaniards and they knew that because they wore crosses and rosaries and images of saints, they were very valiant." If Apaches viewed these items as possessing supernatural power, this hardly indicated, as Ulibarri later claimed that "they are a people more inclined toward our Catholic faith than any of all those that are thus reduced." At the same time, however, it did signal the deep roots of Apache trade with

[144] Ibid.
[145] Ibid., 70-73.

Puebloan peoples and New Mexico. In fact, they not only possessed crosses and medals, but also hatches, sword blades, harquebuses, and "copper things" they had acquired from their trading relations with New Mexico.[146] Ulibarri also noticed that "they have other firearms [besides the French gun] and among them three carbines which they said they had taken from the Pawnees." Describing the trade implications of their enmity with the Pawnees, they also explained how the Pawnees sold to the French the Apache women and children whom they took prisoners, and that the Apaches sold to the Spanish the Pawnees they captured.[147]

After camping at El Cuartelejo for several days, the expedition was finally able to complete the second half of their mission: the redemption of the Picuris. One Tinde headman had tried to keep his captives, and these had to be ransomed for thirteen horses. Ulibarri and his party then set out to return to New Mexico to trumpet their perceived success. They had ransomed sixty-two Picuris, including the most prominent Picuris men, and had left the Tinde "very pleased and contented." Ulibarri believed them to now be "subject to the obedience of his majesty." In this vein, he had personally approved the leadership of one man—Yndatiyuhe—to be the "Captain-Major of all Apacheria" and given him the "staff of command" to signal his position.[148]

Traveling through the Apache Rancherias on the path back to New Mexico, the party received the news on August 27th that the feared Comanche and Ute attack had occurred. Ulibarri seems to have given little thought to this news, however, anxious as he was to advise the governor of New Mexico "of the happy outcome of our expedition." By

[146] Ibid., 72.
[147] Ibid., 74.
[148] Ibid., 75-76.

September 1st, he was back in Santa Fe.[149]

"They No Longer Know Where to Go to Live in Safety"

In the immediate context of Ulibarri's expedition, it is understandable that Spanish officials might believe that through ceremony, reciprocal gift giving, and the assignment of titles—"Captain major of Apacheria"—they had begun the process of bringing the Tinde under Spanish sovereignty. The Tinde had of course read Spanish actions and symbols quite differently. If they had failed to gain Spanish support for a campaign against the Pawnees, they perhaps hoped that their return of the Picuris and their hospitality to Spanish travelers would be reciprocated through military aid in the future.[150]

It is only with the benefit of hindsight that both groups' hopes seem tragically misplaced. In 1706, Ulibarri could imagine that prayer and ceremony had brought a new province of Catholic Indians under Spanish vassalage—"the fertile agricultural plains of San Luis"—and Apache men could hope for Spanish aid for an attack on their traditional enemies the Pawnees, while drawing upon the supernatural power of crosses and rosaries. Within little more than ten years, however, another expansionary people—the Comanche—were overrunning the villages Ulibarri had renamed and "brought under Spanish vassalage." When Governor Don Antonio Valverde travelled back into Tinde Country in the fall of 1719, he was—like Ulibarri—greeted kindly. This time, however, the first Apaches he encountered en route immediately explained that "their enemies, the Comanches, were persecuting and killing their kinsmen and others of their nation." At the

[149] Ibid., 76-77.

[150] On Jicarilla (or Tinde) culture see Veronica E. Tiller, "Jicarilla Apache," in Alfonso Ortiz, ed., *Handbook of North American Indians* (Washington: Smithsonian Institution, 1978), 440-461.

village of La Jicarilla, a Tinde headman also raised the issue of the Comanche first, explaining that his people "were very sad and discouraged" because of the Ute and Comanche attacks. In fact, they had killed so many of the Tinde and "carried off their women and children captives" that they "now no longer knew where to go to live in safety."[151]

While Governor Valverde still noted fields of maize, frijoles, and squash—and described the ditches and canals that the Tinde used to irrigate their fields—he encountered suffering and fear everywhere in lieu of the bucolic agricultural scenes described by Ulibarri. On the 22nd of September, Apache chief Carlana met up with the Spanish expedition and explained that he had come fleeing from his country in the mountains. He described how he had led his people into "a land of Apaches whom Chief Flaco governed, because of the continual war that the Ute and Comanche enemy made upon them." At La Jicarilla, a Tinde headman noted similarly that the Comanche, with their Ute allies, had recently attacked one of the their rancherias, killing sixty and taking sixty-four women and children as captives. "Since that had happened they were sad and filled with misgiving and fear that the enemy might return and finish them entirely," he explained. Governor Valverde tried to console them by promising a campaign against the Comanche to "punish this nation which had caused such great damage to all of them," news they received "with much exalting."[152]

Carlana and other Apache men joined with the Spanish in this effort to "punish" the Comanches, but they were in the end unable to track them down. The Apache situation was truly desperate, as they not only faced Comanche assault, but also attacks

[151] "Diary of the Campaign of Governor Antonio de Valverde Against the Ute and Comanche Indians, 1719" in Thomas, ed., *After Coronado*, 112-113 [Hereafter cited as Valverde Diary, p. #].
[152] Valverde Diary, 114-115.

from their traditional enemies—the Pawnees, who benefitted from alliances with both the Wichita and the French. In fact, for Apaches beyond El Cuartelejo, it was the Pawnees and Wichita who had "seized their lands, and taken possession of them and held them from that time on." Central to these efforts was trade with the French, who supplied Apaches' enemies with guns, powder, and shot. Illustrating the importance of captives to this trade network, the Apaches explained that they had gained some awareness of the gun trade because "they were told by some women of their tribe who were made captives among the French on the occasions when they had war, but who had fled and returned."[153]

Ulibarri and Valverde's visits to Tinde country provided Spaniards with early awareness of the powerful new alliance that would ultimately transform the geopolitical and social landscape of the plains, as Comanches joined with Wichita and Caddoan allies to tap into trade with French Louisiana and forge trading posts of their own. It signaled too the central role that violence and captivity played in this process— sixty men killed and sixty-four women "carried off," for example; Apaches' awareness of the gun trade because of Apache women who had escaped from captivity among the French. Just as the Spanish had sent Apache captives in the seventeenth century to distant locales—from north of the Rio Grande to Parral, Sonora, and even Mexico City—Comanche mobility and alliances were built on trading Apache captives from the Plains to New Mexico and Louisiana. Attention to this trade provides an important context to understand Apache migrations closer to Spanish settlements in the eighteenth century, and illustrates how the long-distance displacement of war captives was far from an exclusively Spanish or

[153] Valverde Diary, 131-133.

Euroamerican practice.[154]

The Comanche Trade in Apache Captives in the Greater Rio Grande

The Comanche and Ute war parties that swept across the Tinde lands north and east of New Mexico kept no written records of their actions. Unlike Spanish military campaign diaries that sometimes described in vivid detail the successes, failures, and violence of battle, Comanche expansion is revealed in the archives only in fragments: through the reports of survivors that their camps had been scattered and destroyed, through Spanish expeditions chance encounters with smoldering Apache rancherias with the bodies of the dead piled in heaps. And yet, despite the destruction the Comanches wrought upon the Tinde who had lived and farmed on the plains, there were survivors. In fact, the captives taken in battle further fueled the Comanche ascendance, as they exchanged them in New Mexico for ironware and horses and in Louisiana for guns, powder, and shot. Tracing the journeys of these Apache captives maps the increasingly far-flung reach of the Comanche and their allies. By the mid-eighteenth century, they controlled virtually the entire Southern Plains region north of the Rio Grande. [155]

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[154] On Spanish trades in Apache captives in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries see Chapter 1 of this dissertation. For comparative context on the role of Native peoples in long-distance slave trades elsewhere in North America see Alan Gallay, *The Indian Slave Trade: The Rise of the English Empire in the American South, 1670-1717* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2002); Christina Snyder, *Slavery in Indian Country: The Changing Face of Captivity in Early America* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2010); Alan Gallay, *Indian slavery in Colonial America* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2009); Brett Rushforth, "'A Little Flesh We Offer You': The Origins of Indian Slavery in New France," *William and Mary Quarterly* LX, no. 4 (October 2003).

[155] For Comanche-Apache conflict see AGN-PI 12, 87, 102, 204; SANM II, Reel 12-13; AGI-Guadalajara 270, 276, 278, 284; Alfred Barnaby Thomas, *Forgotten Frontiers: A Study of the Spanish Indian Policy of Don Juan Bautista de Anza Governor of New Mexico, 1777-1787, From the Original Documents in the Archives of Spain, Mexico, and New Mexico* (University of Oklahoma Press, 1932), especially pgs. 301, 305, 306, 314, 324-325, 331, 387; Alfred Barnaby Thomas, *The Plains Indians and New Mexico, 1751-1778: A Collection of Documents Illustrative of the History of the Eastern Frontier of New Mexico* (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1940). On eighteenth-century Comanche trading practices see Pekka Hämäläinen, "The Western Comanche Trade Center: Rethinking the Plains Indian Trade System," *Western Historical Quarterly* 29 (Winter 1998): 485-513; "The Rise and Fall of Plains Indian

Captive exchange was woven into the fabric of life in the Borderlands. Almost every group had "enemies" they took captives from, adopted some captives they deemed useful, and sold others to trading partners. Apaches themselves described this nonchalantly to Spanish visitors: "The Pawnees sell our people to the French, just as we sell Pawnees to you."[156] But as an increasingly imperial power, the Comanche, as had the Spanish, transgressed the conventional mutuality of captive exchange in the numbers of Apaches and other Native captives they traded to Euroamerican buyers. In fact, 785 Apache baptisms took place in New Mexico between 1700 and 1760—the key decades of Comanche expansion through Apache territories—providing some measure of the volume of the captives Comanches carried to New Mexico.[157] The Comanche took these captives not primarily because they needed their labor, or because they needed to replenish their numbers, but as part of displacing Apaches from key river valleys and obtaining a useful human commodity that was valuable in obtaining what they did need: livestock, tools, and firearms. Trading in Apache captives, in other words, was not about forging mutual exchange relations between equals, but about establishing the dominant position in the Borderlands geopolitical landscape.[158]

The Comanche expansionary wars and trading delegations ranged far and wide, as

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Horse Cultures," *Journal of American History* 90 (December 2003): 833-862; "*The Politics of Grass: European Expansion, Ecological Change, and Indigenous Power In the Southwest Borderlands*," *WMQ* 67, 2 (April 2010), 173-208.

[156] On regional captivity practices see especially Brooks, *Captives & Cousins*, and "'This Evil Extends…Especially to the Feminine Sex': Negotiating Captivity in the New Mexico Borderlands," *Feminist Studies* 22 (Summer 1996): 279-309. Apache quote from Ulibarri expedition, 74.

[157] David M. Brugge, *Navajos in the Catholic Church Records of New Mexico, 1694-1875* (Tsaile, Ariz.: Navajo Community College Press, 1985), 22. Brugge's study of baptismal and burial records remains the preeminent source for data to quantify the significance of captivity in New Mexico. His figures distinguish between "Apaches" and "Navajos," who as Athapaskan speakers Spaniards sometimes lumped together in record-keeping.

[158] This emphasis is distinct from Brooks' focus on captive exchange as a mutually productive exchange relation in the context of relatively equal power relations. See Brooks, *Captives & Cousins*. I drawn in this critique from Barr, "From Captives to Slaves."

baptismal records in New Mexico reveal that they conducted Apaches, Utes, Paiutes, Crows, Pawnees, Kiowas, Taovayas and at least one Osage, Cheyenne, and Arapaho to sell in New Mexico. That Comanches were the primary sellers is supported by the fact that many of the ethnonyms mentioned in Catholic Church records are Comanche loan words. The term "Aa," for example, is clearly borrowed from Comanche "A?aa," their term for Crow Indians, but meaning literally "horn." The term for Kiowa "Caigua" seems likely to have been borrowed from Comanche "Kaaiwa," meaning "Coyote" or "Cheater"; the term "Guazaza" from Comanche "Wasaasi," for Osage Indians.[159]

Comanche captivity practices varied over time based on the needs of the group. By the nineteenth century, for instance, they appear to have captured mainly Hispanic boys who could more easily be incorporated as Comanches and help manage their large horse herds. Joaquín Rivaya-Martínez has compiled a sample of more than 1,000 Comanche captives, focusing especially on the late-18th and nineteenth centuries. He has found that more than half of captives taken by the Comanche (62.5%) were children between five and twelve years old, and that nearly three-fourths of captives (74.2%) were boys.[160] In the early-to-mid 1700s, however, women seemed to have been traded much more frequently. By trading captives, rather than primarily adopting them as they would in later years, the Comanche built their horse herds and acquired and maintained weapons supplies as they established a new life on the plains.[161]

Spanish chroniclers described these trading scenes in moralistic detail. Echoing

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[159] Joaquín Rivaya-Martínez, "Captivity and Adoption Among the Comanche Indians" (Ph.D. Dissertation, University of California-Los Angeles, 2006), 164. On distance of Comanche slave trading see also "Declaration of Fray Miguel de Menchero, May 10, 1744," in Hacket, Historical Documents Vol. 3, p. 400.

[160] Rivaya-Martínez, "Captivity and Adoption," 159-160.

[161] On predominance of female captives see "Report of the Reverend Father Provincial, Fray Pedro Serrano, to the Most Excellent Señor Viceroy, 1761," in Hackett, *Historical* Documents, Vol. 3, especially 481-486; Barr, "From Captives to Slaves"; Brooks, "This Evil Extends Especially…to the Feminine Sex."

the back and forth denunciations between church and civil officials in the 1600s, missionaries in New Mexico decried the abuses of New Mexico governors' by drawing upon horrific scenes of the "wrongs" committed at trading fairs in places like Pecos and Taos. Fray Andres Varo staged the scene perhaps the most vividly for his readers: "Oh how I wish that my grief might describe, in mere outline, what the most excellent viceroy might see [if he were to come to New Mexico]!" Amidst all the rhetorical flair, Varo described quite systematically how this trade worked, however. When the Comanche trading embassy arrived, they could not be missed. At least fifty and sometimes two hundred tents of Comanches "as well as other nations" came together, a multitude so great "it is impossible to enumerate them." The civil officials of New Mexico, the governor, *alcaldes*, and lieutenants prepared to join the trading fair or *rescate* by gathering as many horses as they could and as much ironware as possible: "axes, hoes, wedges, picks, bridles, machetes, daggers, and knives." In exchange, the Comanches offered deer and buffalo hides and Indian slaves "men and women, small and large, a great multitude of both sexes."[162]

Father Varo described the scene as a neo-Babylon where "cannibal barbarians" and Spaniards blinded by greed came together in debauchery highlighted by the purchase of captives from the Comanches. Such captives, he explained, were the "gold and silver and the richest treasure for the governors, who gorge themselves first with the largest mouthfuls from this table, while the rest eat the crumbs." It was a miracle that could only be attributed to God, he argued, that the "barbarians, cannibals, armed, and mixed with numerous apostates…do not ally themselves and unite in secret treason with the Christian

[162] Report of Reverend Father Fray Andrés Varo, 1751, as quoted in "Report of the Reverend Father Provincial, Fray Pedro Serrano, to the Most Excellent Señor Viceroy, 1761," in Hackett, *Historical* Documents, Vol. 3, p. 482-496 [quotes on p. 486]; Hereafter cited as "Varo Report."

Indians."[163]

Varo's condemnation of New Mexico's civil officials through a description of the Taos trading fairs culminated in his account of the moments leading up to the purchase of Apache captives. Varo described the ritualistic rape of Indian women before Comanches delivered captives to buyers. "If they are ten years old or over," he explained, "they deflower and corrupt them in the sight of innumerable assemblies of barbarians and Catholics." The Catholic men—greedy but powerless—watched helplessly until the Comanches handed the captives over saying, "Now you can take her—now she is good."[164]

The broader context of Varo's account raises questions about his descriptions of gang rapes of Apache women. For Father Varo, the greed, barbarism, and debauchery of these trading fairs were only one charge among many against the moral character of New Mexico's civil officials. He went on to describe how they "terrorized, subjugated, and oppressed" the "white people, soldiers, and those who are not soldiers." Accounts of sexual violence served to highlight the questionable moral character of Spanish governors as they saved women from the "barbarians" but had been unable to truly save them from harm. Governors' claimed to be motivated not by greed or sinfulness, but over a concern to try to assuage the inherent dangers of interethnic exchange. They explained that they had no choice but to purchase the captives, to "rescue" or "ransom" them from the devil,

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[163] Varo report, 487.

[164] Ibid. Such rapes are not described explicitly in other sources describing the Taos and Pecos trading fairs, but if the literary context of Varo's account raises questions about actual practice, such violence certainly would not be surprising given the ubiquity of sexual violence in the context of slavery elsewhere in North America. On sexual violence in early North America see Saidiya Hartman, *Scenes of subjection: terror, slavery, and self-making in nineteenth-century America* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997); Sharon Block, *Rape and sexual power in early America* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2006); Jennifer Morgan, *Laboring Women: Reproduction and Gender in New World Slavery* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2004); Kathleen DuVal, "Indian Intermarriage and Métissage in Colonial Louisiana," *The William and Mary Quarterly* 65, 2 (Apr., 2008), pp. 267-304.

from the heathenish Comanche.[165]

If the accounts of civil and religious officials vary from lauding *rescate* to condemning it, both suggested a central theme—Comanche domination—as Spaniards were forced to trade on Comanche terms, not on their own terms.[166] Between 1710 and 1750 the Comanche sold hundreds of these captives at New Mexican trading fairs. Recall that in 1714, Governor Mogollon had explained his concerns regarding the trade in Apache captives in New Mexico. He had received news that Apaches were being bought in *rescates* "large and small" by New Mexicans, as well as visitors from other jurisdictions, and that they took them away to "distinct places" to sell "without baptizing them." As he saw it, baptism was the "only reason the King tolerated this practice." He was worried about the possibility that Apache children would fall off the mules carrying them and be killed, as had happened already, without the benefit of that holy sacrament.[167]

It appears that New Mexicans followed his order, as ninety-seven Apachean captives were baptized in New Mexico in the 1720s, 136 in the 1730s, and 313 in the 1740s. Illustrating the broader significance of this trade, by 1732 Governor Cruzat y Governor had issued an order banning sale of "Apachuelos"— Apache youths—to "Natives of New Mexico." Again citing spiritual concerns, he explained that this trade was being carried out "with little consideration of the spiritual detriment it caused the

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[165] I am critiquing here historians' tendency to reproduce this account without placing in the context of Father Varo's wider critique of civil officials, see for example Hämäläinen, *Comanche Empire*, 45. In this critique I draw from Saidiya Hartman's work on the rhetorical ends achieved through scenes of violence, see Hartman, *Scenes of Subjection*, especially 17-48.

[166] Varo Report, 487-488. For Governors on trading fairs see Thomas, ed., *The Plains Indians and New Mexico,* esp. 180-181.

[167] Order of Don Juan Ignacio Flores, 26 September 1714, in SANM II, Reel 4; See also Brugge, *Navajos in the Catholic Church Records,* xix-xx.

little Apache children." Apparently, he was unconvinced that Pueblo masters would properly instruct these captives in Catholicism. Backing this up with some force, he instituted a fine of 100 pesos to any Hispanic resident who sold an Apache to another Indian, and a punishment of 200 lashes to any Puebloan who bought an Apache. They would also lose any captives involved, and the proceeds would go to pay the judicial costs and to the royal treasury.[168]

The ban on sale of Apaches to Puebloans illustrates that while it was common for New Mexican households to possess Indian *criados* or servants, not all of the Apache captives imported by Comanches stayed in Spanish households. Apache captives were what Spaniards had to buy if they wanted to trade with the Comanche, but captives' fates suggest that the sale and baptism of Apache and other Native captives in New Mexico responded more to Comanche trading demands than New Mexicans' demands for slave labor.[169] The development of a distinct group descended from captives sold at New Mexico's trading fairs illustrates this point perhaps most strikingly. By 1740, for example, "Genizaro" Indians, many of whom were captives sold by the Comanche, lived in a new settlement of their own. Fray Miguel de Menchero explained the roots of this settlement four years later. In his eyes, the new settlement of the "Genisaros Indians" was a marvel, given his experience that the Native nations of New Mexico "cannot endure the sight of one another." Divisions between Native groups were, in Menchero's analysis, a providence of God that allowed the relatively small population of New Mexico to survive, preventing the Natives from "uniting to annihilate the missionary ministers and the Spaniards." But this new settlement was an exception because its residents

[168] Order of D.n Gervasio Cruzat y Gongora, 6 December 1732, SANM Microfilm II Reel 6, fr. 1243-1250; For baptismal records see Brugge, *Navajos in the Catholic Church Records*, 22-23.
[169] Barr makes a similar argument in the context of Louisiana. See "Captives to Slaves."

represented the "various nations that [had] been taken captive by the Comanche."[170]

Menchero traced the fate of these Genizaros from captivity through sale by the Comanche into Spanish society. Describing the remarkable extent of Comanche expansion by the mid-1700s, he explained that the Comanche were "a nation so bellicose and so brave that it dominates all those of the interior country, penetrating into it more than a thousand leagues." The captive trade extended far and wide, as he had experienced when he went to at trading fair in 1731 had asked an Indian about an especially "white and beautiful" captive Indian girl. Those present at the fair had told him that she was of a nation that lived 110 suns, or more than one thousand leagues from New Mexico.[171]

He then detailed what happened after Comanches sold them to the Spaniards of New Mexico. "Held in servitude," adults received Catholic instruction and the children were baptized, (as had been mandated by Governor Mogollon). And yet, the Native captives, he noted, "were not always well-treated in this servitude, no thought given to the hardships of their captivity." In his mind, harsh labor turned these neophytes into apostates, as many decided to desert their masters. As a result, missionaries had petitioned the governor that something be done. Ordering that all Indian men and women who received ill-treatment report it, many had in fact applied to him for redress of their grievances. As a result, the governor had named a place for a settlement thirty leagues south of Santa Fe. Now, Menchero explained, "the people engage in agriculture and are under obligation to go out and explore the country in pursuit of the enemy, which they are doing with great bravery and zeal in their obedience, and under the direction of said

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[170] "Declaration of Fray Miguel de Menchero. Santa Bárbara, May 10, 1744," in Hackett, *Historical Documents*, Vol. 3, 401-402 [Hereafter cited as Menchero Report].
[171] Menchero Report, 401.

father they are erecting their church without any cost to the royal crown."[172]

Within several decades there was more than one Genizaro settlement, as a later account described another Genizaro settlement 10 leagues from El Paso. Its residents had been "bought from the Indians of New Mexico, and by them from the Comanches, who are at war with the Apaches. Similarly surprised by the lack of Native solidarity, this account noted that while the Genizaros are "in reality Apaches, there never as been observed in them any special inclination toward their nation, which is supposed to be because they left their country at a tender age and became strangers to its language." They have "remained quiet, marrying women of their own kind, and afterwards among themselves."[173]

The longevity of the Comanche trade in Native captives to New Mexico combined with Spanish receptiveness to conversion and military service as just causes for emancipation, fueling ethnogenesis among former captives or slaves. Drawing on diverse cultural traditions, the Genizaros built new communities attached to but not subsumed by the nearby Spanish presence. Spaniards would later describe how they "imitated" the heathen Indians, though imitation seems hardly the right word. Instead, memories of past lifeways and continued interaction with both Spaniards and Native communities allowed them to forge a new identity out of past slavery, an identity based on claims to loyal service that facilitated an exit from the servitude they had experienced within Spanish homes, or on the part of their Native captors.[174]

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[172] Ibid., 402.

[173] "Description of the most notable characteristics of the settlement of El Paso del Río del Norte," in Hackett, *Historical Documents*, Vol. 3, 506-509.

[174] For further description of Genizaros, and idea that they "imitated" non-Christian Indians see AGN PI, Vol. 204, fr. 460-487. See also Gutierrez, *When Jesus Came*, esp. 149-156; Brooks, *Captives & Cousins*, esp. 121-142; "Genizaros," in Alfonso Ortiz, ed., *The Handbook of North American Indians*, Vol. 10

While "Genizaros" have attracted the most scholarly attention, this process appears to have extended beyond New Mexico as well, to captives that—as Mogollon had indicated—continued to be circulated on occasion to the south in Nueva Vizcaya. The case of Juan Camacho, an "Apache *criado*" charged with stealing the pearls from the image of Our Lady of the Rosary in a Parral church in 1714, provides only one vivid hint at this practice. Apaches within Spanish society in eighteenth century Nueva Vizcaya appear in archival records through baptism, as witnesses to Spanish elites' adultery, as the perpetrators and victims of sexual violence and suicide, and as newly weds.[175]

The ethnogenesis scholars have noted in the New Mexican context may have also characterized the experience of Apache captives in Nueva Vizcaya. Like "*genizaros*" or "janissaries" in New Mexico, Apaches within Nueva Vizcayan society were called by a term that correlated to their status and labor: "criados." On the one hand, "criado" was a generic term that applied to any domestic servant, but over the course of the eighteenth century it also came to refer to a distinct group within Nueva Vizcayan society, the "Apache criado," as distinguished from the Gila, Mescalero, or Lipan Apache that lived beyond the Spanish sphere.[176]

The degree to which "Apaches criados" understood themselves to be a distinct ethnic group warrants further research, but by the mid-1700s, some individuals self-identified as "Apache criados" in legal testimony, and Spaniards also referred to them as a distinct group. When local officials investigated livestock rustling gangs in the early

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(Washington, D.C., 1988), 198-200.

[175] For criminal case against Juan Camacho, "Indio Apache criado" for theft of pearls from image of Nuestra Senora del Rosario in Parral church see AHP 1714, fr. 691-712. For other references to Apache criados in Nueva Vizcaya see for example AHP 1711B, fr. 860-876; Janos Collection, F1, S1; Cd. Juarez Municipal Archives, MF 513, pt. 2, r. 5, paging sequence 3, fr. 69-75; Cd. Juarez Municipal Archives, MF 513, pt. 2 r. 5, fr. 364-376; Janos Collection F3, S1.

[176] Ibid.

1770s, for example, they explained that these gangs were made up of "Apaches, Cholomes, Norteños, with a mix of those called *criados*, as well as Tarahumaras." Another official explained that for the last five years, haciendas had been raided by "Yndios Apache criados."[177]

If the origins of "Apaches criados" is rarely clarified, in criminal testimony they often testified in Spanish, suggesting that they may have been among the "apachuelos"—young Apaches—that Governor Mogollon described being sent out of the province in his 1714 baptism order. When an Apache woman escaped from her master at the Hacienda of Tabalopa near Chihuahua in 1758, for example, she made it as far as El Paso before officials there apprehended her. They noted that Maria was "*mui bozal*"—not very Hispanicized—but in her rudimentary Spanish she explained she was from "the nations in the interior New Mexico that are traded there." While the captain of the El Paso presidio tried to track down her master, he placed her "in the care of" Domingo Apodaca. The suicide of this Apache *criada* two months later is likely the only reason we have any record of her life.[178]

How should the status of these Indian *criados* be understood? In recent years, scholars have generally understood these captives to be "slaves." As Marc Simmons argues, New Mexicans skirted the laws against slavery and "avoided calling the captives slaves, and instead used the euphemism of *criado*." In this analysis, the religious lens through which Spaniards discuss Indian captivity is read as "an artifice," a means of justifying what was really going on: slaving. By reading too far against the grain of

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[177] For "los que llaman criados" see AGN-PI 132; AGN-PI 42 contains testimony from self-identified "Apache criados" in a case involving raiding gangs charged with associating with Apache Indians.
[178] Ibid., "Diligencias practicadas en razon de haberse ahorcado en casa de Domingo de Apodaca, una india Apache que alli estaba depositada…Año de 1758," Cd. Juarez Municipal Archives, MF 513 pt. 2, r. 7, paging 2, fr. 212-220.

historical testimony, however, we may in fact lose some of the historical specificity of interethnic and household relations in the eighteenth century Rio Grande. Could the Governor of New Mexico have meant what he said when he explained that the king tolerated Indian captivity as a means of Christianization? Was the inspector of war in Mexico City disingenuous and masking his true understandings of Indian captivity when he lauded the Spanish purchase of Native captives as a means through which they "can be educated and brought into the fold of this church"? In the end, distinguishing between "material" and "religious" motives represents something of a false choice: masters could understand their possession of *criados* through a religious lens even as they coerced labor from them and, in some cases, committed brutal acts that fueled escapes or even suicide.[179]

"The Infamous Traffic" to Louisiana

The sale of Apache captives in New Mexico (and their dispersal elsewhere) represents only the most documented venue for Comanche slaving. As early as 1706, an Apache headman had described to Juan de Ulibarri how some of his women had escaped from captivity among the French. By 1726, a Louisiana census revealed the presence of at least 159 Indian slaves, at least some of whom were likely Apachean. As Pekka Hämäläinen has explained, it was restrictions on trade in New Mexico—in particular New Mexicans unwillingness to provide Comanches with guns—that first led them to seek other trading partners to the east.[180]

The development of this market in Indian captives altered older ways of dealing

[179] Marc Simmons quoted in Gutierrez, *When Jesus Came*, 155. James Brooks similarly implies that *rescate* might be understood as an "artifice" see *Captives & Cousins,* 125.
[180] Ulibarri Expedition, 74; Barr, "From Captives to Slaves," 29; Hämäläinen, *Comanche Empire*, 41.

with war captives. The Wichita, for example, had traditionally killed enemy captives in ritual fashion. But by the 1710s, French demand for Apache captives—evident in Ulibarri's report in 1706 that Tinde captives had escaped from the French and returned to the Arkansas valley—had led to a mix of old and new ways of treating captives. When French trader Bénard de la Harpe visited a Wichita village on the South Canadian River, for example, he was given an eight-year-old Apache boy as part of conventional ceremonial speeches and gift-giving. A Wichita chief had explained that had he arrived a month earlier, he "could have given (or sold) him seventeen more Apaches, but alas, they had been killed in a public festival."[181]

The French attempted to trade with the Apaches as well in the 1720s, but in doing so they revealed what the Tinde had already suggested to Spanish visitors: the Comanche-Wichita-French trade network was fueled in part by a trade in Apache captives. In 1724, for example, Etienne de Bourgmont sent a young woman and teenage boy he had purchased from Kansas Indians back to a Tinde village. His goal was to forge new trade relations with Apache leaders, hoping the gesture of returning their kinsmen would be met my reciprocal goodwill. He traveled to the Apaches three months later, laying out for them an array of trade goods that they might receive from the French: rifles, sabers, pickaxes, gunpowder, bullets, red cloth, blue cloth, mirrors, knives, beads, brass wire, and much more. Before more than two hundred warriors and a large group of women and children as an audience, the Apache leader highlighted what had been an impediment to such trade in the past. While he was open to peaceful trade, he explained that they would have to "return to us our women and children whom they have taken

[181] Barr, "From Captives to Slaves," 24.

from us and who are slaves in their country." French efforts to trade with the relatives of people they also purchased proved in vain. As Comanches displaced the Tinde from the Arkansas Valley, opportunity for closer relations with the French, even if they had desired it, came to a close.[182]

By midcentury, such trading networks built in part around an Apache captive trade were well established. In 1748, for example, Spanish officials learned that thirty-three Frenchmen had traveled to Comanche camps northeast of Taos, purchasing mules with "plenty of muskets." The French traded not only guns but also "gunpowder, bullets, pistols, sabers, and coarse cloth of all colors." This visit of Frenchmen to Taos was perhaps unusual, as the Comanche supplied livestock and slaves to Taovaya and French allies at a new trading center they had established in the upper Arkansas valley. From this post, the French returned to Louisiana with "skins of deer and other animals, horses, mules, burros and a few Indian captives whom the Comanches have taken." While no written records indicate the precise numbers of slaves circulated, by the early 1750s, the governor of Louisiana would wonder whether Louisiana held too many Apaches slaves to establish trade or alliance with the Apaches.[183]

After the Spanish takeover of Louisiana in 1763 at the close of the Seven Years War, Spanish attention to French captivity practices provides greater insight into the Comanche circulation of Apaches to the Louisiana Borderlands. After all, discussions of captivity and slavery have long served as means for groups to distinguish insiders from

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[182] Ibid., 24-25.

[183] Quotes from Tomás Vélez de Cachupín, Brief Description of the Province and Territory of New Mexico in the Kingdom of New Spain, in "New Mexico in the Mid-Eighteenth Century: A Report Based on Governor Vélez Cachupín's Inspection," trans. And ed. Robert Ryal Miller, *Southwestern Historical Quarterly* (Oct. 1975): 173; See also Antonio Duran de Armijo to Joachín Codallows y Rabál, Feb. 27, 1748, in Ralph Emerson Twitchell, *The Spanish Archives of New Mexico,* 2 vols. (New York: Arno, 1976), 1:149; Hämäläinen, *Comanche Empire,* 42-44; Barr, "From Captives to Slaves," 28.

outsiders and condemn enemies for their allegedly more severe, inhumane, or transgressive practices. Discussing (and decrying) Indian enslavement was a way for new Spanish administrators of Louisiana, for example, to critique and distance themselves from the French, even as, in reality, many Spaniards also bought and held Indian captives.[184]

Correspondence flooded into the viceroy in the 1770s regarding an "infamous traffic of the flesh" that characterized trade on the Louisiana frontier, and allegedly revealed Spanish superiority to the French. Fray Miguel de Silva described to the viceroy in Mexico City, for example, how in the village of Cadodachos he had met Monsiue Alexi, a French carpenter. He was "so unchristian" that he had a son who was fifteen that he had not yet baptized. "Even worse than this," Silva noted, Alexi had five captive Indian women, "of various nations" in his house. On his way back to the Texas missions, Silva noted that a Frenchman who had put him up for the night had "retired in [his] sight with an Apachi Indian woman." Silva explained that she was pregnant and so near to term that he "prayed to God our Lord that she might be delivered that night in order that I might save the child."[185]

Reflecting the ways in which critique of the French shaped Silva's narrative, he explained how when he showed an image of the virgin to an Indian chief "our Indian…his countenance grief-stricken, and making signs of great pain in his breast, broke forth in his own language with these words: 'If the French do not tell us these

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[184] This is evident not merely in Spanish reports from the region, but in royal decrees like a 1756 order from the King liberating Indian slaves found aboard a French ship exiting the Mississippi: see AGN Reales Cedulas Vol. 76, exp. 13; Spanish correspondence from Louisiana is collected in *Athanase de Mezieres and the Louisiana-Texas Frontier, 1768-1780, trans. and ed. Herbert Eugene Bolton, 2 vols*. (Cleveland, 1914) [Hereafter cited as Mezieres, Vol. #, p. #.]

[185] "Fray Miguel Santa Maria y Silva to the Viceroy, July 21, 1774," in Mezieres, Vol. 2, 74-76.

things, we poor creatures will know nothing. Frenchman only Cambalachi, Cambalachy.' This word 'cambalachy,' most excellent Sir, means commerce or trade."[186] Silva's subtext was hardly subtle: if Spanish missionaries were to be brought to Louisiana, they could save not only Apache women's unborn children but also teenagers who Frenchmen had failed to baptize because they were too busy seeking material gain through "cambalachi." The Spanish governor of Natchitoches, Antonio de Mezieres, saw matters similarly, explaining how on the Arkansas River, one could buy women, children, horses, cattle, and mules. The men who dealt in these good lived "scandalous lives in public concubinage with the captive Indian women whom for this purpose they purchase among the heathen, loaning those of whom they tire to others of less power." In fact, both Silva and Mezieres saw the Arkansas River as something of a heart of darkness. Mezieres argued that it was "the asylum of the most wicked persons, without doubt, in all the Indies."[187]

When officials in Natchitoches forbade the trade in horses, mules, and slaves from Indian nations, men's legal actions in relation to their female captives provided further evidence of the Apachean presence in the region by the late-1700s. Francois Morvant, for example, had declared his ownership of a twenty-five-year-old Apache woman named Marie Anne as well as their twelve-year old son in 1770. Several years later, Marie Anne had been enumerated in census record as Morvant's wife, "Ana Maria, of Apache nationality," suggesting that he may have married her to ensure that her presence in his household would be secure from Spanish meddling. Pierre Raimond acted similarly in marrying Francoise, another Apache woman, following her manumission. The fact that

[186] Ibid., 78.
[187] Mezieres Vol. 1, 166.

other men simply emancipated their slave women in response to Spanish policy changes suggests that Raimon and Morvant's actions may have reflected more than just practical concerns of ownership. Jacque Ridde, for example, freed his eighteen-year-old Apache slave girl, Angélique, after "she pledged to remain in his service."[188]

If the archival record provides little insight into how these Apache women understood their circumstances, the long-term significance of their presence in the region is signaled by the fact that, by 1803, nearly one-quarter of the Euroamerican population born in Northwest Louisiana counted Indian slaves in their ancestry."[189] An 1806 Anglo-American report after the United States takeover of Louisiana is perhaps the most descriptive. It discussed the "still-prevalent Apache women who had been brought to Natchitoches, and sold amongst the French inhabitants, at forty or fifty dollars a head." They had become "servants in good families, and taught spinning, sewing…as well as managing household affairs." By marrying Frenchmen, they had "became respectable, and well behaved women; and have now grown up, decent families of children, have a language peculiar to themselves, and are understood by signs by all others."[190]

As in the case of "genizaros" in New Mexico and "Apaches criados" in Nueva Vizcaya, the descendants of Apache captives transported to Louisiana continued to be recognized as a distinct group over time. Though the perspective of these women is even less accessible than that of "genizaros" and "criados" of the Greater Rio Grande, observers' descriptions of their unique language provide a tantalizing hint at the

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[188] Barr, "Captives to Slaves," 39-40.

[189] Ibid., 40.

[190] John Sibley, "Historical Sketches of the several Indian trabes in Louisiana, south of the Arkansas river, and between the Mississippi and river Grande," 1806, in *American State Papers,* vol. 1 (Washington, 1832), 723.

processes of cultural change and reinvention that they may have begun in diaspora.[191]

Conclusion

From Santa Fe to Natchitoches, the far-flung destinations of Apachean captives in the eighteenth century traced the outlines of two vast networks of trade, commerce, and communication. In their efforts to escape violence and captivity in-between the Comanche and the Spanish, Apachean groups adapted through mobility, diplomacy, and armed struggle of their own. Some clung to Spanish settlements near Taos and Pecos, receiving missionaries. Others, like the Lipans, alternated between raiding and trading near San Antonio de Bexar in Texas. Others found new trading opportunities by forging relations with mission Indian communities along the Rio Grande and south of the Rio Grande in Nueva Vizcaya and Coahuila. It is this trade, fueled in part by the poaching of Spanish livestock, which would become one of the gravest concerns of Spanish officials as they increasingly accepted after 1750 that given the power of the Comanche, the Rio Grande would be a dividing line between civilization and "barbarism," or more precisely, between the Spanish and Comanche empires.[192]

Before returning to consider how Apachean groups adapted and survived in the Comanche-era through migration, however, another thread of the history of captivity and slavery in the Greater Rio Grande after the Native rebellions of the late-1600s warrants

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[191] As Juliana Barr notes, "Most enslaved women…appear in records only as the subjects of baptism at their French owners' behest or as mothers of natural children whose fathers usually, but not always, went unnamed in sacramental registers. Thus the lives of most enslaved Indian women rested on the whims of their owners…The experiences of women began in war, when they were torn from their communities by brutal force, and culminated in their sale into sexual and labor relations defined by coercion (*From Captives to Slaves*, 41). While I agree that John Sibley's rosy portrait of Apache women's lives in "good families" should not be taken at face value, I wonder if Barr overdetermines "slavery" as a category to understand these women's life experiences. We can recognize that their presence in Louisiana was rooted in captivity and shaped by coercion—like most women's lives in early America—while also attending to evidence that their social status may have been characterized by some degree of fluidity.

[192] This history is the subject of Chapter 4 of this dissertation.

further examination. If Indian captive trades flourished in the context of Comanche expansionary wars and limited Spanish power north of the Rio Grande, to the south, new restrictions on the legal enslavement of Native peoples were not merely disregarded. In particular contexts, individuals and groups chose alternative fates for captives that presaged shifting understandings of captivity and forced labor in the Greater Rio Grande. As we will see, the decision not to enslave Indian rebels often had as much to do with local concerns as royal decrees, however.

PART TWO

When Indians Were Not Enslaved

Illustration 1: La Cabaña Fortress in Havana, Cuba, Site where Native captives were imprisoned in the Eighteenth and Early-Nineteenth Centuries[193]

[193] Photo from <http://www.desdelahabana.net/wp-content/uploads/2011/02/Fortaleza_de_San_Carlos_de_la_Cabaña_Havana-650x420.jpg> (Accessed by author, 28 April 2011).

Chapter 3
"To Islands Overseas": From Slavery to Forced Removal in the Greater Rio Grande, 1680-1730

During the long eighteenth century, Spaniards and their Indian allies captured hundreds of Native men, women, and children, and transported them south to Mexico City, Veracruz, and Havana. Some captives labored in textile workshops, tobacco plantations, shipyards, or Spanish households. Many spent months or even years imprisoned in military forts, jails, and poor houses. Others escaped and made the long journey back to the mountains and river valleys of the Rio Grande River Basin.[194]

Relatively few historians have traced these displaced people, and analyses of the banishment or "deportation" of Native groups have cast the practice as unusual and unrepresentative of broader relations between Spaniards and Indians in colonial North America. In a 1975 article, for example, Max Moorhead rooted "the deportation of hostile Apaches" in frontier military regulations issued in 1729. He suggested that local officials were reluctant to send Indians away until the 1780s, however, and argued that the "brutal disposition of a few hundred [Apache] prisoners of war was hardly indicative of Spanish policy." Christon Archer came to similar conclusions in a contemporaneous article. He also explained banishment through imperial policy and focused on the exile of Indians in the final decades of the Spanish colonial period. "Deportation," he argued, provided "a means of removing primitive people who refused to conform or surrender to the ways of the so-called civilized majority." By referencing the later forced removal of Yaqui and Maya groups in the mid-nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries, Archer suggested that

[194] See charts in appendix for demographic significance of these displacements of Native groups, which included Coahuiltecan groups from the Lower Rio Grande; Lipan, Mescalero, Chiricahua, and Western Apaches from the central region, and Seris from Sonora and the west coast.

Apache displacement was an isolated "evil" that presaged the forced migration practices of modern nation-states.[195]

In the years since Archer and Moorhead's articles, scholars have continued to be drawn to the image of Apache warriors in Havana, even if just as a fascinating footnote of Spanish-Indian relations in the final decades of colonial rule. As recently as 2005, for example, David Weber noted that Apache Indians "suffered banishment to distant islands more than any other group of unyielding Indians." Reflecting broader trends in the Borderlands literature, other scholars have reinterpreted Archer and Moorhead's findings to suggest that exiled captives were "sold into slavery in distance lands" or that "for adult men, this probably meant slavery." If Moorhead and Archer looked ahead to the deportation practices of modern nation-states, scholars like Pekka Hämäläinen and Juliana Barr have looked back to long-standing practices of Indian enslavement to explain the fates of displaced Native captives in the eighteenth century.[196]

This chapter develops an alternate explanation for the emergence of banishment or "forced removal" campaigns in the North American West, challenging the idea that they were "hardly indicative" of Spanish-Indian relations, only affected Apaches, or were

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[195] Max L. Moorhead, "Spanish Deportation of Hostile Apaches: The Policy and the Practice," *Arizona and the West* 17 (Autumn 1975), 205-220 [quote on p. 220]; Christon I. Archer, "The Deportation of Barbarian Indians from the Internal Provinces of New Spain, 1789-1810," *Americas* 29 (January 1973), 376-385 [quote on 385]. Moorhead did not cite or seem to be familiar with Archer's earlier work. The link between forced migration and modernity has been a key theme in literature on forced migration more broadly. See for example Richard Bessel and Claudia B. Haake, eds., *Removing Peoples: Forced Removal in the Modern World* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009) and Emma Christopher, Cassandra Pybus, and Markus Rediker, eds., *Many Middle Passages: Forced Migration and the Making of the Modern World* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2007).

[196] See Weber *Bárbaros: Spaniards and their Savages in the Age of Enlightenment* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2005), 150; Hämäläinen, *Comanche Empire*, 78; Juliana Barr, *Peace Came in the Form of a Woman*, 189; Ana Maria Alonso, *Threads of Blood: Colonialism, Revolution, and Gender on Mexico's Northern Frontier* (Tucson, Arizona: University of Arizona Press, 1997), 37-39.

significant only at the end of the colonial period.[197] It interrogates the relationship between Indian enslavement and forced removal by pursuing a case study of one little-known context in which a Native group that Spaniards had enslaved in the past—a coalition of migratory bands they called the "Tobosos"—experienced alternative fates to enslavement in the late-1600s and early-1700s, including transport to the Caribbean. Given the common assumption evident in existing scholarship that exiled Natives were "sold into slavery," it may come as a surprise that neither displaced Tobosos nor the hundreds of Apachean and other Native captives that would be exiled later in the eighteenth century were sold in slave markets.[198]

The capture and exile of Toboso groups emerged not to fulfill market demand for slave labor, but rather as an attempt to achieve security and sovereignty in a region that remained highly contested in the late-1600s and early-1700s. As Tobosos combined talk of "peace" and "obedience to his majesty" with raids of Spanish settlements and participation in Nativist rebellions that swept across the region in the 1680s and 1690s, Spanish residents and their governors explained that mobile Indians impeded the progress of Nueva Vizcaya and threatened its "ruin" and "depopulation." A siege mentality fueled arguments that removing Natives "to islands overseas" represented the only means to

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[197] I favor the term "forced removal" over "deportation" or "banishment" in this chapter because the latter terms assume that Indians were being sent away from territory under Spanish jurisdiction. Many of those Natives displaced, however, likely viewed themselves as being removed from their homelands. It should be noted too that Spaniards referred to their actions using a variety of verbs—"extraer," "sacar," "exterminar," "extinguir" fittingly evoked by the English term "removal." Drawing upon Alf Ludtke's essay, "Explaining Forced Migration" in Bessel and Haake, eds., *Removing Peoples*, I distinguish between "forced migration" and "forced removal." While I see "forced removal" as related to intra-regional "forced migration" practices such as labor drafts, mission settlements, and captive exchange, both Indians and Spaniards understood the long-distance transport of Indian groups away from familiar landscapes and homelands to be something different. I recognize this distinction by using "forced migration" to refer to intra-regional movements, and "forced removal" to reference extra-regional displacement. At times I also use the term "exile" as a synonym for "removal" to avoid repetition.

[198] On past enslavement of Tobosos see AGI-Guadalajara, Legajo 29; AHP 1652B, fr. 301-620; AHP 1655A, fr. 102-107.

bring lasting peace, quiet, and prosperity to their contested kingdom.[199]

Attention to contexts in which Indians were *not* enslaved reveals new insights into the relationship between captivity, violence, and power relations in the North American West. Even as Comanche slave traders found willing buyers for Native captives in New Mexico and Louisiana, for example, Spaniards in Nueva Vizcaya had become convinced that some Native groups posed too great a threat to their security and sovereignty to be allowed to remain within the region, and sought to exile them as captives under terms other than "slavery." If new legal restrictions on Indian enslavement may have played a role in this decision, the central impetus was not imperial but local, as persistent interethnic violence had convinced some Nueva Vizcayans that traditional means of interacting with Natives, including temporal enslavement, would be fruitless. Importantly, these residents were willing to back up schemes to "send away" Tobosos Indians with their "bodies and their funds," an offer that proved key for royal officials in Mexico and Spain to endorse the practice.[200]

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[199] This approach draws upon Brian Delay's argument that Indian nomads are rarely taken seriously as political actors, see Delay, "Independent Indians and the U.S. -Mexican War," *American Historical Review* 112, 1 (2007): 35-68; Brian Delay, *War of a Thousand Deserts: Indian Raids and the U.S.-Mexican War* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2008). For the quotes from local residents of Nueva Vizcaya see "Diligencias practicadas con motivo de la paz que piden los indios de las Naciones acoclames y cocoyomes [Inquiries conducted as a result of the peace requested by the Acoclame and Cocoyome Indian nations]" in El Archivo de Hidalgo del Parral, Microfilm on file at the Benson Latin American, Austin, Texas, reel 1704A, fr. 217-236. Hereafter cited as "AHP, reel #, and fr. # or p. #."

[200] Ibid., for "temporal" slavery see Chapter 1; on imprisonment and forced removal as characteristic of Spanish interactions with migratory Native groups see Chapter 5. For a recent study of captivity and slavery elsewhere in North America that similarly interrogates change over time see Snyder, *Slavery in Indian Country*.

"Until they are permitted to be enslaved…"

Even before the Pueblo Revolt sent Spaniards fleeing from New Mexico in 1680, Indian raids and rebellions had sparked them to imagine the imminent loss of their kingdom at the hands of Native aggressors. On the one hand, migratory Indians served an important rhetorical purpose in correspondence between governors and military officers in Nueva Vizcaya and royal officials in Mexico City and Spain. They helped to explain Nueva Vizcaya's low Spanish population and declining mining revenue while rationalizing the discontent of those Native groups who often lived in towns and missions but occasionally fled from them. On the other hand, the lived experience of violence and the disconnect between Spaniards' imagined enslavement or extermination of Indians and their ability to carry out such actions suggested that the rhetoric of "imminent loss" was not an empty strategy for gleaning royal investment. Nueva Vizcaya—far from being "lost"— had yet to be won.[201]

In January 1677, Don Lope de Sierra Ossorio departed from Mexico City on an 800-mile journey to his new post at Parral, Nueva Vizcaya, where he was to serve as governor and captain general of this kingdom with few Spanish but many Native inhabitants. When he arrived in April after more than two-months of difficult travel, he discovered that the kingdom was "in danger of being lost." From Parral north to the Conchos River, which ran through fertile valleys until it reached the Rio Grande, Indians "wandered about," and committed "murders and robberies without resistance." Only days

[201] For studies of Nueva Vizcaya during this period see especially Susan Deeds, *Defiance and Deference*; Cramaussel *Poblar la frontera*; William B. Grifffen, *Indian Assimilation in the Franciscan Area of Nueva Vizcaya* (Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 1979); Peter Gerhard, *La Frontera Norte de la Nueva España* (México, Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México, 1996); and Edward H. Spicer's magisterial overview, *Cycles of Conquest: the Impact of Spain, Mexico, and the United States on the Indians of the Southwest, 1533-1960* (Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 1962). In contrast to my approach below, these works focus much more attention on sedentary Native groups and tend to assume rather than interrogate Spanish hegemony.

after he arrived, these Indians had raided a farm, killed twenty Native laborers who were sowing wheat and carried off the farm's horses and mules. Ossorio immediately sent soldiers and "friendly Indians" in pursuit, explaining that though his forces had been "few in number," they had caught up to the hostiles and killed thirty-three of them.[202]

Ossorio's assault on thirty-three unnamed Indians was only the beginning of his efforts to secure the kingdom against the "total ruin and depopulation" threatened by Indian "boldness." In his first four months at Parral, during the summer of 1677, he claimed to have killed or taken captive "more than three or four hundred persons." He only lamented that he did not have the military resources to accomplish more in order to fully "pacify" what he viewed as "the best kingdom that your Majesty has in its entire crown."[203]

Ossorio dwelled at length on why Nueva Vizcaya mattered. Its level, well-watered lands, he explained, were productive for a variety of crops and livestock. The Sierra Madre that ran from Acapulco north through New Spain, into New Mexico and "without known end," traversed the heart of the kingdom. These "infinite" ranges, Ossorio explained, were "all full of rich ores of silver and gold." Even though Nueva Vizcaya had "no more than 300 citizens," 150,000 marks of silver were drawn from its mines annually, from which the crown received 200,000 pesos in taxes and tithes each year. He even included a certified receipt with his report to testify to the fact that the

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[202] See "Don Lope De Sierra Ossorio…informs your Majesty of the state of affairs of Nueva Vizcaya, September 26, 1678," in *Historical Documents relating to New Mexico, Nueva Vizcaya, and Approaches Thereto, to 1773,* Volume II, Charles Wilson Hackett, ed. (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Institution of Washington, 1926), 210. Hereafter cited as "Ossorio Narrative, page #" and "Hackett, *Historical Documents II*." Original quotes: "estava mas a riesgo de perderse porque en todos sus contornos, andaban los yndios enemigos, executando muertes y rovos, sin resistencia"; "yndios amigos"; "siendo mui pocos en numero"

[203] Ossorio Narrative, 210: "total ruina y despueble"; "la avilantez, con que los Yndios enemigos andaban executando en todos sus poblaciones, muertes y rovos…"; "les matamos y quitamos, pasadas de trescientas a quatrozientas personas"; "dejar en paz el Reino mejor que tiene Vuestra Magestad en toda su corona."

mines of Parral had produced 120,000 marks of silver in the last year and a half alone.[204]

In emphasizing Nueva Vizcaya's bounty, Ossorio perhaps hoped to connect his warnings that it was "in danger of being lost" to broader imperial concerns. Since the 1630s, the flow of mining revenue from the Americas to Spain had been on the decline. The recession in Mexico had been particularly severe, as royal officials in Spain had diverted a larger share of quicksilver exports necessary for silver production to Peru. Even as Ossorio weighed in on the crown's monopoly on quicksilver, how much they charged for it, how it was transported, and who should receive it, he continued to stress that controlling nomadic Indians was what mattered most. They had "destroyed and entirely annihilated" many mining camps, and in the process had threatened the "loss of Nueva Vizcaya, Sonora, and New Mexico." All the quicksilver in the world, he seemed to suggest, could not make deserted mines operate.[205]

Considering the mining process makes it clear why Ossorio took the Indian threat so seriously, even if he imbued it with hyperbolic flourish. Success in mining was built on three pillars: ore, labor, and quicksilver (mercury). Miners in Parral used the patio process to extract metal from ore. First, they laid out silver-bearing ore on the floor of a circular pit. The grinding process was driven by mules, which turned a central rotating post that forced blocks of stone down upon the ore and reduced it to a fine mud. Next they spread the muddy ore over a paved patio, sprinkled it with quicksilver, salt, and

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[204] Ossorio Narrative, 210: "Por el medio de este Reino atraviessa la Sierra madre que tiene su principio cerca de el Puerto de Acapulco y se entra por el Nuevo Mexico sin que se sepa su fin"; "son infinitas las sierra, y montañas en que se divide y todas ellas estan llenas de ricos minerals de plata y oro"; Ossorio Narrative, 214: "en medio de no tener todo este Reino mas que trescientos vecinos se sacan el pasados de ciento y cinquenta mil marcos de plata."

[205] Ossorio Narrative, 210: "en los Reales de minas que en ellas se empezaron a poblar y han destruido y aniquilado en el todo los yndios enemigos." Ossorio Narrative, 212: "está a riesgo conozido de perderse todo el Reino de la Vizcaia y el de el Nuevo Mexico y la Galicia." On 17th century mining concerns see D.A. Brading and Harry E. Cross, "Colonial Silver Mining: Mexico and Peru," *The Hispanic American Historical Review* 52, 4 (1972), 545-579.

copper sulfate, and drove the mules across it to mix it together. By dissolving impurities, quicksilver then divided elemental silver from the mixture.[206]

Migratory Indians disrupted this process both directly and indirectly. By rustling mules critical to the patio process, they could bring work in a given camp to a halt. At times they raided the road between Parral and Salinas, disrupting transportation of salt from the mines there. While Indians also attacked mining camps directly, they more often disrupted mining by impeding access to the ingredients essential to refining rock into precious metal.[207]

The degree to which Indian raids impacted mining revenue is difficult to measure, but since mining camps further south in Guanajuato and Zacatecas were not disrupted, Native campaigns clearly do not offer an alternate explanation for declining mining revenues in colonial Mexico at large. If the discussions of governors like Ossorio raise questions about the relationship between rhetoric and reality, however, they also raise questions about "Nueva Vizcaya." Who were the "hostile Indians" that Ossorio so feared? How did local inhabitants understand their surroundings?[208]

Ossorio's description of unnamed "hostile" Indians reflected his own sense of a fluid landscape with boundaries that were difficult to pin down. The way he mapped Nueva Vizcaya's large Native population is revealing. First, he sought to distinguish the

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[206] On the patio process see Thomas Egleston, "The Patio and Cazo Process of Amalgamating Silver Ores," *Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences* 3, 1 (1883), 1-66; and for a less technical description, "Patio Process: Pre-Columbian Contribution to Modern Silver Mining," <http://www.associatedcontent.com/article/2059585/patio_process_precolumbian_contribution.html> (Accessed by author March 15, 2010).

[207] For Indians blocking the road between Parral and Salinas see "Extract of a paper which Don Lope de Sierra wrote in regards to matters touching upon the kingdom of Nueva Vizcaya," in Hackett, *Historical Documents II*, 222; for an account of direct attacks on mining camps see "Letter from the residents of Sonora, written to the viceroy, giving an account of conditions existing among them," [San Juan Bautista, February 6, 1693] in Hackett, *Historical Documents II* II, 290-297.

[208] D.A. Brading and Harry E. Cross, "Colonial Silver Mining."

migratory Tobosos and their allies who threatened the kingdom, from the "more than 300,000" Tepeguanes, Tarahumaras, and Conchos who were "all peaceful." He turned to the Tobosos first, taking his readers on a rhetorical journey up the royal road. He explained that it was on the right side of the road where eleven nations of hostile Indians lived in the mountains, noting that it was "because the bravest of them are the Tobosos," that they were all called by this name. Contrasting Indian homelands with Christian settlements, Ossorio described Toboso lands as containing "no river, arroyo, or spring that is perennial," no towns or cultivation, or even "birds or animals."[209]

Ossorio's condemnation of the Tobosos emerged as much from their strategies of warfare as from his perception of their ways of life. It was not simply that they waged war against Spaniards, but that they did not hesitate to kill or enslave "women, children, old men…and priests." In his eyes, they committed these murders "without motive," and, even more importantly, they had "never gone out to fight in the open." Thus they were not simply fierce, but "treacherous."[210]

Fears of Toboso "treachery" led Ossorio into his discussions of the broader Indian population of the Rio Grande. Importantly, Ossorio articulated a clear divide between Spanish and Native territory. Though he described the imaginary boundaries that mapmakers drew on elegantly crafted maps, he also recognized the lines of effective authority on the ground: lands "contiguous to" but not under the possession of Spaniards,

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[209] Ossorio Narrative, 214: "Dentro de la jurisdision del Reino de la Nueva Viscaia, hai muchas diversas naziones y algunas de ellas mui numerossas, y solo las de los Tepeguanes, Taraumares y Conchos, en lo descubierto llegaran a trescientos mill familias, y todo estos están de paz"; "por ser entre ellas la de más valor la de los Tovossos comunmente todas se llaman con este nombre"; "en toda su tierra no hai rio, arroio o fuente, que sea perenne, ni ellos tienen poblaciones o siembras algunas, y por lo que yo he visto en dos vezes que he pasado por parte de ella, ni paxaros ni animales hai…"

[210] Ossorio Narrative, 210: "no rreservando su bárvaro crueldad, mugeres niños viejos, Religiossos y sacerdotes"; "además de ser sin caussa todas las [muertes] que exejutan, son con alevosia por que jamas han salido a pelear a campaña rasa mientras no se les hisiere la Guerra mui de propósito…"

the lands of the Conchos, Tarahumaras, and Tepeguanes, who each "occupied 150 leagues of mountain range."[211]

In lieu of a Spanish kingdom, Ossorio had found a contested landscape still not entirely charted by Europeans when he arrived in Parral in the late-1670s. Through his own travel, and missionary and military informants, he learned it was filled with "many distinct nations, some of which are very large." Indians had explained to friars travelling to the north that "the multitude is innumerable in every direction" and on the Rio Grande alone, "there are so many nations that with all their efforts the friars who are in that vicinity have not been able to understand and learn their names."[212]



Map 4: Native Groups of the Greater Rio Grande c. 1700[213]

[211] Ossorio Narrative, 214: "todas estas tierras, estan contiguas a las que Vuestra Magestad possee…"; "cada una [nación] ocupa ciento y cinquenta leguas de cordillera"

[212] Ossorio Narrative, 214: "Dentro de la jurisdision del Reino de la Nueva Viscaia, hai muchas diversas naziones y algunas de ellas mui numerossas"; "y preguntados los yndios ultimos a donde han llegado los padres, si en lo de adelante y a los lados hai mas indios, responden, que es innumerable la multitud, hazia todas partes y solo en el rio del norte…son tantos las naciones que hai, que toda la diligencia de los padres que hai por aquellos contornos, no ha podido comprehender y saver sus nombres…"

[213] From Oakah L. Jones, *Nueva Vizcaya: Heartland of the Spanish Frontier* (Albuquerque: University of

Even as Ossorio declared that the Indians along the Rio Grande had "no idolatry among them," and described them as a part of the bounty of the landscape, he revealed how being surrounded could provoke both promise and fear. On the one hand, he emphasized the potential utility of converting the inhabitants of this landscape, and noted that the expenses would be repaid, "since there is so much in this region which is contiguous to that which your Majesty possesses." On the other hand, he warned that these "docile and gentle" Indian masses could just as easily swing in the direction of the Tobosos. He explained that they had already invited these Indians to come to their aid in raiding wagon trains on the way from Parral to New Mexico with clothing. This development should not be taken lightly, he cautioned, noting that Indians' desire for clothing, "which they crave so much since they all go naked," might lead them to "inundate these kingdoms and provinces," and risk "all New Spain being lost."[214]

In his proposals to prevent such loss, Ossorio first drew upon the "just war" doctrine to call for "real and determined war" and Indian enslavement. He asserted that Spaniards had never encroached on Indian lands. Rather, it was the hostile Indians who had "come to the lands that are in possession of the Spaniards and Christian Indians," had "robbed them of their farms with barbarous cruelty," and "taken their lives without distinction of sex." In a telling comparison, he argued that there was "more justification in making war upon them than upon the Turks," who were the "declared enemies of all Christendom," but at least gave quarter to the defenseless. Underscoring this line of reasoning, he stated that until it was "permitted for them to be enslaved," Nueva Vizcaya

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New Mexico Press, 1988), xix.

[214] Ossorio Narrative, 214: "en todas ellas no hai ydolatria alguna"; "siendo tanto lo que hai en estas partes contiguo a lo que Vuestra Magestad posehe"; "las mas mansas y dosiles"; "estava a riesgo de perderse toda la Nueva España, por que con el zelo de la ropa, que tanto apetesen por andar todos desnudos fueran innumerables las naziones del norte que salieran a innundar estos Reinos y provincias."

would always remain at risk of being lost.[215]

Before Ossorio retired as governor of Nueva Vizcaya, travelled to Guatemala, and then returned to Mexico City as an advisor to the viceroy, however, he chose a solution that was neither determined war nor slavery. "All those of [the Toboso] nation," he noted, "were reduced to peace. I settled them at San Francisco de Conchos." Emphasizing his work in making peace and bringing the Tobosos into a fixed settlement—"*I* settled them"—reflected his paternalistic role in the legally sanctioned approach to Spanish-Indian relations. As an agent of "our Lord" and "his majesty," he was to watch over and protect these Indian vassals, who reciprocated for his generosity and guidance by offering their martial labor as "the principal defense" of Nueva Vizcaya. "Our Lord has permitted," Ossorio asserted, "that they should become such enemies to the rebellious nations that the hostile Indians fear them most."[216]

At first glance, Ossorio's narrative is vexing in its bipolarity. The kingdom is at risk of being lost, migratory Indians must be enslaved or vanquished, and then suddenly, these same Indians are its greatest strength. In one breath the "innumerable nations" of the Rio Grande are "docile" and in the next they are cravers of clothing who threaten the loss of all of New Spain. The fact that bounty and loss coexist in his narrative provides

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[215] Ossorio Narrative, 212: "mientras no se les hisiere la Guerra mui de propósito"; "si los españoles hubiesesses pretendido en algun tiempo quitarles su tierra, o entrar en ella o hazerles Guerra, no hubiera razón alguna que les disculpara ni justificara el hazerles esclavos, pero siendo los yndios enemigos, los que vienen a las tierras que estan poseiendo los españoles, y los Yndios cristianos, y que estan de paz y con bárvara crueldad les rovan sus haziendas, quitan la vida sin distincion de xesso, sin que para su fin principal que es rovar, conduzga, en mi sentir con mas justificazion se les puede hazer la Guerra, y hazerles esclavos, que a los Turcos, que siendo los enemigos declarados de toda la cristianidad dan quartel a todos los que se rinden sin llegar a ensangrentarse en las vidas de los que por su sexo, edad o profession estan indefensos."

[216] On Spanish Indian law see Brian P. Owensby, *Empire of Law and Indian Justice in Colonial Mexico* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2008); Ossorio, Narrative, 212: "todos los de esta nazion se han reducido de paz, y los poblé en San Francisco de Conchos y ha permitido Nuestro Señor que estos se enemistasen de manera con las naziones alzados que hoi son la principal defensa de la Vizcaia, y a quien mas temen los yndios enemigos."

useful insights into how Spaniards viewed the Greater Rio Grande, however. Uncertainty and ambiguity reflected constraints on Spanish knowledge and power. Moreover, in his response to these constraints, Ossorio raised questions that other governors and Spanish residents wrestled with in the years to come. How could highly mobile Indians be controlled, if not through traditional legal means? Was Indian behavior innate or changeable?

Ossorio vacillated. Even as he critiqued past efforts at peace, baptism, and Christianization, he attempted the same. Perhaps pride led him to imagine that he would be the one to really subdue the Indians, and that the Toboso would stay settled this time and continue to be the "principal defense" of the entire kingdom. Or maybe he was merely obedient to new legal restrictions, choosing peace "until they are [again] permitted to be enslaved." Or perhaps making peace with the Indians simply reflected Ossorio's sense of Spanish weakness—"three hundred citizens" in the face of thousands of Indians.

What is clear is that his warnings of imminent loss were not entirely hyperbolic. Two years after he wrote about his arrival in Parral, the killing and capture of hundreds of Indians and the potential but stifled wealth of the kingdom, allied Natives in nearby New Mexico rose up against Spanish settlers. At the height of their siege, nearly 2,000 Pueblo Indians surrounded Santa Fe. By late-September 1680, Natives had eliminated Spaniards from New Mexico, killed over 400 of its 2,500 Hispanic residents and destroyed nearly every Spanish building. Fleeing New Mexicans marveled at how Pueblos had broken up and burned images of Christ, the Virgin Mary and "everything pertaining to

Christianity."[217]

Such actions, and the presence of dozens of refugee families among them, lent new purchase to the links neighboring Spaniards made between future prosperity and the enslavement, extermination, or forced removal of migratory Indians like the Tobosos. Subsequent governors and residents also recognized Indians as a cause of the kingdom's impeded progress. Like Ossorio, they struggled with and debated efforts to make "Nueva Vizcaya" a reality.

"Compelling them by force, to crave peace"

Juan Isidro de Pardiñas had been governor of Nueva Vizcaya for fifteen months when he weighed in on the matter in 1688. Adhering to common tropes in governors' missives to the viceroy and Council of the Indies, he first detailed the kingdom's bounty. "It is a very fertile kingdom," he explained, noting that not only were "all kinds of grain" grown there, but that it was "extremely rich in gold and silver ores."[218] Military officers who had surveyed the region agreed. Joseph Francisco Marin and his subordinates had explored the Greater Rio Grande at length in the early 1690s pursuing both Indian raiders and rumors of French incursions. As he described it to the viceroy, "heaven favored this most extensive kingdom with a benign climate, as much so as can be desired, and with great fertility of the land, for the plantings produce most abundant crops." Then there was the "principal nerve" of the kingdom: "All experienced persons in New Spain," he argued

[217] On the Pueblo Revolt see David Weber, *The Spanish Frontier in North America* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1992), 133-141.

[218] "Don Juan Isidro de Pardiñas, Governor of Nueva Vizcaya, to his Majesty, Parral, November 21, 1688," in Hackett *Historical Documents II*, 228: "que es un Reyno muy fertil pues en el se cojen todos generos Semillas que hay en otra qualquiera parte de la America…es opulentissimo de minerales de platta y oro por que no hay parte en todo el que no manifieste betas." Hereafter cited as "Pardiñas Narrative, page #."

in 1693, "assert that the said kingdom has more silver than all the rest of it."[219]

Two interrelated concerns prevented this bounty from being fully exploited. First, as Ossorio had noted, nomadic Indians disrupted mining and ranching. When Tobosos rustled horse and mule herds, they slowed work in the silver mines, "for without the horses and mules this work cannot be done."[220] If Spaniards saw Indian raids as motivated by Native subsistence strategies, noting that livestock, and especially horses, provided food—"their maintenance"—they also suggested that Indians saw raids as a geo-political tool. Since war had been continuous, much of the kingdom "had no Spanish population."[221] Indian raids helped explained this "depopulation" because "as a result of the inhabitants being forced to go on foot, [the Indians] are able to obtain possession of the province."[222] For Pardiñas and Marin, controlling the Indians would allow for the working of the mines and for the growth of the population; a growing population and working mines would in turn prevent new Indian attacks.[223]

They tied Spanish possession of Nueva Vizcaya to control of the wider Indian population as well. Marin reported in detail on the dozens of Indian nations that Captain

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[219] "Letter, report, and reply of the *maestre de campo* Don Joséph Francisco Marin to his Excellency the Count of Galve. Parral, September 30, 1693," in Hackett *Historical Documents II*, 388: "Este dilatadissimo Reyno le favorecio el cielo con benigno temperamiento, quanto puede dessearse, con gran fertilidad de sus campos; pues producen los fructose colmadissimas cosechas"; "asegurando todos los mas practicos de la nueva españa, tiene dicho reyno mas plata que lo restante de todo ella." Hereafter cited as "Marin Narrative, page #."

[220] Pardiñas Narrative, 228: "caussando tanto Perjuiciio que quando menos consiguen, se lleban las Cavalladas y muladas que pastan los campos frustrando el Veneficio de Sacar platta por que sin ellas no se puede hacer."

[221] Pardiñas Narrative, 229: "Lo mas deste Reyno es despoblado de Españoles por que como ha ssido continua la guerra en el no se atreben a poblar."

[222] For a vivid description of Tobosos that echoes that of other Spanish writers see, "Extract of a paper which Don Lope de Sierra wrote in regard to matters touching upon the kingdom of Nueva Vizcaya," in Hackett *Historical Documents II*, 221: "Siendo al mismo paso voraces quando Roban algunos Ganados, o caballadas (que es a lo mas que anhela su codicia por conseguir con este medio dos fines, el primero es el de su mantenimiento pues Su mayor Regalo es este Genero de comida y el segundo por que consiguiento el dejar a pie los Avitados logran sin resistencia el apoderarse de la Provincia."

[223] For Marin's discussion of mining and "depopulation" see Marin Narrative, 391.

Juan Hernandez de Retana had discovered on his recent expedition north across the Rio Grande. Contrasting the "five hundred" Spanish families with "the many nations that surround [them]," he explained that along the banks of the Rio Grande alone there were fifty-four Indian nations. Like Ossorio, Marin saw these Indians as a potential threat because "it [was] impossible to prevent [their] robberies and invasions," and also as a potential resource, because "all these nations are more peaceful than warlike, for which reason it should be possible to penetrate with ease to their interior."[224]

Pardiñas focused his attention closer to home, noting the particular importance of the Tarahumara Indians, whose territory included important mineral deposits. He revealed how Christianization, forced migration, and colonialism went hand in hand. "As a result of the Indians of the Tarahumara nation having been converted to our holy Catholic faith," he explained in 1688, "riches have been sought in their lands." He noted that it was because *he* had maintained "good relations" with Tarahumara headmen that during his governorship "there was discovered in the region one of the richest mineral deposits that has been encountered in these parts." Even as he asserted that the discovery of new mineral deposits and the resulting Spanish settlements did not "alienate" the Tarahumara because of his personal persuasion, he hinted at another story. He explained that settling Tarahumaras had allowed new mines to be opened on the road to Sonora. "These settlements," he noted, "will be of great profit to the royal income of your Majesty."[225]

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[224] Marin Narrative, 388, 390, 392: "y ser tanta la copia de las naciones barbaras que los havitan…que no es dable, que aun maior numero impidiessen semejantes latrocinios"; "Las familias de españoles que havitan en el Reino seran como quinientas con poca diferencia, corto numero a el crecido de las muchas naciones que le circumbalan"; "Todos estas naciones son mas pacificas que velicossas, por cuia razon se pudiera penetrar con facilidad hasta lo interior de ellas."

[225] Pardiñas Narrative, 228: "por haverse combertido a nuestra Santa fee Catolica los de la nacion

Other sources suggest that converting and settling the Tarahumara had required more force and produced more "alienation" than Pardiñas disclosed. Captain Joseph de Berroterán, for example, later recalled yearly missions to Tarahumara country to "extract" Indians from the mountains. He noted that in 1690 and 1691 it had become necessary for missionaries to "correct the Indians' idol worshiping" through "the thorn of the sweet vine of the Gospel message." In response to this "correction"—and I would add, increased pressures on their land base by Spanish settlement—Tarahumaras rose up against their neighbors. In Tarahumara Alta, Indians had "murdered priests, burned the churches, and retreated to the cliffs and canyons." In a two-year campaign that followed, 150 soldiers and 500 Indian scouts "pacified" them.[226]

"Pacification" campaigns call into question the "gentle means" by which Pardiñas claimed to maintain good relations with the Tarahumara. In his description of later campaigns against this group, for example, Captain Berroterán clarified what "pacification" involved. He explained that "besieging and battering the mountains with four to six small cannons of mobile artillery" could overcome the inaccessibility of the gorges, rivers, and buttes to which Indians had fled. He noted how capturing Indians, destroying their cultivated fields, and removing them for resettlement "to another region" would facilitate the growth of a Spanish population and prevent the return of Natives to

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Tarahumara se han buscado en sus Tierras"; "mediante la buena correspondencia que he procurado se tenga con los naturales, se hallan muy bien sin estrañar el que pueblen en su provincia los Españoles"; "despues que entre en este govierno se descubrio en aquella partte un mineral de los mas ricos que se han experimentado en estas partes"; "segun demuestran seran de mucha Utilidad al Real haver de Vuestra Magestad."

[226] See "Captain Berroterán's Report on the Condition of Nueva Vizcaya (1748)," in *The Presidio and Militia on the Northern Frontier of New Spain*: Volume II, Part II, The Central Coridor and the Texas Corridor, 1700-1765, Diana Hadley, Thomas H. Naylor, and Mardith K. Schuetz-Miller, eds. (Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 1997), 206-207. Hereafter cited as "Berroterán Narrative, page #." Original quotes, "era preciso corregir por sus padres misioneros los abusos de la idolatría, atribyuendo a 'espinas de dulce parral,' de la parte evangélica"; "dando muerte a algunos padres, quemando los templos, se retiraron a los peñoles y barrancas"; "pacificada la Tarahumara."

their former homelands. He had personally taken 120 families from the canyons and resettled them at his presidio.[227]

Such interactions with Tarahumara Indians also shed light on Spanish approaches to migratory Indians like the Toboso. The link between colonialism, violence, and forced migration is evident in Pardiñas's call to compel them "by force to crave peace," and in Marin's suggestion to the viceroy that they be "compelled to build their houses correctly, raise chickens, and plant their cornfields." As he saw it, forced resettlement of Tobosos would cause them to "lose and abandon their inherent instinct to wander in the mountain ranges."[228]

The relationship between the discourse of "imminent loss" and forced migration practices helps explain Spanish expansion during the 1680s and 1690s, as military campaigns intertwined with missionization to help fuel new possibilities for mining, ranching, and Euroamerican settlement. Pardiñas, Marin, and others described how reciprocal violence was effecting social change in the Rio Grande, even as they continued to recognize Indians as a grave threat. They suggested that Tobosos were now "small in number," but also that more than ever before they were leading other Indians to hostile action. As Captain Escorza explained to the Governor of Nueva Vizcaya in 1693, "formerly [the Tobosos] were so numerous that they had had no need to make use of other Indians further in the interior, and could prevent them from coming in." Now, Escorza feared, the Tobosos' desperate situation, the result of "time and war" had led

[227] Berroteran Narrative, 221: "sitiando y batiendo con cuatro o seis cañoncitos de artillería manejables en dicha sierra."
[228] Pardiñas Narrative, 230: "con deseo de obligarles con las Armas a apetecer la Paz"; Marin Narrative, 400: "obligandoles a que hagan cassas en forma, y cria de gallinas: y que siembren sus milpas de calidad."

them to solicit "strange" Indians to migrate south of the Rio Grande.[229]

Even as the Spanish population slowly grew, from Ossorio's estimate of "not more than 300 citizens" in 1678, to Marin's estimate of "five hundred families" in 1693, Indian raids continued and settled Indians continued to rise up. Even as Spaniards built new towns and mines in Nueva Vizcaya, and they resettled New Mexico in 1694, Spanish writers continued to assert that "depopulation was worse than ever," "the potential loss of the kingdom" was at hand, and Indian nomads were to blame. As Escorza summarized, "the truth is that affairs are in a worse state in these parts and the consequences are worse than they have ever been."[230]

Like Ossorio, governors and military officers in the 1690s drew upon macabre fantasies to imagine a final end to the Indian siege. Marin explained, for example, that though the Tobosos are few in number, they incited other nations to atrocities, and as a result "it is extremely necessary to extirpate and destroy them entirely…for it is certain that as long as such very bad Indians live trouble will not be lacking."[231] Governor Gabriel de Castillo, echoing Marin's sentiments, suggested that it was "contrary to reason not to put Indian men to the sword." In addition to putting a bounty of 100 pesos on the heads of five Toboso leaders in 1693, he requested that the viceroy allow him to send to

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[229] On Tobosos influencing other nations see Marin narrative, 390; "Copy of a letter from the *sargento mayor* Juan Bautista de Escorza to be sent to his lordship Don Gabriel de Castillo. Cerro Gordo, July 13, 1693," in Hackett *Historical Documents II*, 324: "siendo ellos como eran en numero crecido no solo no tenian nezesidad de balerse de otros Yndios de mas adentro Sino que antes les Ympedian la entrada pero oy que los a consumido el tiempo y la Guerra y Se ben pocos no solo no ympiden a los Yndios estraños sino que antes los Solicitan y combidan Subordinandose a ellos…" Hereafter cited as "Escorza Narrative, page #."

[230] Escorza Narrative, 324: "por estas partes estan las cossas de peor calidad y consequencias que han estado nunca"; for other descriptions of depopulation see Marin Narrative, 390; Pardiñas Narrative, 228.

[231] Marin Narrative, 400: "que se les haga la guerra mui viva, y sangrienta sin darles quartel…consumirles y acabarles del todo, y reducir las chusmas, que es cierto, mientras subsistan tan pessimos Yndios, no faltaran travajos al Reino…"

Mexico City the women and little children of those who he killed.[232]

These schemes met with resistance. A crown attorney in Mexico City counseled the viceroy to reject both plans. He condemned the extermination of Indian men and stated that they should be put on trial, "conducting these cases according to law and proving them fully." With regard to Indian removal, he noted that it would not only involve "considerable expense" but that "the demoralization of these people would be such that, having nothing for them to do…they would be maintained at the expense of the royal coffers."[233] It is worth noting, however, that such condemnation did not prevent a war council in Durango in 1696 from envisioning a plan to capture Indians when they came to offer peace and then "take them in carts to Mexico, Veracruz, and transport them over water to Campeche."[234]

If the opposition of royal advisors in Mexico City helps explain why visions of extermination or forced removal largely remained fantasies of Spanish residents in the late-1600s, it is important to note that Nueva Vizcayans had not entirely abandoned the traditional legal framework of "peaceful" persuasion either. Recall that Ossorio declared that he had made peace with the Tobosos and through his efforts he had transformed

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[232] "Another letter from the said Governor Gabriel del Castillo. Parral, November 20, 1693," in Hackett *Historical Documents II*, 350: "aseguro a Vuestra Excelencia es contra razon no pasarlos a todos a cuchillo." For scheme to send Indians away see "Response of the fiscal (crown attorney), Mexico, December 16, 1693," in Hackett *Historical Documents II*, 355-361. Hereafter cited as "Fiscal's Recommendations, p #." On bounty on the heads of chiefs see "Order which Don Gabriel del Castillo gives to Captain Juan de Retana, Parral, November 10, 1693," in Hackett *Historical Documents II*, 344-349.

[233] Fiscal's Recommendations, 358: "que devera dicho Governador y los demas Capitanes y Cavos ajustarse a lo mandado fulminando las causas conforme a derecho y substanciandolas con los mas breves terminos que la calidad de los delictos permitieren"; "por ninguna manera haga semejante remission pues fuera del considerable costo que causaran en la conduccion el embarazo de esta gente sera de calidad que no haya en que ocuparla ni parte donde ponerla y havran de manenterse por quanta de la Real hazienda." Note that the fiscal did not ruleout forced migration altogether but suggested they could be remitted to near or distant missions.

[234] The plans to send Indians away in carts is discussed in "Reply of the fiscal to the letter of the royal officials. Acknoweldged by the señor fiscal, Madrid, April 2, 1698," in Hackett *Historical Documents II*, 458: "dizen se pudiera dar providencia de apricionarlos en dandose de Paz y conduzirlos en caros a mexico y a el Puerto de la vera cruz trasportandoles a la provincia de Campeche para poner los en encomiendas…"

them into the "principal defense of the kingdom." Pardiñas argued that Tarahumaras were not alienated because *he* maintained good relations with them. In fact, virtually every governor, putting pen to paper, wrote that Indians "always break the peace," described Indian diplomacy as "false," and then described their own entrees into peacemaking with Tobosos. When Indians actually arrived offering peace, after months of violence, speaking back to Spaniards in deferent language—"we pledge obedience to his majesty," "we want you to be our godfather"—governors almost always granted them their requests.[235]

The paternalistic tradition reflected in settling Indians in missions in order to Christianize and civilize them suggested lingering hope that Indian behavior was not innate but changeable. In the late-1600s, governors of Nueva Vizcaya usually engaged this question implicitly rather than explicitly, but it ran through their correspondence and emerged in a question they asked Indians repeatedly during diplomatic and legal inquiries: "Why do you pledge peace and then break it?" Calls for Indians to be "put to the sword" or sent away in carts suggest that through the weight of experience, residents of Nueva Vizcaya were becoming more convinced that Tobosos were never going to lay down their arms and take the Christian path.[236]

Obedience to traditional legal frameworks only goes so far in explaining Spanish

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[235] Ossorio, 212; Pardiñas, 228. Ossorio, characteristic of other discussions of "false" peace, described Indian peace entrees as follows: "Under a feigned peace which on various occasions they have made, they have succeeded in securing a knowledge of all the towns and farms of the Spaniards and friendly Indians, which they have no utterly annihilated and depopulated."; "Also, under the pretext of peace, most of them were baptized, yet today they are apostates." For multiple discussions of Indian peace entrees and the long history of "false peace" see Archivo de Hidalgo del Parral Microfilm (AHP) Reel 1704A, fr. 171-217; AHP 1711A, fr. 33-44, AHP 1711b, fr. 1030-1040, AHP 1715A, fr. 57-337; AHP 1718A, especially fr. 117-151; AHP 1722A, fr. 175-354.

[236] On questioning during trials in the 1680s and 1690s see especially Archivo General de la Nacion, Mexico City, Mexico, Provincias Internas, Volume 30, expediente (file) 9, hereafter AGN, PI, vol. #, file #; AHP 1688c, fr. 1432-1461. AHP 1686b, fr. 854-918, AHP 1684A, fr. 66-176.

approaches to migratory Indians, however. Questions about Indian "character" were never divorced from power relations; violence fueled in part by fears of "imminent loss" had helped Spaniards realize new prosperity through increased royal investment, even if they continued to suggest their situation was "worse than it has ever been."[237] If anything, the Spanish visions of the Greater Rio Grande examined above reveal that their calls for enslavement or extermination are necessary but not sufficient to explaining the emergence of forced removal campaigns. Why were Indians requesting peace and then returning to the mountains? Why, if they held the province in constant threat of loss, did they not mobilize to cast the Spanish presence out of Nueva Vizcaya, as neighboring Indians had in New Mexico? How did Indian actions relate to visions of extermination or removal, and the possibility of turning them into reality?

"All Spaniards do is eat bread and drink Chocolate…"

In the 1680s and 1690s the constraints on Spanish power in the Greater Rio Grande were multiple. As governors' accounts made clear, Indians surrounded them. Even if many groups had interacted with missions, received baptism, and self-identified as "Christians," vast swaths of territory were controlled by migratory Indians like the Toboso and their allies. Furthermore, recurrent rebellions and uprisings among "friendly" Natives like the Tarahumara made even the heartland of Spanish settlement seem vulnerable.[238]

Power was rooted in landscape. In Spanish towns, missions, and haciendas,

[237] I am drawing here from David J. Weber's insights on the relationship between power and Spanish approaches to Indians; see *Bárbaros* especially 277-278. Quotes from Escorza Narrative as cited above.
[238] For broader Indian rebellions in Nueva Vizcaya see Deeds, *Defiance and Deference*, especially Chapter 4, "Crises of the 1690s."

soldiers and friars watched over laboring bodies with rifles and whips; framed in benevolent aims, coercion was effected through the specter of violence. If Spaniards feared that Tobosos might "pervert" the "domestic" Indians, they also drew upon the capture and punishment of enemy Indians to warn Native subjects about the consequences of disobedience.[239] Just a few leagues from Spanish towns, however, their cavalry were virtually useless in the rugged mountain ranges. Horses required water in abundance and the aridity of the terrain and Spaniards' lack of knowledge about those springs and creeks that did exist challenged their ability to move through the Greater Rio Grande.[240]

Outside islands of Spanish hegemony, Tobosos and their allies built social worlds that were tied to but not determined by the Spanish presence. At times they fell upon Spanish haciendas and ranches in small groups, opening a corral and driving off the mules and horses before local residents knew what had happened. Other times, they organized coalitions of 400 or 500 Indian raiders, attacking convoys along the royal road, taking captives, clothing and livestock and returning to their mountain camps. Spanish explorers described what happened to these spoils when they journeyed north to the Rio

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[239] For "pervertir los reducidos" [pervert the settled ones] see AHP 1718, p. #726b. Note too that the emphasis here is on the danger of Natives' "continual movement"—"continuo movimiento." I chose this quote for its particular vivid language, but discussions of enemy Indians bringing settled Indians to their cause are evident in the late-1600s as well; see the governors narratives as cited above, and trials manuscripts like AHP 1684a, fr. 393-421, AHP 1684d fr. 2222-2229, and AHP 1688c, 1432-1461, for example.

[240] Drawing upon Cynthia Radding I view landscapes as socially constructed spaces that emerge historically out of the interaction between humans and nature. See Radding, *Landscapes of Power and Identity: Comparative Histories in the Sonoran Desert and the Forests of Amazonia from Colony to* Republic (Durham: Duke University Press, 2006), especially Chapter One, "Ecological and Cultural Frontiers." On the relationship between labor coercion and violence I draw from Saidiya Hartman, *Scenes of subjection : terror, slavery, and self-making in nineteenth-century America* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997). On punishment see AHP 1684A, f. 66-176 and Ramón Gutiérrez, *When Jesus Came, the Corn Mothers Went Away: Marriage Sexuality, and Power in New Mexico, 1500-1846* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1991), especially 191. For difficulty of horse travel, see Berroteran Narrative, especially p. 194, and AHP 1710A, f. 12-19.

Grande and observed the Native trading fairs at La Junta in the 1680s and 1690s, or when Captain Domingo Ramón came upon a "great meeting of Indians" near present day Austin, Texas in 1716. He observed piles of cloth, clothing, buffalo skins, rifles, and "many fine horses"—with Nueva Vizcayan brands—before Indians noticed his presence and sent him fleeing.[241]

The evidence of how Tobosos organized and understood this world is surprisingly rich. Escaped captives described their experiences among the Indians, military officers wrote campaign diaries that described their movement through Indian homelands, and perhaps most importantly, Spaniards recorded Toboso testimony during diplomatic and criminal proceedings. Taken together, this material can be used to suggest a range of motivations for Indian actions that help shed further light on the Greater Rio Grande and the relationship between Indian raids and diplomacy and Spanish visions of Indian removal.[242]

The category of "Toboso" encompassed distinct Native groups who shared broad similarities in political economy. If Ossorio described "eleven" Tobosos nations,

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[241] On Estrada's descriptions of a "gran Junta de Indios" near Austin with "pedazos de paño fino" and "muchos cavallos Buenos" see AHP 1716A, p. 258; On La Junta trading fairs see Anderson, *Indian Southwest*, especially Chapter Two, "Ethnogenesis and Cultural Continuity within the Jumano Exchange Network, 1682-1720," see also "*Autos* from Pardiñas, 1688-1692" and "*Autos* from Parral, 1691-1694," in Hackett *Historical Documents II*, 228-363. For an alternative to Anderson's emphasis on Native dominance see Maria F. Wade *The Native Americans of the Texas Edwards Plateau, 1582-1799* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 2003).

[242] A note on methodology: I use material from the 1680s to the 1720s in this section to construct a composite portrait of Toboso groups. Cultures change over time through social relations, but I have nonetheless gone forward with this approach cautiously, cross-referencing sources and carefully considering the context of their production. This approach made sense to me for two reasons: first, the evidence suggests that the basic political economy of Toboso groups continued even as they faced new disruptions with the emergence of forced removal campaigns in 1711, and second, while extant evidence is rich, it is scattered enough that breaking from a thematic approach to emphasize change over time would limit my ability to imbue a larger sense of the Tobosos and their world to my readers. Most studies that address Tobosos have opted for strict chronology. See William B. Griffen, *Culture Change and Shifting Populations in Central Northern Mexico* (Tucson: Univerrsity of Arizona Press, 1969). Griffen's work has been immensely useful in facilitating my archival inquiries and helping me contextualize my findings, even as I hope to build upon his work through a more analytical approach.

Spaniards usually used the term with less specificity, to refer generically to migratory Indians or as a synonym for "enemy Indians." I use the term here to describe several interrelated Native groups that appeared consistently in archival records: the Cocoiomes, Acoclames, and Chisos. These groups allied with a variety of others like the Cabezas, Gavilanes, and Coahuileños who also shared similar patterns of subsistence and social organization. Individuals never self-identified as "Toboso" but described themselves as belonging to a specific "nation," like the "Acoclame" or the "Cacuitatome." In describing the raiding and trading political economy these groups shared, the terms "Toboso" or "Toboso and their allies" are nonetheless useful in the interest of coherence even as it is important to recall the complexity and multiplicity of identities these terms encompass.[243]

It is impossible to reconstruct Toboso culture before epidemic disease and the incorporation of Spanish livestock began to affect Native groups in the region, but the archival record can provide an entry into the post-contact world in motion. By the late-1600s, significant changes in social organization and subsistence practices among all the "innumerable" nations of the Rio Grande were underway. Over the course of the seventeenth century, epidemics had thinned the Native population both south and north of the river, as long-distance trade networks and the increased mobility offered by horse travel carried disease from missions, towns, and mining camps north to Native trading fairs and seasonal encampments. Smallpox epidemics and plagues in nearly every decade help explain the decline in the Native population from an estimated 300,000 to 80,000 by

[243] On Spanish ethnic ascriptions see Ossorio Narrative, 213; Marin Narrative, 393-395

1700, though it still dwarfed the Spanish population of 5,000 or so by that year.[244]

The degree to which disease and slave raids may have affected the population of Toboso groups in particular is difficult to pin down precisely. On the one hand, Spaniards explained that Tobosos were "now small," and that their power centered on "inviting in other groups." But Indian testimony suggested that between 1680 and 1710, Tobosos and their allies demonstrated remarkable stability in numbers. Spaniards most frequently cited three groups in concert when discussing the broader category of "Toboso": the Cocoiomes, Acoclames, and Chisos. Chiso bands were distinct from the Cocoiomes and Acoclames in homeland, dwelling further north towards the well-watered Conchos Valley, but they shared similarities in political economy and often served as intermediaries between the Toboso and "settled" Indian spheres. Some Chiso bands regularly labored in haciendas and resided in mission towns for extensive periods even as they maintained alliances with Cocoiomes, Acoclames, and Indian groups north of the Rio Grande. Indian testimony suggests that there were approximately 1,000 Cocoiomes and Acoclames through much of this period, and it was sometimes noted that Chisos were an even larger group.[245]

Toboso subsistence centered on mastery of harsh landscapes that Spaniards asserted were virtually uninhabitable. In their homelands in mountain ranges like the

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[244]Daniel T. Reff, *Disease, Depopulation, and Culture Change in Northwestern New Spain, 1518-1764* (Salt Lake City: University of Utah Press, 1991), especially chapter three's wider anlaysis of the impact of disease on Native organization; See also Gerhard, *La Frontera Norte de la Nueva España*, 214-15; Anderson, *The Indian Southwest*. Smallpox was a constant threat for Spaniards and Indians alike, though observers noted that "the laboring population"—Native subjects of the Spanish—and "enemy Indians"—the Tobosos—were particular affected. For the late-1600s see Marin Narrative, 391: "To this the epidemic which prevailed last year, and part of this [1693], contributed not a little, for it destroyed more than a third of the kingdom, the working people suffering more generally from this misfortune."

[245] For population estimates see "Testimonio de los autos fhos Sobre las Providencia dadas en tiempo de D.n Gabriel deel Castillo," in Archivo General de Indias, Seville, Spain, Guadalajara 67-4-1 (1693); AHP 1704A, fr. 222; AHP 1715A, p. 166-169; AHP 1715A, fr. 279, AHP 1716, fr. 155. For an alternate discussion of population see Griffen 94-95.

Sierra Mojada and Sierra del Diablo, they gathered the fruit of cacti (tunas), roasted agave roots (mescal), and drew upon rich botanical knowledge to make use of a variety of other plants and animals. What to Spaniards was hazy, hostile terrain was to Tobosos a named landscape full of watering holes, enemies and allies, and secure shelters. They drew upon generations of life in a semi-arid region prone to prolonged drought in demonstrating a clear attachment to place and returning repeatedly to particular camps.[246]

Illustration 2: Sierra Mojada, Site of Toboso camps in the late-1600s and early-1700s[247]

Tobosos had adapted to violence and disease by drawing upon Spanish horses and fragmenting into small, extended family groups that were highly mobile. They sought to

[246] On harvesting tuna and mescal from nopal cacti see AHP 1684A, fr. 115; AHP 1704A; AHP 1716 fr. 156 (p. #307); AHP 1722A fr. 422-425; AHP 1724A, fr. 257-260; Griffen, *Culture Change and Shifting Populations*, 110.

[247] Image courtesy of, fittingly enough, a mining investment website: <http://www.goldstockbull.com/articles/gold-silver-takeover-targets/> (Accessed by author on 31 March 2010).

counteract disease with movement, and sometimes cited it as both a reason to seek peace with Spaniards and a reason to break alliances and return to the mountains. Descriptions from military campaign diaries shed light on both Indian responses to disease and Toboso political economy. In 1715, for example, Diego de Estrada noted that his soldiers and Indian scouts had witnessed Cocoiome and Acoclame Indians "fleeing from an epidemic." As they followed their tracks and moved through their abandoned camps, they described discarded gourds, shattered pots, rifle cases, leather bags, linens and other types of cloth "from Mexico and Cholula." They came across piles of capes, overcoats, undervests, and other discarded clothing. Particularly indicative of the "severity of the sickness," they noted, was the shorn hair that littered the trail, suggesting a mourning practice that was common among other groups in the region as well.[248]

The camps, or "rancherias," that these soldiers came across during epidemics served both for rapid movement and as bases for raiding and trading expeditions, as descriptions of pots, rifles, and piles of cloth and clothing suggest. Accounts from escaped captives who had lived among Tobosos and their allies reveal that rancherias were chosen both for access to water and for security. Cocoiomes, they reported, lived in huts that they covered with skins that could easily be set up and taken down. By locating camps high in the mountains, they were both nearer to perennial springs or rainwater pools and less vulnerable to attack. When water ran out, the group could move easily to a

[248] On reorganization as a result of disease see Spicer, *Cycles of Conquest*, 12-13; Reff, especially Chapter Two, "Aboriginal Culture in Northwestern Mexico"; on motivations related to settlement see AHP 1715, p. 85-99; For Indians "huyendo de la enfermedad" see AHP 1716, p. 269. Apaches also had the mourning practice of shearing one's hair, see Michael Steck's description in Microfilm Reel 1 (1858), Steck Papers at UNM Center for Southwest Research and Morris Opler, *Apache Lifeway: The Economic, Social, and Religious Institutions of the Chiricahua [Apache] Indians* (New York: Cooper Square Publisher, Inc., 1965), 475.

new camp.[249]

Even as escaped captives provide a window onto Toboso ways of life, they suggest how captivity and captive exchange shaped social relations in the Greater Rio Grande. In the short term, interrogating captives could provide information about the location of enemy settlements and military forces and help groups make strategic decisions. Captives also served as translators or were used to deliver messages to their former captors. At times it was explicitly noted that a given individual had lived among the Spaniards or lived among the Indians and was especially useful as a result. Some captives remained among outsiders long-term and were adopted as kin. An "Acoclame" man explained this practice to Spanish officials in 1705 when he noted that he was not actually the son of an Acoclame headman but "like a son." He reminded Spaniards that they had the same practice of raising outsiders among them "as if they were their children."[250]

Captive exchange or the exchange of women served to forge relations between Toboso groups and their allies as well. Offering captives as gifts signaled goodwill to be met with reciprocity, while the offering of female relatives forged affine kinship relations that bound Cocoiomes, Acoclames, and Chisos together as "relatives." In 1703, for example, twelve Chisos arrived at an Acoclame encampment with four girls that they wanted the Acoclames "to marry." In the ensuing months, the two groups lived together

[249] AHP 1715A: "los cueros que tapaban sus jacales"; for a particularly vivid account see AHP 1724A, fr. 256-260. See also AHP 1716A and AHP 1686C.

[250] References to captives litter the archival record, see for example: AHP 1684A, p 27; AGN-PI vol. 30, exp. 9 (1688); Archivo General de Indias, Seville, Spain, Guadalajara Leg. 152 (1693); AHP 1704A, exp. 103, 104, 105, 136; AHP 1710A, fr. 12-19; AHP 1715A, p. 85-99; AHP 1716A, fr. 467; AHP 1724A, fr. 257-260. Quote from AHP 1704A, fr. 200: "el no es hijo de raton [the Acoclame headman] que lo tenia y estava con el como si fuera su padre como tienen los xptianos y espanoles otros q. crian y enseñan consigo q. los quieren como hijos…"

and aided one another in the Sierra Mojada. Suggesting that this was not an uncommon practice, one Indian explained in 1688 how Contotora Indians had brought news that the Spanish governor had died to a Cabeza headman because "his wife was their relative."[251]

Out of this world enlaced with kinship, Tobosos built alliances that helped them obtain subsistence goods and status items like cloth, captives, and horses through raids and diplomacy. In the process of forging the large coalitions Spaniards described raiding the royal road, Tobosos and their allies contrasted their ideas about political economy to those of Spanish elites. They drew upon gendered language to make their case. One Chiso leader, Natura de Cacalote, recruited hacienda laborers in the 1680s by stating that, "I am a man. I kill Spaniards and have mules and horses and clothing." Or as Seis Dedos, another Chiso leader explained, "*I* am a man, but *not* the Governor of Parral, all he does is eat inside; he does not know how to go out and find it outside." Other Tobosos reportedly made their case in the form of a question: "What do Spanish men know how to do but eat bread and drink Chocolate?"[252]

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[251]AHP 1704A, fr. 200: "Binieron un años dose chizos con sus familias y quatro muchachas que se havian de casar con acoclames y q. estos los han ayudado en el tiempo que han estado con ellos"; In AGN-PI vol 30, exp. 9, p. 391-397 the "confessions" of Francisco and El Tuerto are particularly useful (1688): Francisco explained that "él es diferente nacion y que se junto con ellos por aver casado con una mujer de dhos cavesas "; The Contotora Indians brought news about the death of the governor because they were "parientes de la mujer de D.n S.ntiago Cap.n de los cavesas"; El Tuerto noted that he had been raised among Spaniards (perhaps as a captive) and that "Por que como se crio en este puesto con los españoles nunca queria salir a hazer mal, y que c.do los cavezas y tovosos vinieron a Caopas q. mataron algunos y se llevaron cav.da, q. el no vino y que aun cueles preguntó q era lo que havian echo noselo quisieron dezir por estar enojados en el por no aver querido venir con ellos." If the exchange and adoption of captives helped Tobosos forge alliances and may have helped them maintain their population in the face of violence and disease, it also could fuel conflict. On one occasion, for example, Cociomes sought to "turn in" their Coahuileño allies to the Spanish, explaining that they wanted to keep some of their women since "they had married them." (AHP 1722A) In this case, Spaniards sought to manipulate the rift to their advantage, by drawing upon Coahuileño scouts in their campaigns against Cociomes and other Toboso groups. Though the roots of conflict between these Native groups are more often left unexplained, Indian emissaries at times cited "fights" between the Cocoiomes, Acoclames, and Chisos as a motive to seek peace with the Spaniards.

[252] AHP 1684A, fr. 111-113, 127: "Yo sí que soy hombre que mato españoles y tengo mulas y cavallos y ropa que me dieron en los Carros"; "el sí era hombre y no el Gov.or del Parral que no hazia mas que comer alli dentro, que no savia salir a buscarlo fuera"; "que saven hazer los Españoles que solo comer pan y

Such testimony suggests ways in which Spanish elites and Toboso headman constructed gendered visions of political economy in relation to each other. Recall that for Spanish elites, prosperity centered on taking possession of Indian homelands to build farms, ranches, and mines. They contrasted these activities with the "wandering" and "inconstancy" of Indian men. For Tobosos and their allies, wealth encompassed possession of captives, horses, and clothing, accessed through both raids and diplomatic entrees. They contrasted "going out" to make a living, the practice of a real man, with Spanish civility—"all they do in Parral is talk."[253]

Such distinctions between Spanish practices and their own were also reflected in ceremonies of adoption for Hispanic captives. Though Tobosos occasionally took adult captives, they explained that they more often killed them because "they were the enemy." They incorporated young captives, especially boys, "to raise them up as their own." At the moment of capture, Indians stripped Hispanic boys of their clothing, explained that "trousers made them look ugly" and put them in loincloths. Upon reaching Native camps, women greeted them, dancing and tapping them with clubs. Boys were assigned a "master" and helped take care of the horses, gather firewood, and transport water. Suggesting the kind of kinship slavery that James Brooks has described for New Mexico, escaped captives noted that there were Hispanic captives who had chosen to continue to live among the Tobosos because they had become accustomed to their ways of life and had learned the language. After a period of harsh labor, they had been allowed to go out on raids and had married Toboso women. The ability to go out on the raid was a key rite

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semitas, y vever chocolate." [Note that emphasis is in original as the phrasing "el sí era hombre" stresses his claim to manhood. See also AHP 1686C, AGN PI-30, 9 (1688).

[253] See Marin Narrative as cited above for language of "penetration"; AHP 1684A, especially fr. 111-127, for Indian visions of making a living like a real man.

of passage into manhood, as both captives and Tobosos revealed in their testimony, and suggested a transition from "slave" to "kin" status.[254]

While raids were key to Toboso ideas about wealth and gender, Tobosos also drew upon the language of "peace" and "obedience to his majesty" as a political economic strategy. Emissaries often came bearing news that their leaders "wanted to make peace" or that they were "ready to live in peace and never return to mountains." These visits began a process by which Spaniards put military campaigns on hold while they waited for Indians to fulfill their end of the bargain and bring in their families to "ratify the contract of peace."[255]

On most occasions, neither Indian headmen nor their families ever arrived, even as messengers returned time and time again to explain the delay. During such visits they received tobacco, corn, and some cloth and clothing before returning to the mountains "quite content with having been gifted and received in name of his majesty." One Acoclame Indian testified, for example, that his people talked about making peace by saying, "let's go, let's get food and clothing and something to eat, and cheat the Spaniards." They "cheated the Spaniards" through offers of peace framed in terms of fictive kinship, telling one Spanish official in Parral, for example, that they wanted him to

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[254] AHP 1715A, p. 85-99 (a number of captive Cocoiome women testified along these lines): "para criarlos y para que los ayuden"; AHP 1724A, fr. 257-260, "les hizieron quitar los calzones disiendo que con ellos estavan feos y les dieron tapa ravos." See note 225 above for other references to captives.

[255] "Pledging peace" took many forms, but after Indians were gifted and rationed (in 1677, 1682, 1684, 1688, 1693, 1695, 1699, 1703-1704, 1708, 1715-1716, 1718, and on other occasions) Spaniards usually accused them of being faithless or treacherous. See Ossorio Narrative, AHP 1682, AHP 1684A, AHP 1688C, Marin Narrative, AHP 1703, AHP 1704A, AHP 1710A, AHP 1715A, AHP 1716A, AHP 1718A, AHP 1722A, and Griffen *Culture Change*. Weighing intent in such situations is admittedly difficult. But the evidence for such actions is not only from a Spanish perspective, as Indian testimony was also frequently recorded. This recorded testimony has its own challenges—shaped as it was by the frequent use of one or even two interpreters, and the threat of violence or even torture in the immediate context of proceedings. I have been careful to consider the "scripting" of recorded testimony, and its invocation, or mirroring of Spanish tropes of Indian behavior, but I am unwilling to cast it aside as simpling mirroring Spanish fears and the Spanish mind.

"be their godfather." This language was met with so many gifts of tobacco, food, and clothing that the governor lamented that there was "not even a cape left in this town." He was outraged when the Indians promptly returned to their mountain homelands.[256]

Toboso actions suggest multivalent motivations for entering and leaving peace settlements. Spanish reports of Indian raids in the midst of peace proceedings suggest, for example, that Natives may have used "peace" as a diversionary tactic. Since settlements were garrisoned with military regiments, newly settled Indians diverted soldiers away from their kin and allies in the mountains. Settling among the Spaniards could thus provide immediate benefits to some Toboso groups, while their relatives and allies raided Spanish livestock with newfound security.[257]

Even as Tobosos at times manipulated peace entrees to their advantage, it must be stressed that the decision to settle among Spaniards was often shaped by the context of violence. In the hours after a devastating attack, for example, Indians knew that "pledging obedience" would lead soldiers to put down their arms, and prevent further casualties. It was often on such occasions that Tobosos and their allies brought in their people to stay among Spaniards for longer periods, though usually no more than six or seven months. They aided with farming and Tarahumaras "helped them sew corn." They ran errands for priests, and served as scouts in military campaigns against other Native groups. Many

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[256] AHP 1704A, fr. 182: "los acoclames y cocoiomes siempre que pedian Paz dezian bamos a que nos den rropa, que comer, y lo que nosotros quisieremos, y a engañar a los españoles como aora al presente lo hazian los cocoiomes en Parras…"; AHP 1716A, fr. 380: "y que io los abia de apadrinar y defenderlos"; "ni a quedado capote ni justacor de soldado que no este en su poder este es el modo mas conbeniente para traerlos a nuestra pas."

[257] If Toboso likely had diverse motivations for entering into such peace settlements and receiving baptism, they revealed little useful information on this matter in their testimony to Spanish officials. In explaining why they had come to request peace, they spoke in the language of Spanish Indian law, saying they had come to live in peace, under the obedience of his majesty, and never return to their hostilities. When they were asked why they broke the peace and returned to their homelands, they claimed to "not know why" or said that "it was their custom," or noted that "they left because the missionaries flogged their children." See note 255 above.

Tobosos were thus baptized and received Christian names, even if Spaniards often clarified that they had not been "instructed" in Catholicism.[258]

It is also clear that more than just rational calculation or violent coercion shaped Native decision-making. One particularly vivid illustration of the cultural lens that shaped Toboso actions is evident in a 1704 raid into Coahuila, when headman Contreras's son was mortally injured. Retreating with the spoils, the raiding party came across three priests and an Indian servant on a hillside. Declaring that "it was not right that his son was dying while the Fathers lived," Contreras ordered his men to kill the priests. Stripping them of their habits, as they did to most victims, the raiding party ultimately abandoned this valuable clothing in a cave on the way back to their mountain encampments. One man later described why, explaining how a few of his relatives had put on priests' clothing once and staged a dramatic performance, blessing and kissing everyone in the camp in imitation of the friars. These Tobosos "priests" had soon died, however, and this incident had convinced the raiding party that priests' clothing was simply too dangerous to keep in their possession.[259]

The degree to which Toboso and Spanish worlds intertwined reflects the ways in which Natives met their rapidly changing world through adaptation. Tobosos demonstrated a clear awareness of the Spanish political system, developed a sophisticated understanding of how this system worked and benefitted from a network of kin and allies that transmitted information about Spanish military campaigns and the arrival and

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[258] By meeting expectations of reciprocity through military service, Tobosos may have strained relations among other Native groups in the Rio Grande. Spaniards hoped as much, drawing upon Indian scouts both because they were essential to military campaigns' success, and in the interests of fragmenting Native alliances: I discuss this issues at length in subsequent chapters of my dissertation. For a history of these peace entrees see AHP 1722A, fr. 499-501.

[259] AHP 1704A, fr. 205-206: "no es bien que estando mi hijo muriendose esten los Padres bivos."

departure of governors. They linked raiding and peace entrees in Spanish Nueva Vizcaya to position themselves as suppliers of horses, clothing, and captives to Native trading fairs north of the Rio Grande. They also, like Spaniards, saw the world as defined by supernatural forces, and sought balance by fleeing epidemics, breaking or discarding symbols of Spanish power like priests' habits, and seeking vengeance for slain warriors, women, and children.[260]

This glimpse at the Toboso world sheds light on the landscapes of power and identity that both cut across and interlinked the Greater Rio Grande. The Toboso and their allies, like Spaniards, may have at time imagined exterminating their neighbors. A Chiso man testified to Spanish officials in 1684, for example, that the Tobosos talked about how they would not be satisfied until they had killed "many Spaniards" and their Indian allies. Others explained that "what the Indians talk about is little by little killing all the Spaniards." Several factors worked against the longevity of Nativist campaigns, however. Even as Tobosos contrasted their methods of making a living to Spanish ways of life, their political economy was deeply tied to Spanish haciendas, ranches, and merchant convoys. In carrying horses, cloth, and clothing to Native trading fairs, they drew upon the presence of Spaniards, not their elimination.[261]

Taking Tobosos seriously as political actors suggests that Spanish fears of migratory Indians were not merely a rhetorical invention to spur royal investment. They *were* that in part, as warnings that Nueva Vizcaya was "at risk of being lost" helped spark the creation of a string of new military forts in the mid-1680s and helped glean more than

[260] For an argument that Indian nomads did not grasp Spanish political organization see William H. Griffen, *Apaches at War and Peace* (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1988). For a critique see Brian Delay, "Independent Indians and the U.S.-Mexican War," as cited in introduction.

[261] I draw here upon the insights (and borrow the terms) of Cynthia Radding; for discussions of "killing all the Spaniards" ("matar a todos los españoles"), see especially AHP 1684a and AHP 1704A.

120,000 pesos per year in military defense funds by the 1690s. But reading Spanish discourse as merely a subterfuge to manipulate the royal treasury would elide the degree to which the Greater Rio Grande remained a contested landscape, and mask the violent context out of which Spanish and Indian visions of that world emerged. The complex relationship between fear, Indian raids, and violence warrants closer examination.[262]

"They cut the shame parts…"

Violence, diplomacy, and political economy were interlinked in the Greater Rio Grande for both Tobosos and Spaniards. For Tobosos, "pledging peace" was a means to access rations, tobacco, and clothing immediately. But it also could serve as a means to survey Spanish herds and settlements to later raid, or even to divert Spanish forces for the security of relatives who stayed behind. Such raids were often accomplished through acts of physical violence that terrorized targeted communities by employing fire and bodily dismemberment. Importantly, these actions were not construed as morally problematic but valorized as "going out to make a living," a moral concept constructed in opposition to Spaniards who "stay[ed] inside, and talk[ed]."[263]

For Spaniards, the potential wealth of mines, ranches, and haciendas was extracted by linking violence to paternalistic persuasion. Tobosos themselves noted this by explaining that they had left their settlements in past years because of the whippings of missionaries in the farm fields. Spaniards valorized violence against Indians as necessary defensive action within the wider ideology of "imminent loss," or as punishment for sins—"correction by the thorn of the gospel message." Though in theory

[262] On military funds and new presidios see "Reply of Fiscal, 1698" in Hackett, *Historical Documents II*, 455; Weber *The Spanish Frontier in North America*, especially Chapter Eight, "Indian Raiders and the Reorganization of Frontier Defenses."

[263] See notes 252 and 253 above.

they approached migratory Indians through "gentle means" by persuading them to come down from the mountains voluntarily, images of hundreds of armed men climbing mountain trails or blasting mountains with artillery raise questions about Indians' ability to "consent" under the threat of violence.[264]

Violence was not merely a reflection of ideology, however, but had generative potential. When Ossorio or Berroterán discussed having "reduced" a Native group to the Catholic faith, their language masked the violence of that process and its impact for targeted Native groups, as noted in the case of the Tarahumara above. Similarly, the ubiquitous trope of Indian "murders and robberies" often stood in for a discussion of the specific acts that might help us better understand how an Indian raid could generate the type of reprisal that Ossorio carried out in the summer of 1677, when he "killed or captured 400 persons," or when Escorza killed twenty-two men, eight women, and described "a very bloody trail where the hostiles had retreated" in 1693.[265]

A close reading of the way Indian and Spanish violence played out in concrete encounters helps explain the push from discussions of extermination or forced removal to action. On a Sunday morning in March 1684, for example, residents of a small settlement in rural Nueva Vizcaya learned that two of their neighbors had gone missing. The day before, Juan Caburrado and Luis, an Indian servant, had gone down river to cut wood to replace a broken cartwheel. When they did not return home that night, a party of men went out to investigate. Pedro Albarez later recalled that they had first noticed an axe,

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[264] See Ossorio, Pardiñas, and Berroterán narratives as cited above. On the link between violence and consent I am influenced here by Saidiya Hartman, *Scenes of Subjection,* especially Chapter Three, "Redressing the Pained Body."

[265] Ossorio Narrative, 211; Escorza in Hacket *Historical Documents II*, 333. On violence and ideology see Allen Feldman, *Formations of Violence: the Narrative of the Body and Political Terror in Northern Ireland* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991).

chisel, and a stocking—which he recognized as Juan's—before coming upon his naked, wounded body. Covering him with a blanket, they continued their search for Luis. They found him on a nearby hillside: pierced with arrows; his skull split by an axe. They carried the bodies downriver to the valley of San Bartolomé, where authorities began an investigation into who had killed and robbed these men.[266]

Inquiries immediately turned to the Chisos at a nearby hacienda, who had only recently settled "at peace" and officials worried had already returned to their old customs. Analysis of the arrows found at the attack site suggested that it was the Chisos and suspicious tracks led in the direction of the hacienda of Balsequillo where they labored. After further investigation, a Concho Indian was brought into testify to the matter. By explaining that he and three Chisos had committed the murders together on that day, he verified officials' suspicions. Perhaps he hoped that by confessing right away, and identifying his companions, he would reduce his own punishment. Maybe he thought that the argument they coerced him into joining them would let him off the hook.

As initial investigations turned into a full-fledged trial, Indian testimony shed further light on the relationship between newly settled Indians and longtime hacienda workers like Juan. In front of a Spanish tribunal, Juan described exactly the situation that local Spaniards feared, and provided an alternative perspective on the events of the raid. On March 4, he had left the hacienda of San Andres and travelled towards the ranch of Simon Cordero until he met with several Chiso Indians. Though Juan did not detail how they persuaded him to join them, together they headed off the road and up a canyon, until they heard the sounds of axes chopping where Juan Caburrado and Luis were working,

[266] Narrative below is drawn from full trial proceedings extant in AHP 1684A, fr. 66-266. Quotations hereafter cited as Chiso Raid Trial, frame #.

cutting wood for their cartwheel. The Chisos turned to Juan and said, "let's kill them." When he asked "why? Why should we kill them?" They responded, "let's kill them, and if you don't help, we are going to kill *you*." And so they set to work, approaching them, giving the war cry, shooting arrows. Though Juan insisted that he shot into the air, "to not do harm," he recalled how after "the work was done," they cut "the lower parts," the "shame" parts of both men, and stripped them of their clothing. They took away a white shirt and trousers, a purple cape, shoes, boots, a hat and work tools, and the men's brown horse with a saddle. Juan de la Cruz received none of these spoils, however, "because he was not known to them."[267]

This testimony corroborated current Spanish suspicions. First, Chisos that were allegedly "at peace" laboring at the Hacienda of Balsequillo were in fact continuing to raid. Second, they were recruiting hacienda laborers like Juan to their cause. The magistrates' line of questioning reflected these fears when after asking Juan to describe the events of March 4, they immediately asked what he knew about the Indian nations that were laboring in the haciendas of the valley and whether they wanted to or had tried to "rise up." Juan said that he knew that the Chisos and Chichitames had risen up or tried to rise up many times before returning again recently. Moreover, they communicated with their Toboso allies, "declared enemies of the Spaniards." He knew all this because he had heard the Chisos talking about it many times. After remitting Juan to Parral "given his flight risk," local magistrates immediately issued orders that the Chiso men who Juan

[267] Chiso Raid Trial, fr. 81-82: "por no aser daño"; "cortaron las partes bajas y bergonsosas a los dhos dos difuntos a Juan Caburrado se las cortó el Yndio Lasaro y los desnudaron la rropa que tenian…"; "por no ser conocido por ellos." Spoils described as follows: "Una camisa calzon y blancos calzon y de Paño [illegible] morados capote de paño del mysmo color sapatos y botines y a luis calzones y sonbrero y de las erramientas conque estavan travajando una acha carpintera y el cavallo castaño ensillado de Juan Caburrado toda la qual ropa y lo demas se rrepartieron unos con otros."

had accused be apprehended.[268]

Spanish officials now hit a roadblock, as after arriving in Parral, Juan changed his story. Or at least, he changed the names of the Chiso Indians involved. While he had original accused Francisco, Bartolomé, and Francisco Manijera, he now accused Lazaro, Frasquillo, and Ignacio. He only explained that he had told the story wrong the first time because "he was afraid, having been captured."[269] Officials set the former group of Chisos free and apprehended the latter group, but then Juan changed his story again and returned to his first declaration. He now said that he had only changed his testimony because Chiso leaders had told him that if they "were discovered in what they had done they would kill him." It was out of fear of Chiso revenge, he contended, that he had made his second statement.[270]

The testimonies of the apprehended men suggest the multiple worlds of Chiso Indians recently settled at peace. They worked at the hacienda of Balsequillo "and also in their country, towards the Rio Grande." They were part of, or party to discussions about livestock rustling, trades in cloth and clothing, and larger political aims to kill Spaniards, and even the governor of Parral. Such talk was, as I have noted above, tied to gendered visions of political economy. In this case, for example, Chiso leaders contrasted their ideas about wealth and manhood with Spaniards to declare that "they were men and that they carried away the horse herds, and since Spaniards could not take them back they were not men, nor did they have weapons." Such language may have been refracted

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[268] Chiso Raid Trial, fr. 81-82: "de paz…admitida y prometida"; "alsados y declarados por enemigos de los españoles."

[269] Ibid.: "por miedo por verse preso"; "y por que entendio que con esso le soltarian pero que la verdad es que ninguno de los que estan pressos ni el dho Fran.co manijosa tienen culpa en las dhas muertes por que no las ysieron."

[270] Ibid." "si los descrubria en lo que avian echo le avrian de matar y que por este temor y miedo dijo y declaró lo que contiene su segunda declarazion."

through the setting of captivity in a Spanish tribunal, and through translation between Native languages and Spanish. But in light of specific acts committed in recent raids it is certainly suggestive. What sentiment, for example, would the accusation that "Spaniards…were not men nor did they have weapons" have generated for Spaniards present, amidst testimony about Indians cutting off the "shame parts" of their victims?[271]

The trial of Juan and the Chiso men who led him on a raid also opens up the Spanish world of violence and forced migration. Imagine a man laboring in fields with his family, perhaps as one means of subsistence during times of seasonal scarcity, or perhaps because his leaders are biding time until political coalitions can take shape, until the time comes when Tobosos, Chisos, and others have solidified their plans to "kill all the Spaniards." He is snatched by Spanish soldiers at gunpoint, carried to a tribunal, and asked to identify his name, nation, age, and occupation.

Perhaps he participated in the actions he is accused of, or maybe—as in this case—a man from another group is accusing him of an action he may not have committed. When he denies it, magistrates insist: "but how can you say you don't know about the murders, when there are those who say you shot the arrows?" When he asserts his innocence again, they put him before his accuser, who reiterates testimony that he was there. He denies it a second time and they strap him to the torture machine—"the pony"—tying cords around his extremities, and tightening them, pulling his body apart until he cries out "yes, yes, it was me."[272]

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[271] Chisos Raid Trial, 110-115: "asisten en el Rio de S.n P.o y en su tierra mas alla del Rio del Norte"; "estos le avian dicho que ellos sí eran hombres q. se llevavan las cavalladas que como no yban los españoles aquitarselas que no eran hombres ni tenian armas"; another Indian noted that Spaniards' rifles weren't worth anything, they didn't "reach" their targets: "que sus arcabuzes no valen nada que no alcanzan ni matan."

[272] This narrative draws upon descriptions of torture contained in the trial documents: see Chisos Raid Trial,

Later he tries to take it back, and tells his accusers that "he said what he did only out of fear of the torture machine." But they cling to his confession. He is hung from the gallows and shot. They place the pieces of his quartered body on posts along the royal road to warn other Indians about the danger of contesting Spanish authority.

These events during the spring of 1684 illustrate how violence and bodily pain overlaid Indian decisions to interact with the Spanish sphere. On the one hand, they received rations and gifts, and through raids accessed clothing and livestock. On the other hand, they became vulnerable to Spanish inquisitions, and the demonstrations of power in the face of weakness represented by "el potro," the machine of torture. Indian acts of violence in turn reveal ideologies that served to join Tobosos and their allies in alliance against Spaniards: how individuals contrasted Indian and Spanish visions of gender and wealth to argue that "Spaniards were not men," and then kill and castrate them.[273]

Spaniards also built their society and distinguished it from Indian ways of life through violence. They cloaked it in the fiction of the legal proceeding. Ironically, inquiries into Indian raids suggest ways in which Spaniards helped fulfill their own fears of uprisings and mass rebellions. They ordered that "all Chisos" be captured, and whipped any Indians who had heard about the raids, but not informed them. When they descended upon the hacienda in search of Chiso families, they found that they had already fled. Thus actions intended to determine if the Chisos "wanted to rise up," in the end helped spark them to rise up. Through "justice" and inquiries into "truth," Spaniards

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106, 134-136.

[273] Ibid. I draw here upon insights into the "structure of torture" in Elaine Scarry, *The Body in Pain: The Making and Unmaking of the World* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1985), 27-59; Michel Foucault, *Discipline and Punish: the Birth of the Prison* (New York: Vintage Books, 1979), 3-72; Irene Silverblatt, *Modern Inquisitions: Peru and the Colonial Origins of the Civilized World* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2004), 55-76.

helped produce their deepest fears and fuel Indian discontent and rebellion.[274]

In sum, Indian-raid trials like those of 1684 reveal how attention to the mutuality of violence might help clarify the bewildering confusion of Indians pledging peace and then abandoning it, and the seeming mindlessness of unending cycles of violence and peace. It adds context to Spaniards' discussions of "enslavement" and "removal" and helps explain the move from the hope of transformation embodied in contracting peace to the conviction that Indian behavior would never change. Importantly, the impetus to *act* to "remove" Tobosos and their allies from their homelands in the Greater Rio Grande emerged as much from residents of Nueva Vizcaya—miners, farmers, and ranchers—as from the Council of the Indies in Spain or the viceroy in Mexico City.

"…to the islands of *Californias*…"

On a January afternoon in 1704, two emissaries arrived in Parral, Nueva Vizcaya to request peace on behalf of the Acoclame nation. Through an interpreter, Nicolás and Curi performed the customary peace ritual. They said they came on behalf of "all of their people to see the new governor and ask him for peace in the name of God and King." They pledged to deliver news of the governor's decision to their headmen, who were prepared to "settle down, form a town, and live at peace for all their lives without breaking it." Similar peace entrees were occurring in other towns and *presidios* in the Greater Rio Grande, where Chisos, Cocoiomes, and Apaches had also offered "to come in and pledge their obedience to his majesty." While Governor Juan Fernandez de Cordova was inclined to accept these requests, the present state of the royal treasury

[274] Ibid. For other contemporaneous references to torture in Spanish trials in Parral see AHP 1686B, p. 27; AHP 1704A, fr. 248-249.

complicated matters. With the funds for war and peace nearly exhausted by recent military campaigns—seventy soldiers and 240 Indian scouts were still in the field—Cordova realized he might need outside support to provide the customary gifts and rations granted to newly settled Indians. For now, he sent the Acoclames on their way with a letter to present to Spanish soldiers if they happened to come upon the Indians' camps. Cordova then set to work on raising the necessary funds to fulfill this promise. It was perhaps in hopes that local residents might help foot the bill that he called town hall meetings —"*juntas de vecinos*"—at settlements across the kingdom.[275]

A bankrupt treasury provided an opportunity for Spanish residents to advise their governor on relations with migratory Indians. Though some residents of Parral suggested that the Chisos should be admitted to peace, "because they [had] not committed the same depredations as the others," other towns in Nueva Vizcaya unanimously opposed granting peace to the Acoclames, Cocoiomes, or Chisos. They mobilized histories of failed peace to justify this decision. In San Bartolomé, San Diego, and San Blas, for example, miners, farmers, and cattle raisers present noted in collective statements that based on many years of experience they could assure the governor that "these nations are not people that keep the peace." With the Apaches, they explained "they had no experience, and so could not give any advice," but with the other groups, past peace experiments had "not served any useful purpose for the kingdom" because the Indians had "never maintained it." In fact, offering peace had only served "for the further ruin of the kingdom."[276]

Residents explained why peace led to ruin by highlighting Indians' strategic

[275] AHP 1704A, fr. 217-237. Hereafter cited as 1704 Juntas de Vecinos.

[276] Ibid.: "por que de ellos [los chisos] no an esperimentado las eniquidades que de estos otros"; "No es gente que persiste en la paz"; "las Veses que se la an dado [la paz] los Señores Governadores no aservido de Ninguna Utilidad deste Reyno y Antes ansido parra mayor Ruyna deel…"

politics. In San Bartolomé, they alleged that Tobosos manipulated the peace process in order to receive gifts and familiarize themselves with Spanish haciendas, ranches, and towns. By learning "our most hidden secrets," they explained, they had returned to their lands better equipped to continue to "kill and rob, as is their custom." The principal men of San Diego explained "peace" as a multilayered political strategy. They noted that some Tobosos requested peace to familiarize themselves with Spanish settlements and divert soldiers away from their kin and allies, who continued to raid. When the Tobosos who had offered peace returned to the mountains—which they always had—they did so more enlightened then ever before as to Spanish settlements, military resources, and the location of livestock herds.[277]

If histories of "faithlessness" were key to residents' decisions to reject peace, interpretations of violence shaped the alternative courses of action that they envisioned. The residents of San Blas were particularly descriptive. It was not simply that Indians had killed their neighbors but that they had "not been content to just take lives and frequently cut apart their bodies and danced with the pieces." Out of fear of such acts miners and their helpers were not willing to work and neither were "the blacksmith and lumberjack, for the same reason." Not only had the Indians stolen herds and taken the lives of their neighbors, but that they had set fire to the corrals, causing mass wildfires that had "even

[277] Ibid., the collective statement of the mining town of San Diego is worth quoting at length: "Siempre que los Yndios acoclames cocoiomes chizos y todos los demas Yndios que rebeldes a la R.l Corona hostilizan este R.no piden la paz lo hacen por sus fines particulares y por combeniencias suias sin animo de mantenerse en ella y que solo se mantienen en el nombre de paz mientras aseguran tiempo al proposito p.a andar robando y matando con las crueldades que sabe todo el reino y que las bezes que an dado dha paz no se experimentado util ninguno en el R.no por que para mantenerlos segasta la Haz.da R.l y los soldados se ocupan en escoltarlos haciendo falta a las ymbaciones que hacen los que no estan de paz por que siempre su sagacidad lo dispone de manera que unos bienen a pedir la paz y otros quedan a dar Guerra y los que vienen de paz solo bienen a hacerse capazes de las haciendas y entradas y salidas para luego alzarse con mas luz de nuestra casa."

been visible from the governor's palace in Parral."[278]

In rejecting peace, citizens envisioned only one means to prevent the further "ruin" of their contested kingdom: to capture the Indians and transport them as far away as possible. In other words, residents were willing to step up to aid Cordova "with their bodies *and* their funds," but only in order to lure the Indians, trap them, and move them out of Nueva Vizcaya. In San Bartolomé, they signed a collective statement agreeing to support granting peace as long as the Indians were subsequently transported to "some island like *panzacola* or the island of *californias*." San Blas's citizens imagined a different, if equally extreme, response to Indians' recent peace requests. After they described how Indians had set their corrals on fire and danced with the body parts of their murdered neighbors—though not mentioning their own display of dismembered Indian bodies—they suggested that Indian men be "punished by fire and blood, carrying their families out of this kingdom to work in textile workshops in Mexico City." Given that these Indians' customs were "so innate," they argue that if this "breed" was allowed to remain within Nueva Vizcaya, the kingdom would never prosper.[279]

On the surface, the citizen councils appear to echo the narratives of Governors like Ossorio, who set north from Mexico City and discovered Nueva Vizcaya "at risk of being lost" in 1677. Like governors in past decades, residents of towns across the Greater

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[278] Ibid.: "sus cuerpos echos Pedasos y falttos de alg.s miembros que Para Sus Bailes les an quitado No contentos con aver quittado Las Vidas…"; "Ni el minero Puede Alargarse a trabajar Minas que esttan Paradas…por el peligro manifesto de la vida…el carbonero y leñador por lo mismo…"; "Prendieron [los Indios enemigos] fuego de que Resulto averse quemado toda la madera que avia corttado…duro Muchos dias y fue mui P.co q. se alcansaba a ber desde el Palasio en q. asiste Su Señoria…"

[279] Ibid.: "estan promptos a Servir a su Mag.d con la cortedad du sus caudales y sus personas…"; "Reynos estraños retirados de este o alguna Ysla tal como la de pansacola la de California u otras que conosen los que saven la tierra fuera…"; "Deven ser castigados llevandolos a fuego y sangre y a sus familias y chusma estrañar de este Rn.o a Parttes dilattadas y a obrajes Para que en ning.n tiempo puedan bolver a sus continuas costumbres…"; "que tan connatturalisados en ella [sus costumbres] se hallan q. no quedando tan mala Ralea tendra estte Reino multiplicados aumentos."

Rio Grande described their fears of destruction at the hands of Indians and plotted counter-insurgency strategy. Spanish governors and residents alike scripted their relations with migratory Indians as an unending cycle of failed peace and impeded prosperity. By displacing change to some future date, when Indians could finally be exterminated or removed from the kingdom, these narratives both masked Spanish acts of violence and their role in social change over time. One would hardly know that important changes were in fact occurring: the Spanish population was growing, excavating new mines, and sewing new farm fields.

These meetings also shed light on how the move from sentiment to action worked, however. Particularly in the case of San Blas, residents mobilized discussions of violence and failed peace to argue that Indian behavior was not changeable, was "so innate" that the traditional framework of settlement and Christianization should not apply. Though such thinking had been evident earlier, in suggestions that Indians warranted extermination or enslavement "even more than the Turks," many residents of Nueva Vizcaya went a step further in 1704 by rejecting any claim to Indian labor. This rejection was based on intimate knowledge rooted in social relations. Though Apaches had asked for peace, for example, citizens noted that they could not speak to the matter because "they had no experience with this group." But with Cocoiomes, Acoclames, and Chisos, they believed that peace, and even enslavement, would be fruitless.[280]

These town hall meetings in Nueva Vizcaya provide a startling contrast to the traditional emphasis on bureaucrats, soldiers, and missionaries in explaining Spanish relations with migratory Natives. In this context, law and policy were subordinate to local

[280] Ossorio Narrative, 212; 1704 Juntas de Vecinos.

concerns and to the experience of long-term Spanish residents. Fifty years earlier, when Spanish soldiers and Indian allies had waged war on the Tobosos, they killed nearly 300 men and women, and auctioned off survivors as slaves. If any of the prominent citizens of Nueva Vizcaya hoped to profit off the capture and sale of captives now, they did not reveal it, as they instead offered to collect funds to help pay to send them away permanently. It is striking in this respect that they did not discuss what they envisioned would happen to the Tobosos in exile, or how they imagined that a group they argued was "a breed" of murderers and robbers would be changed into something else.[281]

Forced Removal In Practice

In the end, ongoing citizen meetings and offers to help pay for the forced removal of Tobosos proved key to the emergence of campaigns to send Indians away. Such campaigns did not begin immediately, however. Though it is unclear how he raised the funds—records corroborate his financial strain—Governor Cordoba chose to admit the Acoclames, Cocoiomes, and Chisos to peace in January and February of 1704. By March, however, they had returned to the mountains, and Cordoba renewed both military campaigns and diplomacy, perhaps to the frustration of local residents, who had seen this cycle unfold before. After new cycles of violence in 1708 and 1709, soldiers had transported a large number of Acoclame and Chiso captives to the public jail in Parral.[282]

By the spring of 1710, Tobosos had begun to mobilize in large numbers to raid the haciendas and farms of military officers, perhaps to retaliate for the capture of their kin and seek their ransom. In March, 400 Indians attacked the hacienda of Captain

[281] As the preceding chapters of this dissertation reveal, Nueva Vizcayans purchased Apache slaves by the hundreds earlier in the 1600s. For Toboso wars and enslavement in the 1650s see AGI-Guadalajara, Legajo 29.

[282] AHP 1704A, Griffen *Culture Change*, 54-55.

Maturana, taking two captives and warning observers that they would return in five days. In early April, they rustled 150 cattle from Captain Flores, killing sixty of the animals on the spot. In subsequent days they raided the hacienda of Alferez Ugarta, killing a shepherd and driving off more than 100 livestock. Mobilizing the usual contingents of soldiers and Indian scouts, officials complained that the horses could not pass to where the Indians were, a constant complaint for Spanish forces in the Greater Rio Grande.[283]

In the midst of these mass raids, the fate of Native captives in the public jail gained new urgency. As he had in 1704, the governor convened town hall meetings. He explained that his budget was exhausted and that hostile Indians threatened the massive new mining strike at San Felipe. This time, however, both he and the viceroy had reconsidered residents' earlier proposals. A new plan from the viceroy authorized the forced removal of Tobosos and their allies currently in captivity, as long as local residents paid for it.[284]

The order followed the recommendations that some Spanish residents had made in town hall meetings in 1704 and 1710. All Cocoiome, Acoclame, and Chiso men and women over the age of seventeen would be removed from the kingdom and sent to Mexico City, where they would "earn a living with all security" in mills and textile workshops and thus never return to "cause turmoil." Local residents would pay the costs of both the military escort and rations for the prisoners given that the royal coffers "were strained by the costs of war in Europe." Fragments of donation lists suggest that citizens fulfilled their end of the bargain. The mining camps of Santa Rosa and San Diego had

[283] AHP 1710A, fr. 13-14, 68-69; AHP 1711A, fr. 33-44.
[284] AHP 1711A, 33-44.

together donated more than 200 pesos by September.[285]

Precisely how many Indians were sent away in 1711 is unclear from extant documents, but mentions of the fact that "most of the Acoclames and Chisos" were in captivity suggest that the number was significant. If Spaniards hoped that forced removal would usher in a new era of peace and tranquility after 1711, they quickly observed unintended consequences, however. By 1715, a number of Indians sent to labor in Mexico City had escaped and returned north. They brought new wariness to their interactions with Spaniards and spread news of what had happened to them among their neighbors. Some Native groups fled their settlements as rumors circulated that governors were targeting them for forced removal.[286]

By the early 1720s, consensus had developed between local Spaniards, officials in Mexico City, and the King that a final solution was needed to bring an end to migratory Indians' challenge to Spanish sovereignty in Nueva Vizcaya. After some of the Tobosos and their allies had again pledged peace and then abandoned their settlements after nine months, the crown issued a *cedula* approving the removal of all Cocoiomes, Acoclames, Chisos, and Coahuileños to Mexico City for the viceroy to decide their fate. In the fall of 1722, military campaigns began to capture as many men, women, and children as possible. In November, for example, with the aid of more than 100 Indian allies and 50 militiamen, soldiers encircled a Toboso camp near the Valley of San Bartolomé. Before dawn, Lieutenant Antonio Rodela entered the camp to demand three times—as required by law—that Indians surrender, telling them "in their language" that they were

[285] Ibid.

[286] For accounts of uprisings over fears of exile see "Testimonio sobre la sublevazion y pacificazion de los Yndios de nacion Tacuitatomes (alias) Chizos que resident en el Pueblo de San Fran.co de Conchos," AHP 1723A, fr. 159-278.

surrounded by many men of arms. The Tobosos did not lay down their arms and sixteen died fighting before their leader, Juan de Lomas, surrendered. The Spanish forces took forty-four women, forty-six children, and thirty-one adult men as captives. Similar campaigns continued in the coming months.[287]

In April 1723, a *collera*—or chain of captives—departed for Mexico City with 311 Cocoiome, Acoclame, and Coahuileño men, women, and children. If Governor Martin de Alday argued that "this removal of Indians," represented the only means to bring peace to his contested kingdom, officials in Mexico City saw matters somewhat differently. The Marques de Casafuerte, viceroy of New Spain, expressed skepticism that "so few" Indians could in fact cause such a threat to so large a kingdom as Nueva Vizcaya. The fact that Nueva Vizcayans had failed to subdue the Tobosos, despite thousands of pesos in military funding every year, suggested that they were merely wasting the King's treasure. He saw his sanction of the plan as something of a test, as Nueva Vizcayans could hardly continue requesting funds for Indian wars after the viceroy had given into their demands to send the Tobosos out of Nueva Vizcaya. After all, both Casafuerte and the King explained, the Toboso groups and their allies represented the "last three" of the more than 80 Indian nations that had existed in Nueva Vizcaya when the King had founded the kingdom's presidios as a result of the great rebellions of the 1680s and 1690s.[288]

As the march of the Tobosos south to Mexico City proceeded, the viceroy and his

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[287] "Expediente sobre la Conquista y reduccion de varias castas de Yndios de la PRovincia de la Nueva Vizcaya," AGI-Guadalajara, Legajo 171.

[288] AGI-Guadalajara 171; quote from Alday in 20 November 1722 letter to viceroy: "esta saca de indios." Regarding wasting funds for so few Indians see the Marques de Casafuerte's 20 March 1723 letter to the king: "que solo por ducientos Yndios que es el numero que component las expresadas Naciones se ayan de gastar anualmente porciones mui crecidas en la subsistencia de varios Presidios"; see Also AHP 1722A, "Autos sobre la pricion de los Yndios Coaguileños."

advisors planned their fates in an ad hoc fashion. When the convoy of captives began to be afflicted by smallpox, an initial decision to bring them to labor in the workshops of the capital was discarded, and Casafuerte ordered that they be temporarily diverted to Puebla. Giving the matter further consideration, he explained that if the Tobosos were allowed to remain in New Spain, it would be necessary to "construct them houses and assign them lands…at great cost to the royal treasury." Moreover, he argued that their "vehement inclination" might lead them to return to Nueva Vizcaya and "commit the same atrocities as they had in the past." In the process, the final "pacification" of that jurisdiction would not be realized and he would face continued complains from area residents. The "only solution" he envisioned echoed residents' long-standing recommendation to send them to islands overseas. In the mind of the viceroy, this would both prevent their return to Nueva Vizcaya and alleviate any expenses to the royal treasury. He imagined that Toboso families would be divided equally between Havana, Santo Domingo, and Puerto Rico, where men, together with their wives and children, would be "entrusted" to residents of those islands who would give them food and clothing and Christian instruction in exchange for their labor.[289]

There proved to be a wide divide between the ease with which Spaniards could imagine sending Indians to "islands overseas" and their ability to put such ideas into practice, however. Of 311 displaced captives, 227 survived the journey south to central New Spain. Because some young children remained in the city of Puebla, and more than seventy escaped en route to the coast, the Spanish armada embarked only ninety-two men

[289] AGI-Guadalajara 171.

and women for Cuba in 1723.[290]

If theoretical plans reveal broader conceptions of Spanish governance: incorporating Indians through Christianization and labor under the watchful eye of upstanding Spanish subjects—they tell us little about the Native experience of displacement. In this respect, the testimony of an escaped captive extant in archival records provides some access onto what the emergence of forced removal campaigns was like for migratory Indians living through these years. It was on a September afternoon in 1723 that a boy in Parras, Nueva Vizcaya noticed an Indian man on his family's doorstep. Recognizing him as a Coahuileño Indian whom local officials had captured and sent south to Mexico City with Toboso captives months before, the boy called to his father to come to the door. The Indian fled, but a party of men was soon in pursuit. They hunted him down, apprehended him, and confined him to the town jail.[291]

The Indian man—Diego de la Cruz Pacheco—remained in prison in the coming months after his recapture, testifying twice through an interpreter about his experiences in exile and the circumstances of his escape and return back to Nueva Vizcaya. In January 1724, he explained that he had returned to Parras to try and find family members who had hid out there in order to avoid being sent away to Mexico themselves. He spoke of the initial shock of capture and claimed "he did not know why he had been apprehended." Reflecting a common experience of Natives apprehended in warfare, Diego noted that after his capture near Parras he had first been imprisoned along with his compatriots at a military fort for seven months. Though some of his kin had died while incarcerated, the

[290] Ibid.: the Spanish monarch explained in February 1724 that he had received news that "se embarcaron en la Armada de Barolbento nobenta y dos..." I hope through further research to find information regarding their final fates in the Caribbean.

[291] The testimony of Diego de la Cruz Pacheco in Parras in September 1723 and January 1724 is contained in AHP 1723B, Fr 769-778 and AHP 1723A, fr. 72-81.

survivors had then been cuffed and chained and marched south by an escort of soldiers, passing Mexico City and descending towards the coast. It was midway between the city of Pueblo and the port of Veracruz that they had taken advantage of the fact that the locks on their chains had not been properly secured in order to escape. While seventy men, women, and children managed to flee to the hills, the escape met resistance, as Diego noted that a man named Nicolás had been shot in the mouth, shattering his jaw, and had fled injured and bleeding.[292]

Traveling with his family members—including his brother and wife—Diego began the journey north, passing the slopes of the volcano of Orizava and rustling cattle to eat en route. Near Orizava they had also met a priest who invited them to come to the town of San Andres where he maintained an hacienda. In a striking scene that paralleled in diaspora Spanish efforts to incorporate Natives in the Greater Rio Grande, the priest offered to petition on their behalf for them to be able to stay on his hacienda and offered to give them lands to plant. Diego and his companions labored "for some days" there before continuing their journey.

Weeks passed as they travelled through unknown terrain. As Diego noted, "he didn't know the name of these places." They skirmished several times with soldiers who were by this time hot in pursuit. They occasionally came upon ranch hands and mule drivers that they either asked for supplies or robbed. As they neared Parras, they began to be pursued by soldiers again, who killed one member of Diego's group. One morning, Diego hid himself from his compatriots in order to separate from them. He entered the town of Parras alone that night. He eluded capture and slept in the doorway of a house. It

[292] Ibid.

was the next afternoon, he remembered, when the town magistrate caught him and put him in jail.[293]

In the end, if Diego de La Cruz and his compatriots' fates may have been particularly harrowing, they cannot simply be cast aside as "unrepresentative" of broader Spanish-Native relations. Attention to the experience of displaced captives provides a useful contrast to the correspondence of Spanish officials, which as we have seen, posited violence and forced migration as accomplished acts rather than lived experiences. In their analyses, Natives were repeatedly "reduced" to towns, "transferred" from one mission location to another, "pacified" or "sent away." Diego's testimony provides insights into how these actions were accomplished, and contested. Soldiers captured him in the countryside near Parras. With guns and swords they transported him to a jail. He was imprisoned for seven months, likely living through episodes of sickness and disease that took the lives of other captives. Finally, he was shackled and forced to march for weeks, as familiar landscapes became unfamiliar places with names "he did not know."[294]

Conclusion

If the forced removal of the Tobosos in 1723 proved far more difficult than Spaniards had hoped, the unexpected challenges of these campaigns did not prevent officials from continuing to send convoys of Indian captives away in the future. In May 1726, Spanish soldiers apprehended forty-two fugitives from the 1710 and 1723 campaigns and conducted them south to Mexico City. Perhaps because the violence of

[293] AHP 1723A, especially fr. 79, where he repeatedly employs the phrase "a place that I didn't know the name of": "otro paraje que no sabe como se nombra…a otro puesto que no sabe como se nombra…a otro serro que no sabe como se nombra…"

[294] On violence and forced migration as accomplished acts in Spanish correspondence see, for examples, notes 201 and 202. For Diego's testimony see AHP 1723B, fr. 769-778 and AHP 1723A, fr. 72-81.

these campaigns succeeded in shattering Toboso resistance, Nueva Vizcayans forgot the mass escapes that had characterized these efforts, and remember them as decided successes. Royal officials who toured the region in the late-1720s reported that Toboso removal had ushered in a new era of peace and prosperity, just as they had hoped. Similarly, military men in the late-1700s did not mention the challenges of Toboso forced removal when they employed this history to argue for the exile of Apache captives to the Caribbean. As we will see, the fates of Native captives transported south into New Spain later in the eighteenth century would be shaped more than ever before by imperial interests in security and sovereignty, rather than by labor or market demands.[295]

In the case of Toboso removal, the demands of Spanish residents and imperial interests coincided, as the willingness of ranchers and miners to pay for and participate in military campaigns they hoped would serve their interests in the "peace and prosperity" of their contested kingdom coincided with the interests of imperial officials in reducing costs to the royal treasury in the long term. If the forced removal of Tobosos was a local concern that eventually gained imperial purchase, in the chapter that follows we will see how migratory Indians and neighboring Native and Hispanic groups could also find common ground that sparked tension between local and imperial interests. The initially peaceful history of Apachean migrations into Northern New Spain as they fled Comanche slave raiders will highlight the difficulties of making generalizations about the trajectory of violence, captivity, and slavery in the North American West.

[295] For 1726 capture of Toboso fugitives see AHP 1727. For later forced removal campaigns see Chapter 5.

Chapter 4
Intimate Enemies: Apache Migrations and the Roots of War, 1730-1770

In October 1747, Joseph de Berroterán wrote one of the first histories of Apache migration across the Rio Grande into Nueva Vizcaya and Coahuila. Drawing upon decades of experience as a military officer and presidio captain, he explained in a report to the viceroy of New Spain how the forced removal of the Tobosos in the 1710s and 1720s had left the rugged mountains and deserts they had once inhabited free for the taking, and more than 400 Apaches Indians had made these lands their own. In referring to the recent past, Berroterán described his relations with these migrants as friendly: he traded with Apache headman Pasqual, whom he called his "compadre," and sent his soldiers on a joint military expedition with Pasqual's men to capture some of the last remaining Tobosos. When he looked to the future of the Apache presence, however, Berroterán turned apocalyptic. Native men surely would begin attacking Spanish haciendas and ranches, and by turning groups like the Tarahumara against the Spanish they might "easily destroy " Nueva Vizcaya and Coahuila, he predicted. If in the years since the Toboso wars the Greater Rio Grande had seemed peaceful, Berroterán argued that this relative calm should be regarded "as a period of convalescence from a bad illness, and preparation for another more serious one threatened by the Apaches."[296]

In discussing peaceful relations with Native groups while warning about looming violence, Berroterán's report is a quintessential example of official correspondence between the Greater Rio Grande, Mexico City, and Spain. Indians had long served dual

[296] "Captain Berroterán's Report on the Condition of Nueva Vizcaya (1748)" in *The Presidio and Militia on the Northern Frontier of New Spain: Volume Two, Part Two, 1700-1765*, Diana Hadley, Thomas H. Naylor and Mardith K. Schuetz-Miller, eds. (Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 1997), 167-226 [quote on 194]. For a manuscript copy of this report see AGI-Guadalajara Legajo 191.

purposes for Spanish administrators in the region: as trading partners, military allies, and laborers, on the one hand; and as potential rebels, apostates, and enemies, on the other. Whether the Native presence represented an ominous threat or a welcomed opportunity depended upon one's perspective, and as Berroterán's report illustrates, upon on one's audience. Berroterán exploited the Apache presence in every way possible in the midst of a political controversy over his own failed explorations and allegations that he used his post as a presidio captain solely for personal gain. Through trade and military cooperation, he benefitted materially from their physical proximity, even as he drew upon imagined dangers to argue for the need for continued royal investment in frontier military regiments. It is fitting in this respect that he favored metaphors that naturalized the presence of "enemy Indians" onto the landscape: if the Tobosos had been a "bad illness," the Apaches were a "more serious one." The question was not whether this violent "illness" would break out, but when.[297]

Berroterán's report introduces both the history and historiography of Apache migrations south of the Rio Grande in the eighteenth century, the subject of this chapter. In his prophecies of inevitable violence, he summarizes the dominant historical narrative of Apache-Spanish relations in Nueva Vizcaya and neighboring Coahuila. As this story is usually told, Comanche violence and expansion sent Apache groups fleeing south into Northern New Spain by 1748, when they initiated devastating raids that continued until Native headmen and Spanish administrators negotiated imperfect but lasting peace

[297] Ibid. For accessible examples of similar rhetoric from other governors and military officers in Nueva Vizcaya see especially "Don Lope De Sierra Ossorio…informs your Majesty of the state of affairs of Nueva Vizcaya, September 26, 1678," in *Historical Documents relating to New Mexico, Nueva Vizcaya, and Approaches Thereto, to 1773,* Volume II, Charles Wilson Hackett, ed. (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Institution of Washington, 1926), 210; "Don Juan Isidro de Pardiñas, Governor of Nueva Vizcaya, to his Majesty, Parral, November 21, 1688," in Hackett *Historical Documents II*, 228; "Letter, report, and reply of the *maestre de campo* Don Joséph Francisco Marin to his Excellency the Count of Galvez. Parral, September 30, 1693," in Hackett *Historical Documents II*, 388.

agreements in the 1780s and 1790s. If a previous generation of "Spanish Borderlands" historians regarded Berroterán as a prescient observer whose warnings against imminent Indian raids went unheeded, it is striking that the turn towards Native-centered histories in recent decades has done little to shift the basic narrative of Spanish-Apache relations. Instead, it is primarily historians' evaluation of Native violence that has shifted, as astute Native political actors have replaced "marauding invaders."[298]

Recent Latin American scholarship has suggested the need for a reexamination of this long-standing narrative, however. In a provocative new account of late-colonial Nueva Vizcayan society, Sara Ortelli has argued that the threat of Apaches was primarily a rhetorical tool drawn upon by local elites to resist imperial reforms, secure royal investment in the region, and provide cover to presidio captains and local residents who benefitted from cattle rustling and contraband trade. Ortelli's prodigious research also provides compelling evidence that neither Apaches nor livestock rustling were devastating the regional economy. In fact, by using the term “apache” in quotes throughout her text, Ortelli calls into question the influence of actual Apache Indians on the history of late-eighteenth century Nueva Vizcaya. War and "enemy Indians,” she argues, are better seen as discourses through which local elites sought to shape the

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[298] For Berroteran as prescient see Hadley, Naylor, and Schuetz-Miller, eds., *The Presidio and Militia on the Northern Frontier of New Spain: Volume Two, Part Two*; Alfred Barnaby Thomas, *Forgotten Frontiers: A Study of the Spanish Indian Policy of Don Bautista de Anza, Governor of New Mexico, 1777-1787*, (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1969); Oakah Jones, *Nueva Vizcaya : Heartland of the Spanish frontier*, 1st ed. (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1988). On Apache raids as looming presence in Nueva Vizcayan history see Susan Deeds, *Defiance and Deference in Mexico’s Colonial North: Indians Under Spanish Rule in Nueva Vizcaya* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 2003); David Weber, *The Spanish Frontier in North America* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1992); Ana Maria Alonso, *Thread of Blood: Colonialism, Revolution and Gender in Mexico’s Northern Frontier* (Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 1995). Recent studies of Comanche expansion include Pekka Hämäläinen, *The Comanche Empire* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2009) and Brian DeLay, *War of a Thousand Deserts: Indian raids and the U.S.-Mexican War* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2009). For quote on "marauding" Apache invaders see Max Moorhead, *The Apache Frontier: Jacobo Ugarte and Spanish-Indian relations in Northern New Spain* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1968, 26.

interventions of an increasingly assertive imperial state in the context of Bourbon-era reform measures.[299]

By examining the relationships that developed between Apache migrants, local Native communities, and Hispanic residents over the course of the eighteenth century, this chapter both builds upon and challenges Ortelli's innovative work. The fact that Spaniards manipulated the idea of war, or had an incomplete understanding of the diversity of groups that they labeled "Apache," does not mean that Apachean groups mattered little to the history of the Greater Rio Grande. Even as Berroterán used the idea of "Apaches" for his own political ends in correspondence with royal officials, for example, he also had to make decisions with how to interact with men and women who arrived peacefully at his presidio that he understood to be "Apaches."

I develop three interlinked arguments in the ensuing pages that emphasize the material reality of Apache groups' presence in the mid-to-late 1700s while reconsidering the ultimate emergence of war in the late-1760s and early-1770s. I first explain how the migrations of Apachean groups south of the Rio Grande in the early-1700s often centered on trade and diplomacy, and argue that there is in fact little evidence that interactions between these Apaches and other Native and Hispanic groups in these decades were primarily violent, as even recent histories have suggested.[300] Secondly, I examine

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[299] Sara Ortelli, *Trama de una guerra conveniente: Nueva Vizcaya y la sombra de los apaches, 1748-1790* (México, D.F.: El Colegio de México, Centro de Estudios Históricos, 2007). For other accounts that have de-emphasized the importance of Apache militancy see Gary Clayton Anderson, *The Indian Southwest, 1580-1830: Ethnogenesis and Reinvention* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1999), Richard Perry, *Apache Reservation: Indigenous peoples and the American state* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1993), and Ian Record, *Big Sycamore Stands Alone: the Western Apaches, Aravaipa, and the Struggle for Place* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 2008).

[300] For accounts emphasizing Apache violence see Ana Maria Alonso, *Thread of Blood*, and Brian DeLay, *War of a Thousand Deserts*, especially chapter 1. Clearly Spanish military campaigns and raids attributed to the Apaches occurred during this period, especially in New Mexico and Sonora, but I believe evidence of relative peace and trade relations has been neglected amidst the emphasis on Apache violence in the

livestock rustling and homicides in Nueva Vizcaya after mid-century, highlighting that investigation into Apaches' alleged raids rarely produced eyewitness accounts. While local officials most often attributed these actions to the vague category of "enemy Indians," they also noted that mission Indians might be to blame. This uncertainty of attribution, far from simply providing discursive fodder for local elites' to manipulate the imperial state, helped produce the outbreak of a devastating war which affected all residents of the region beginning in the late-1760s, as Hispanic residents responded to the perception that they were surrounded by "domestic" enemies and enemy "invaders" alike; local Native groups faced mass inquisitions into their alleged raiding activities and collusion with Apaches; and Apaches sought revenge for Spanish military offensives. The Borderlands warfare of the 1760s and 1770 reveals the fine line between manipulating the threat of violence, and being caught up in its ravages. It is only by considering both the material reality of the Apache presence and the rhetorical ends to which it was put that we can understand the ultimate escalation of violence in the 1760s and the mass capture and displacement of Apaches and neighboring Native groups alike beginning in the 1770s.[301]

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historiography. For examples of raiding and violence in the mid-1700s see for example see Spanish Archives of New Mexico (SANM), reel 8, f. 748-763; f. 773-779; AGN-PI, Vol. 14, f. 208-216; AGN-Historia, Vol. 393, f. 155-156.

[301] I am influenced in this approach by scholarship examining the relationship between discourses of Indian "menace" and colonial violence elsewhere in North America, especially Ian Steele, "Shawnee Origins of Their Seven Years' War," *Ethnohistory* 53, no. 4 (Fall 2006): 657-688; Richard Drinnon, *Facing West : The Metaphysics of Indian-hating and Empire-building* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1997), Eric Hinderaker, *Elusive empires : constructing colonialism in the Ohio Valley, 1673-1800*. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999); Eric Hinderaker and Peter Mancall, *At the edge of Empire: The Backcountry in British North America* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2003).

"They Go Around on Horseback, Trading with the Apaches"

In order to understand Apache migrations into Northern New Spain, it is essential to peel off the veneer of Spanish rhetoric and consider what the presence of Apaches meant for a variety of groups living in the region. In almost any give decade, it is possible to find a Spanish administrator writing from Northern New Spain to his superiors in Mexico City or Spain lamenting Natives' allegedly unending "murders and robberies."[302] If for some Spanish officials Apache migrations were shadowy, menacing, and threatening, for other individuals and groups—Native and Hispanic alike—Apachean groups were welcomed as new trading partners and allies.[303]

Who were these "Apache" migrants that began appearing in increasing numbers in Spanish records in the early-1700s? They were Athapaskan-speaking groups that defined their identities through extended families and clans, rather than pan-tribal nations, but who shared a common enemy: the Comanche. In part, as we have seen, Comanches attacked Apache rancherias for captives, which they sold for essential commodities—horses and guns—in New Mexico and Louisiana. Comanche-Apache conflict was also rooted in a struggle over land, however. Both groups sought to control key river valleys that provided water, food, and shelter during harsh seasons and droughts. For the Comanches, such valleys were essential for grazing horses key to their long-distance mobility. For Apaches, river valleys provided irrigation for crops that they had cultivated more frequently over the course of the 17th century as they developed a

[302] This trope is truly ubiquitous. For discussion of Indians' "muertes y robos" in the eighteenth century Rio Grande, see for example AGN-Historia, Vol. 52; AGI-Guadalajara, Legajo 191; AGN-PI, Vol. 171; AGN-PI, Vol. 69; AGN-PI, Vol. 42.

[303] On Apaches integrating into Native trading economy I draw here upon Gary Clayton Anderson, *The Indian Southwest*, especially Chapter 5, "The 'Apacheanization' of the Southwest." If his emphasis is on Texas, I consider more source material from regions south of the Rio Grande in the ensuing pages. The Tobosos' role in Rio Grande trading fairs was discussed in the previous chapter of this dissertation.

mixed hunting and farming economy. This diversified economy had provided security against an unreliable climate and uncertain trading partners, but after the emergence of the Comanche around 1700, Apaches' ties to the soil at particular times of the year became a military liability. As Pekka Hämäläinen has explained, "Apache farmers were defense-less against their mounted rivals who turned the once-protective farming villages into deathtraps."[304]

Obligations to extended family groups and clans worked against pan-Apache organization, producing further military challenges. Though the recognition of kinship ties and linguistic and cultural similarities could work to forge temporary alliances between Athapaskan groups, such alliances often proved fleeting amidst the intensity of the Comanche onslaught. As the Comanche either killed their kin or carried them off as captives after 1700, Apache groups sought safety through settlement near the Spanish, retreat into the mountains, or new alliances with Native communities near the Rio Grande. Such flight was likely also a response to casualties of war, reflecting the belief in Apachean cultures that staying among the dead was risky given that the ghost of the dead lingered and could do harm to the living. Camps where death had occurred were immediately moved, and the name of the deceased was not to be mentioned again aloud. If such customs sought to encourage ghosts to accept their fate and leave the land of the living, they also spurred Apaches to find some place where they could “live in safety," as

[304] Hämäläinen, *Comanche Empire*, 27-41 [quote on 32]. For another invaluable account of Comanche expansion and captivity practices see Joaquín Rivaya Martínez, "Captivity and Adoption Among the Comanche Indians, 1700-1875," (Ph.D. Dissertation, University of California-Los Angeles, 2006). For Apache divisions and identity see Morris Opler, *An Apache life-way: the economic, social, and religious institutions of the Chiricahua Indians* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1996); Grenville Goodwin, *Western Apache raiding and warfare* (Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 1971); William Griffen, *Apaches at war and peace: the Janos Presidio, 1750-1858* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1998).

one headman explained.[305]

If Joseph de Berroterán later explained the emergence of the Apache as something new to the 1740s, Apache groups' role in the regional political economy was in fact well established by then. The northernmost Apaches, the Jicarillas (or Tinde) were perhaps the most affected early in the century by the Comanche, as they fled present-day Colorado to settle in Eastern New Mexico, seeking some measure of Spanish protection. Their neighbors to the south, the Faraones, traded livestock for buffalo hides with their relatives, the "Mescal people," or Mescalero and Natagé Apaches, who migrated towards the Rio Grande and eventually forged alliances with the Jumanos, Cibolos, Julimeños, and Tarahumaras. The Lipan appeared near San Antonio by the 1720s, also migrating between the South Plains and the Rio Grande valley seasonally as they forged a new life between Spanish and Comanche spheres of influence. Western Apaches—who Spaniards tended to lump under the term "Gila" or "Gileños"—were perhaps the least affected by Comanches, as their appearance on the Western frontier in Sonora had more to due with lure of trade, hunting, and gathering opportunities than Comanche pressure.[306]

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[305] See Chapter 2 of this dissertation for further discussion of the Comanche trade in Apache slaves. See Opler, *An Apache Lifeway*, p. 475, for Apache fears of death, which is evident historically in common references in primary sources to Apaches fleeing camps where death had occurred. Quote on finding a safe place from Alfred B. Thomas, *After Coronado: Spanish Exploration Northeast of New Mexico, 1696-1727*, p. 113: "These had killed many of their nation and carried off their women and children captives until they now no longer knew where to go to live in safety." On fleeting alliances see Hämäläinen, *Comanche Empire*, 32.

[306] William Edward Dunn, "Apache Relations in Texas, 1718-1750," *Quarterly of the Texas State Historical Association* 14 (January 1911): 198-274; Anderson, *Indian Southwest*, especially 93-127. For a discussion of Apache-Spanish relations in Texas see Juliana Barr, *Peace Came in the Form of a Woman : Indians and Spaniards in the Texas Borderlands* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2007), 159-196. Early sources noting Apache presence in Nueva Vizcaya or Coahuila [south of New Mexico and the Rio Grande] include AHP 1704A, fr. 217-237 (1704); SANM, rl. 4, f. 48-61 (1707); AHP-1711A, f. 429-436 (1709); AHP-1727A; fr. 211-216 (1727). Of course Spaniards had long carried Apaches south as captives and slaves, and servants in Nueva Vizcaya were often identified as "Apaches" in the eighteenth century. See for example AHP-1711b, fr. 860-876; AHP-1714, fr. 691-712; AHP-1729c, fr. 1616-1633; Ciudad Juarez Municipal Archives, Microfilm on file at University of Texas at El Paso, MF 513, pt. 2 r. 5, fr. 364-376 (1757); Ibid., paging sequence 3, fr. 69-75 (1758).

In fact, references to Apache migrants in Northern New Spain early in the 1700s suggest that the Comanche role in displacing Apache groups should not be overdrawn. A devastating regional drought that began in 1703 and continued into the 1720s also played a key role. Natives' inability to gather sufficient food and game, the retreat of buffalo north in search of forage, and mission communities' failed agriculture contributed to Apache entrées to Spanish communities further south than usual. In January 1704, for example, a group of Apache men arrived at the Presidio of El Paso. They requested peace and offered to "submit to royal obedience," explaining that other Apaches were headed south of the Rio Grande to Janos to do the same. In some respects this visit was completely ordinary; Native groups in the region were well aware of the proper ceremony to trade with Spanish communities—one need only carry a cross or some other Catholic image and request peace or baptism. Military officers explained what *was* unusual about recent events when they informed officials in Parral that they had little experience with these Apaches and were not sure whether they should trust their promises of allegiance. As local residents met in the ensuing weeks to decide whether to grant peace to Apaches and other Native groups—the same meetings that recommended Toboso banishment—they explained that with the Apaches, "they had no experience, and so could not give any advice."[307]

Residents of the region gained greater experience with Apaches in the 1710s and 1720s, noting in the process that Apache migrants indirectly benefitted Spanish interests. In 1726, the commander of the Janos presidio explained that it was because of war with the Apaches that 143 Suma Indians had recently arrived offering to live alongside the

[307] For another vivid account of Apache peace ceremonies in this period see Thomas, *After Coronado*, especially 61-71; See also Juliana Barr, *Peace Came in the Form of a Woman,* especially Chapter 1. On 1704 Apache entrées to Janos, see AHP 1704A, fr. 217-236.

Spanish military fort and receive missionaries.[308] The same year, refugee Tobosos that had survived years of war with the Spaniards sued for peace for similar reasons. When asked why they were seeking peace, they explained that, "The Apaches had attacked and killed their people, and finding themselves outnumbered and under assault they wanted to settle at Guajoquilla [under Spanish protection]." Apaches, in sum, indirectly helped bring an end to the Toboso wars while leading some local Natives groups to accept life in mission towns.[309]

Such violence between Apache migrants and local Native groups in Nueva Vizcaya and Coahuila was not universal, or enduring, however. Along the Rio Grande, for example, Mescalero Apaches encountered Jumano and Cibolo Indian communities in the early-1700s that had a long history of trading with hunter-gatherer peoples. The Apaches brought dried meat, hide clothing, and horses to exchange for the Spanish clothing and metal tools these people received from nearby missionaries, as well as food items. At the same time, the degree to which Apaches alone supplied Spanish livestock should not be overstated. A number of other groups in the region—the Julimeños, Cholomes, and Sumas, for example, some of whom lived at least seasonally in missions—also brought horses and mules to trade near the Rio Grande or the Pecos River.[310]

The Apache dispersal in the early-1700s should not be understood as a definitive

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[308] Antonio Becerra, Presidio of Janos, to Governor Carbajal, 18 December 1726, AHP 1727A, fr. 211-216

[309] AHP 1727A; When asked why they had come now: "an respondido que por haverles dado los Apaches y Matadoles algunos de cuya Naz.on…se allan conbatidos y sin yguales fuerzas para resistirles por cuya razon quieren Poblarse en el Referido puesto de Guajoquilla."

[310] On relations between Sumas, Cholomes, and Apaches see especially "Testimonio de los autos que se formaron a pedimento de Don Jph de la Tierra S.e los robos de los Suma infieles," AGI-Guadalajara, Legajo 191 (1751). See also AGI-Guadalajara, Legajo 194 (1754). On Jumanos see Nancy Hickerson, *The Jumanos: hunters and traders of the South Plains* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1994).

or fixed relocation, as groups like the Mescaleros adapted to life in the Comanche-era through cyclical migrations. They made their camps for part of the year near the Pecos River in present-day Texas, from which they hunted buffalo and fattened their horse herds. During the summer, they often camped near agricultural villages and mission communities along the Pecos and Rio Grande to trade. It was in the fall that they moved south, gathering and roasting the agave roots—the "mescal"—that formed their namesake, while at times pursuing Spanish livestock. On occasion, Spaniards also reported encountering Apache *milpas* or fields, suggesting that they might have also engaged in some agriculture in isolated mountain valleys of the Sierra Madre.[311]

Trade between Mescalero Apaches and Cibolo and Jumano Indians was reported as early as 1715 during Spanish expeditions to La Junta on the Rio Grande—long a site of both Native trading fairs and sporadic Spanish missionization efforts. In addition to ten towns of Cibolo and Jumano Indians with a population of more than 1,400, Spanish observers described "a friendly Apache band living just north of the Cibola/Jumano village, and a visiting Apache had agreed to bring his people to meet the Spanish missionaries, backing out only on receiving the news that smallpox had broken out in his village."[312] In fact, Apaches camped near the Rio Grande at La Junta for most of the summer, as one Spanish captive who had been among the Apache noted in 1723. He described a lively exchange in meat, hide clothing and horses for food items such as "beans, sugar, and salt." This trade persisted into the 1730s, when friars returned after

[311] For cyclical migrations see Anderson, *Indian Southwest*, 118 and AGN-PI 25, 35, 102; AGI-Guadalajara 191 and 194. For Apache "milpas" see especially, "Diario seguido desde el dia siete de Septiembre en que ha dado Cuenta con el ultimo al Exmo. Señor virrey," Hugo O'Connor to Viceroy, 1 December 1775, AGN-PI 88: "En el Parage en que hize alto, y en todas las orillas del Arroyo, hallé infinitas Milpas que sembraron los Enemigos, y muchas Xacalerias Viejas en que se conoce viven durante el tiempo de la Cosecha."

[312] Anderson, *Indian Southwest*, 64.

being cast out again in 1725 and noted that La Junta was “a passage and exit for many nations of Zibolos and Apaches.” One friar worried that the Apaches were preventing “many souls [from being] won to God.”[313]

Thirty years after the first references to the Apache trade at La Junta, Don Pedro de Rabago y Theran’s fall 1747 expedition to explore for a presidio site near La Junta provided the most detailed explanation yet of Apache-Native relations along the Rio Grande. As the governor of Coahuila, Rabago y Theran had received repeated reports from area landholders about livestock thefts, which the journey north towards the Rio Grande verified. Soon after beginning the march, the expedition encountered “many signs of enemy camps, including 35 lights.” Though this enemy went unnamed, they came across a dead mule, “with the brand of a Monclova citizen,” suggesting that individuals in the nearby camps were responsible for recent raids in Coahuila. This was but the first hint of the Native trading economy that was built in part on rustling Coahuila residents' free-roaming cattle. As they continued the march they came across more the tracks of "the enemy," as well as stray horses with the brands of Coahuila residents.[314]

It was upon arriving at La Junta on November 31st, however, that the question of who was in fact "the enemy" began to blur. After “imponderable colds, floods, snows, and freezes, with a loss of many horses and mules,” Rabago y Theran and his companions initially rejoiced at having reached the Spanish mission of "Our Lady of Guadalupe." They embraced the mission's lone friar, who met them by ringing the bell, happy to have company for the next six days. As the initial jubilation waned, however,

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[313] Nicolás Flores y Valdez to Aguayo, 21 October 1723, AGN-PI 181; see also Anderson, *Indian Southwest*, 118-122.

[314] "Diario de la campaña executada por el Govern.or de Coahuila Don Pedro de Ravago y Terran en el año de 1747 para el reconocimiento de las margenes del Rio Grande del Norte," 1 January 1748, AGN-Historia 52, especially fr. 111-141. Hereafter cited as "1747 La Junta Expedition, fr. #."

the friar explained that the Indians in his mission were in no way subject to God or King. They came and went as they pleased, and when they were in the pueblo they asked him, "when are you leaving, father?" Worse, they engaged in frequent trade with Mescalero Apaches. The friar lamented that he was powerless to stop them, but that he did his best to instruct them in Christianity, when they were willing.[315]

Though Coahuila residents had blamed "enemy Indians" for rustling livestock, the ensuing days in the La Junta missions suggested that both Apaches and mission Indians were involved in this trade and it was in fact unclear who was the main supplier. Rabago y Theran and his men passed through missions with no missionaries, and numerous mules, horses, and mares, "with different brands of Saltillo, Nuevo Leon, Santa Rosa, Rio Grande, and Monclova." Some members of the expedition wanted to reclaim them, but Rabago y Theran ordered them to let them be, since they appeared too lean to survive the journey back to Coahuila anyway.[316]

More than just livestock circulated between Apaches and the La Junta missions. At San Francisco de la Junta, for example, the expedition found two Indian captives that the Apaches had sold "when they came into trade with the mission towns." These captives were originally from the missions of San Bernardo and San Juan Baptista, more than three hundred miles downriver. Rabago y Theran took it upon himself to explain to the Indians that they could not sell these women, "since they were not slaves...as both were baptized." The masters proved unwilling to part with them, however, until Rabago y Theran had given them gifts to compensate them for their losses. "What little fear of God

[315] 1747 La Junta Expedition, fr. 124: "despues de los imponderable travajos de frios, aguas, niebes, y Yelos con perdida de basttantes cavallos y mulas y rodar sierras"; "le preguntan: Quando te vas Padre? Cuias expreciones, y ottras que se omiten, me compadezieron..."

[316] Ibid, fr. 125: "manadas de Yeguas, Cavallos, y mulas con diferentes hierros de los vecinos de la Villa del Santiago del Saltillo, Nuebo Reyno de Leon, Santta Rosa, Rio Grande, Santiago de la Monclova..."

they have," Rabago y Theran summarized in his diary, echoing the sentiments of the lone friar who served these communities.[317]

In fact, the Apache trade was not limited to missions at La Junta. Returning south of the Rio Grande along the Conchos River, the expedition found missions there similarly engaged in trade with Apaches. At the mission of San Juan, for example, they observed the nations of the Conexos, Cacolotes, Mesquittes and others, living in distinct settlements along the banks of the river, divided by a league or two. As their ministers explained, “they heard mass, when it suits them, they pray, when they want to,” but most of the time, "they went around on horseback, trading with the Apaches.” Rabago y Theran understood from what he observed and heard that these mission communities, “were lost.”[318]

Royal officials had commissioned the La Junta expedition to explore for a new site for a presidio that would guard against the potential "deaths, fires, and robberies" of the Apaches. Along the way, the expedition had discovered an Apache-Mission Indian trade that signaled to a Spanish governor that these Indian subjects had "little fear of God" and they had lost their way. The Conexos, Cacalotes, and other groups' decisions to trade with Apaches illustrate that they saw matters quite differently, however. They farmed and traded the produce to Mescalero Apaches; they bought slaves and sold horses

[317] Ibid.: "me dieron quenta aver en estta Mission una Yndia cautiva de la nazion Pampopa, que dizen, les vendieron los Apaches, quando entran a el trafique a esttos pueblos, cassada de la Mission de S.n Bernardo, y ottra de la de San Juan Bapttistta, ambas de la Jurisdicion del rio grande del nortte de la Governazion de Coaguila, vendida por dhos Yndios en la mission de S.n Fran.co de la Junta. Con cuia nottizia vi a los Yndios que las tenian compradas, dandoles a enttender no poder ser vendidas, assi por no ser exclavas, como por que la una es cassada, y vive su marido, y ambas bautizadas en dhas missiones..."; "ningun temor a Dios, ni a sus Ministros..."; The idea that Indians that had been baptized should not be enslaved reflecting the long-standing link between religious status and legal enslavement.

[318] Ibid., fr. 126b: " oyen missa, quando se les anttoxa: resan, si quieren, como todos los demas de los Pueblos (segun dizen sus Ministtros) y no tienen ottro assilo, que el andar a cavallo, y comerziar con los Apaches; con que tengo comprehendido, que por todos modos, esttán perdidos."

and mules, and went to mass "when they wanted to." At the moment, they saw no contradiction in having a Spanish friar living among them while receiving visits from the Apache. While occasional rumors of Apache attacks on Rio Grande missions suggest that relations with Apache groups were not always friendly, the descriptions of the Rabago y Theran expedition nonetheless indicated that Apaches were hardly seen as a grave threat by many area residents.[319]

Among Apache groups, the Mescaleros near La Junta were especially well positioned in their new territory. They benefitted from access to Spanish goods and livestock, as well as mission agriculture, even as they could quickly reach seasonal encampments distant from Spanish settlements or military garrisons. Though the Lipans built a similar migratory trading pattern, they faced greater scrutiny from Spanish officials in Texas who had more capability to pursue them for their alleged raids—and to employ Lipan captives taken in punitive expeditions in San Antonio households. During the 1730s and 1740s, some women and children that Spanish soldiers had taken in campaigns against Lipan rancherias labored as *criados* in San Antonio de Bexar, for example, echoing longstanding Spanish practices of distributing Native captives of war for personal service. In fact, in 1739 the Lipan rancheria led by Cabellos Colorados faced the same treatment granted to the Tobosos twenty years earlier in Nueva Vizcaya. As Spanish officials explained, "thirteen Indian men and women prisoners in the said presidio, [shall be taken] tied to each other, from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, to the prison of the capital in Mexico City...the two-year-old daughter of chief Cabellos Colorados,

[319] 1747 La Junta Expedition, on broader Spanish inquiries into interethnic raiding activities and concerns about Apache-mission relations, see AGN-Historia 20 and 52; AHP 1749, fr. 3-15; AGI-Guadalajara 191; AGN-PI 194, fr. 333-369; AGN-PI 25, fr. 74-99. On the Native peoples of present-day Texas north of the Rio Grande see Maria Wade, *The Native Americans of the Texas Edwards Plateau, 1582-1799*, 1st ed. (Austin: University of Texas Press, 2003).

María Guadalupe, shall be treated in the same manner." Cabellos Colorados and his family ultimately traveled 102 days on foot, the men shackled in leg irons, before reaching Mexico City. Within six months, only five of the fourteen Apaches originally sent south remained alive. As Juliana Barr notes, "whether any of [these five] survived is unknown; the last records say only that prison officials sent two men to a hospital, while two women, although very ill, went into servitude in prominent Spaniards' private homes." Such banishment, imprisonment, and forced labor in Mexico City echoed past practices even as it presaged future forced migrations of Apaches out of the Greater Rio Grande.[320]

If some Lipan Apache groups faced capture and exile at the hands of Spaniards in Texas, enmity towards Apaches in Nueva Vizcaya and Coahuila was far from universal. In fact, there is a danger in dividing too neatly the "Spanish" and "Native" approaches to Apache migration into the region. Relations between Apachean and other Native and Hispanic groups in the Greater Rio Grande are best understood as a shifting mosaic of rivalry and trade that varied across time and place. By mid-century, such interactions were in fact characterized more by mutually beneficial coexistence than unending cycles of violence.[321]

"Imaginary fears of future dangers…"

As Mescalero, Lipan, and Gila Apaches were displaced by Comanche violence or drought and lured by new lands and trade opportunities, they encountered Hispanic

[320] For the cycles of violence and truce that characterized Spanish-Apache relations near San Antonio in the 1730s and 1740s see Barr, *Peace Came in the Form of a Woman*, 159-196 [quote on p. 169]. See also Dunn, "Apache Relations."

[321] On the danger of homogenizing the Northern Frontier, see Ortelli, *Trama de Una Guerra*, 51, especially note 144.

groups engaged in their own migrations and settlement-building. The four-year tour of Brigadier General Pedro de Rivera across Northern New Spain between 1724 and 1728 provides a panoramic view of the Greater Rio Grande amidst Comanche expansion, Apache groups' southward migrations, and the end of war with the Tobosos in Nueva Vizcaya. If the situation for Spanish subjects in New Mexico and lands north of the Rio Grande was precarious amidst vast Native-controlled terrain, south of the Rio Grande Rivera described a peaceful region with a burgeoning population and largely idle presidios. Hispanic residents were petitioning for land grants and grazing permits and building new haciendas and ranches in the countryside of the Lower Rio Grande. In fact, a population boom had begun in the midst of the Toboso wars, as mining strikes north of Parral at Chihuahua City fueled new migration to the region, and the lure of silver and land proved stronger than fears of migratory Indians. Nueva Vizcaya's Hispanic population of less than 10,000 residents in 1700 ballooned to 30,000 by 1730 and would surpass 50,000 by 1750. This expansionary trend spread beyond Nueva Vizcaya, as Spaniards had settled in Texas at San Antonio de Bexar and Los Adaes. Most striking perhaps was the colony of Nuevo Santander, where Spanish settlers, rather than missionaries or soldiers, directed the establishment of new towns on and near the Gulf Coast.[322]

In recommending cutting the number of permanent posts on the Northern frontier, it is striking that Rivera demonstrated little concern about Apache migrants in Nueva

[322] For Rivera's tour of Northern New Spain see Weber, *The Spanish Frontier in North America*, p. 214-216. On Spanish settlement and expansion see Cheryl Martin, *Governance and society in colonial Mexico: Chihuahua in the eighteenth century* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1996); Oakah Jones, *Los Paisanos: Spanish Settlers on the Northern Frontier of New Spain* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1996); Peter Gerhard, *La Frontera Norte de la Nueva España* (México, D.F.: Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México, 1996). On Nuevo Santander colonization see Omar Santiago Valerio-Jiménez, "*Indios Bárbaros*, Divorcées, and Flocks of Vampires: Identity and Nation on the Rio Grande, 1749-1894," (Ph.D. Dissertation, University of California-Los Angeles, 2001). Population numbers from Gerhard, 214.

Vizcaya. In fact, he explained that there were few Indians that threatened the province, and any raids that did occur could easily be quelled by extant presidios, if only soldiers were not so occupied in tending their captains' livestock and fields. Rivera's recommendations and reform of the region's presidios were formalized in the Regulations of 1729, which immediately met opposition from some local residents, and especially the military establishment, who argued that the situation with local Indians remained precarious and cuts to military forces were thus dangerous. Invoking the same rhetoric that had followed the Pueblo and Tarahumara revolts in the 1680s and 1690s, Governor Barrutia argued in 1728, for example, that Indians' "lax customs" indicated that a new rebellion might occur at any time, threatening the kingdom in much the same way as the great revolts of the 1690s.[323] Rivera challenged this argument head on in a response to the viceroy, rejecting the idea that Tarahumaras posed any real threat. He explained that even if they were to rebel the Spanish population alone was now more than large enough to contain six or seven thousand warriors. Moreover, he noted that many of the reported Indians raids surely had to do with the drought in the area, which for the last six years had been so severe that "even the most elder men" could not recall one similar. While there was plenty of evidence that some Tarahumara pueblos were destitute and starving, in other words, there was little evidence that they were in fact on the verge of rebellion.[324]

Continued fears of "enemy" Indians were equally baseless, in Rivera's eyes. If

[323] The back and forth exchange between Nueva Vizcaya officials and Rivera is contained in "Expediente sobre Visita de Presidio hecha por el governador del Parral D.n Ygnacio Fran.co Barretia," (1728), AGN-PI 154.

[324] Ibid.: "de seis años a esta parte se ha experimentado en la tharahumara una seca, que los mas ancianos no avian reconocido; causa por que los Yndios de aquellos Pueblos, usando de el derecho de las Gentes, constituidas en la extrema necessidad, y sin apelacion a otro recurso humano, han descendido de la sierra a los Valles…y han muerto Reses, y Cavallos para alimentarsse."

Governor Barrutia claimed "any man of even middling intelligence knew that this province is surrounded by an infinite number of bellicose barbarous nations," Rivera countered that the governor's warnings of impending Native violence were nothing more than "imaginary fears of future dangers." Rivera explained to his superiors that the testimony of military officials like Joseph de Berroterán himself had suggested that the number of remaining Tobosos—who he believed to believe the last "rebel" Indian group in Nueva Vizcaya—did not exceed 50 men of arms. Reminding his readers of the "valiant" actions of Don Martin de Alday in 1722 and 1723, he explained how the more than 300 prisoners that Alday had removed to Mexico City and the Caribbean had completely splintered Native resistance below the Rio Grande. An occasional Indian raid or two, he noted, hardly could be said to truly threaten the entire kingdom.[325]

These back and forth exchanges during and following Rivera's tour of the Northern provinces painted a portrait of Nueva Vizcaya as the most opulent of provinces, the most populated, and the Spanish jurisdiction in Northern New Spain with the fewest "enemy" Indians. It is striking that for Rivera, the Apaches' seasonal migrations south of the Rio Grande hardly even registered. For Rivera, the only "problem" in Nueva Vizcaya was corrupt officials, who sought to maintain the advantages they could by describing the province as the frontier it no longer was.[326]

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[325] Ibid.: "ningun hombre de sano Juicio, de mediana intteligencia...creera que por medios regulares en muchos años pueda cesar en la Vizcaya la necesidad de manttener tropas para su Conservacion, asi por que su dilattadissima fronttera es havitada de Ynfinittas naciones de Yndios velicosos..."; "la representaz.n melancolica, que el Govern.or hace solo son recelos imaginados de futuros peligros..."

[326] Ibid. Rivera pointed out that given that Nueva Vizcaya was the "most populated" province, it was ironic that it was the only place he encountered opposition to his reforms: "'Es digno de toda tencion, Veer que en la Vizcaya, (como unico de reparo) ha tenido oposicion la Visita; sin que en ninguna de las otras mas Provincias, se haya oydo hablar palabra sobre la materia…"

"*Mi compadre*…the Apache headman"

The expanding settlements and relative peace that Rivera noted continued in Nueva Vizcaya and Coahuila into the 1740s. In this context, and amidst debate over whether the region even needed the presidios that had been established in the late-seventeenth century amidst Native rebellions, presidio captains like Joseph de Berroterán faced new scrutiny. One Nueva Vizcaya resident explained this broader sentiment when he noted that "it had been a long time since [soldiers] had been on a campaign," and they currently "spent their time tending their captains' herds." Military officials in general, he believed, were "all occupied in their own pursuits."[327]

One presidio captain in particular—Joseph de Berroterán—the captain of the Conchos presidio, was occupied in his own pursuits with Apache Indians. In the early 1740s, the Apache headman Pascual visited Conchos ever three months or so to trade buffalo and deerskins for "tobacco, flour, sugar, arms, and clothing." Pascual had even allowed some Apache children to be baptized as a part of these exchanges. Pasqual and Berroterán collaborated militarily in addition to their peaceful trade relations. Berroterán had drawn upon Apache headman Pascual's aid to help track and capture twelve Indian fugitives from the town of Conchos. During this joint mission, however, one of Pasqual's men had been killed in the Sierra Mojada. Berroterán aided the Apaches in taking revenge on the responsible party, providing them with provisions, and arranging for some of his men to join them. In February 1743, twenty-five leagues east of Conchos, they captured nineteen Toboso "fugitives," including an Apache captive who was restored to

[327] Domingo Vélez del Rivero, as cited in Ortelli, *Trama de Una Guerra*, p. 41: "es cosa de perder el juicio, porque no sabe en qué se pueden entretener los soldados de los cinco presidios, si sirviendo a los capitanes, o cuidando la caballada que tienen, o ejecutándose negocio de los capitanes, porque como hace tanto qu eno hacen campaña los juzga ocupados en negocios propios."

her family. Berroterán sent these Tobosos that had eluded past forced removal campaigns south to Mexico City, as mandated by the law.[328]

Amidst ongoing debates about frontier defenses, Berroterán's peaceful dealings with an Apache "compadre" seemed to affirm Rivera's conclusion that enemy Indians were not a significant threat. So did his landholdings—two haciendas and a ranch—which included "a water-powered flour mill, five thousand head of cattle, two hundred riding horses and pack mules, several small adobe houses, stockyards, and a large wooden rodeo corral." The farm at his principal residence, San Antonio de la Ramada, included "ten milk cows, seventy plow oxen, ten herds of mules, more than 2,000 head of sheep, almost 1,000 head of goats, and a heard of cattle." It also had a recently constructed eighteen-room adobe house, with movable windows, locking doors, and furnishings including three "French-style" wooden chairs.[329]

When Berroterán was commissioned to write his famous 1747 report, however, he made no mention of such landholdings and de-emphasized his peaceful relations with Apache Indians. Faced with the potential disbandment of his presidio, the loss of his soldiers' labor, and personal legal trouble, Berroterán emphasized future war over present peace. "All the mountains and rough country are impassable to our forces, but accessible to the enemy," he explained, noting that the dry basin that stretched from the Rio Grande south along the boundary of Nueva Vizcaya and Coahuila—the *Bolson de Mapimi*—posed the greatest danger. If the Apache south of the Rio Grande now numbered only 400, he believed there to be "countless" more north of the Rio Grande, and he envisioned that once they migrated south, "once they penetrate and move into that long, narrow strip

[328] Berroterán Narrative, p. 193; Ortelli, *Trama de Una Guerra*, 50-51.
[329] Inventory of Berroterán landholdings is in AGI-Guadalajara 513 and Berroterán Narrative, 171-172.

[the *Bolson*] they will occupy almost all of the eastern side of Nueva Vizcaya and the western side of Coahuila, and will easily destroy both these important jurisdictions." Even as he traded with Apaches like Pascual, in other words, Berroterán warned that the Bolson de Mapimi could be both a launching pad and safe haven for raids, if the Apache so desired.[330]

The Indian "threat" was a highly malleable rhetorical tool, as Berroterán's interpretation of recent raids on area haciendas further illustrated. While he explained that the haciendas of El Alamo, Sierra de Albino, San Juan del Rio, Rama Zarca, and Cadena had all been raided at the beginning of 1747, "with sixteen to eighteen lives lost," he was unclear about who had perpetrated these raids. Some attributed these actions to the Apache, but Berroterán was not sure whether those responsible "were [those] who remained of the defeated enemy [the Tobosos], some of those who are scattered from [mission] pueblos, or the more than 400 Apaches who are ensconced in the hill country."[331] In fact, small scale raids could be invoked to make any number of arguments: that mission Indians were backsliding in the faith, that civil authorities were failing to prosecute crimes, or that the military forces were needed to contain the attacks of "enemy" Indian groups. Berroterán's description of the rugged Bolson de Mapimi as a safe haven for a vague but menacing enemy, highlighted this malleability: "The heathen enemies, unconverted *and* apostate," he stated, "come from settlements tucked away there, and their movement will always continue like the waves of the sea." Whether it was backsliding Natives in mission pueblos—the "apostates"—or Apache Indian migrants—the "unconverted"—Berroterán suggested that the Indian threat was as

[330] Berroterán Narrative, 194.
[331] Berroterán Narrative, 200.

permanent as the ocean. The subtext, of course, was that his own position, and that of the military more broadly, should be beyond reproach.[332]

This was exactly the kind of rhetoric that Pedro de Rivera had challenged as hyperbole twenty years earlier, when he had explained to royal officials that Nueva Vizcaya was in fact the most populous of the Northern provinces and that its Hispanic settlements and mission Indian communities could easily quell any enemy attacks. Perhaps because such arguments were so familiar to them by the mid-1700s, royal officials in Mexico City and Spain did not take Berroterán's bait. After another botched exploration in 1749, Berroterán was hauled off to face trial in Mexico City, and while he was eventually cleared of any misconduct, he failed to prevent his presidio from being disbanded two years later. As a crown attorney in Mexico explained after reviewing Berroterán's reports, it made no sense to continue to spend money on useless presidios in order to chase "a few Indian bandits who lived only off what they rustled and robbed." After all, "even in this capital of Mexico," he explained, "and all the cities, villas, and major populations of the kingdom, there are thieves and all kinds of evil doers." In those settlements local citizens were enough to handle such crimes, even if they could not prevent them entirely. Noting that almost all area Indians "had been vanquished," he accused Berroterán of inviting in the Apaches. Embracing both his menacing tone, and his description of peaceful relations, the attorney noted that "according to Berroterán himself" Pasqual, who had brought 400 Apaches into Nueva Vizcaya, was his "compadre"—his good friend. Ascribing agency to Berroterán, but not to Apaches like Pasqual, the crown attorney argued that under no circumstances should Berroterán have

[332] Berroterán Narrative, 191 [emphasis added].

allowed "on this side of the river" heathen Indians, unless it was to congregate them into missions.[333]

If Berroterán in the end failed to convince royal officials to maintain area presidios, he succeeded in drawing new scrutiny to Apachean groups' presence south of the Rio Grande and their interactions with Spanish subjects, Native and Hispanic alike.[334] As Rabago y Theran "discovered" an Apache-mission Indian trade, and Berroterán faced accusations he was "inviting in" heathen Indians, Spanish officials in Mexico City and Spain began a broader reappraisal of what could be achieved in the Northern domains of their empire. With the exception of California, by 1750 the Spanish empire had reached its maximum extent in North America. Expansion in the early 1700s had been checked by the emergence of the Comanche trading empire by 1750s, and despite outposts in Texas, royal officials and local military men alike began to describe the Rio Grande as a dividing line.[335] Though they saw it as a boundary between civilization and barbarism, we might more accurately see it as a borderland between the Spanish and Comanche empires, and a homeland for a diverse Native population, including several thousand Mescalero and Lipan Apaches.[336]

Apaches' status outside the Catholic monarchy—as the "unconverted"—appears

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[333] Fiscal to Viceroy, the Marques of Altamira, 5 December 1748, AGI-Guadalajara 191: "es contra toda razon, ocasionarle [a su magestad] nuebos freq.tes gastos por solo, que cuatro indios salteadores que viven solo delo, que Urtan, y rrovan se lleven algunas, cavalladas... pues ni en esta corte, y capital de Mexico ni en todas las ciudades, villas, y mayores poblasiones del Reino faltan Ladrones, y todo genero de mal hechores ni en sus immediasiones ni contornos faltan salteadores publicso de caminos, y con todo eso, solo las poblasiones, y vezinos bastan, al remedio."

[334] On disbandment of presidios see AGN-PI 69.

[335] Decree of Marques de Altamira, Mexico City, 7 Dec 1748, AGI-Guadalajara 191: "no permitir en manera alguna Yndios algunos barvaros de la banda de aca de dho Rio"; "por todos los quatro Veintos, y mayor circunferencia posible de las referidas sesenta o mas leguas se castiguen, y escarmienten los insultos, y ostilidades de todas, y qualesquiera de aquellas Barvaras nasiones de forma que queden de una Vez bien intimidadas, y aterrorisadas, y pase el nombre, y terror de las armas catolicas a mayores distancias de unas en otras nasiones Barvaras p.a q.e no Vuelvan a sus Ostilidades, y antes soliciten su christiana reduz.on."

[336] On broader reappraisal of frontier defenses see Weber, *The Spanish Frontier*, especially 204-235.

to have engendered some toleration for small-scale livestock rustling through the 1750s and 1760s. After the Bishop of Durango's *visita* tour of the region in 1761, for example, he noted that while the Apache took a few animals, "it was not with the excess of past years with the [Tobosos]." Most Apaches remained in the mountains, he explained, traveling at times to "the regions of the north, which have no known end," likely to trade.[337] The governor of Coahuila wrote similarly about Apache trade relations in the early 1760s and explained that his jurisdiction was at relative peace, with the exception of an occasional raid. He explained how the men he had sent out to track some stolen mules and horses had come upon a great meeting of Native traders in July of 1760 eighty leagues north of the Presidio de Santa Rosa, along the Rio Puerco in present-day Texas. More than 1500 Indians had recently camped there, "as evidenced by the fires and huts." Two leagues away, 500 Apaches were camped, preventing the party from passing any further north. The governor noted, however, that these Apaches "maintained themselves without harming any person, though they did enjoy taking some horses and mules." They did so in parties of three or four, taking animals from Coahuila that the governor himself admitted "roamed free." It was often days, he explained, before anyone noticed they were gone, making it difficult to track and punish the perpetrators. The only solution, in his mind, echoed a common mantra of the period: "more settlements."[338]

Trade relations and relative peace characterized El Paso and other communities

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[337] Bishop of Durango to Viceroy, the Marques de Cruillas, 9 September 1760, AGN PI 69: " ya no es con el exceso que años pasados...; "otros que suben de las regiones del Norte para donde se estiende esta ensenada, sin conocerle el fin, pero los daños no son tantos como antes...";

[338] Jacinto Barria to Viceroy, the Marques de Cruillas, 15 November 1760, AGN-PI 25, fr. 146: "que en el ya cittado paraje avian esttado como mill y quinientos Yndios, segun reconosieron por los Pueblos, y fuegos, y que a dos Leguas disttante de el, esttarian como quienientos Apaches, y que no pudieron penettrar el desttino les conduxo; Los Apaches de mantienen sin hazer daño a las personas... y como estas manadas estttan a su liverttad, luego que los hechan menos hazen dilixenzia de buscarlos y quando abisan de el robo han passado ya tres o quattro dias, y aunque salgan luego partidas en su seguimientto, es inutil qualquiera dilixencia...estto no encuenttra…otro remedio, que otros esttablecimientos."

along the Rio Grande as well in the early 1760s, involving more than just presidio captains. In 1762, for example, the Captain of the Presidio del Norte, Manuel Antonio San Juan, issued an order warning that no residents, whether Spanish, Indian or "of broken color" could trade with the Apaches in seeds, firearms, or livestock. Captain San Juan explained his fear that residents, in seeking their own personal gain, would bring danger to themselves by inviting Apaches into their homes to trade. Strikingly, however, he did not restrict dealing with Apaches who came at peace altogether, but ordered that trade be carried out "in the light of day" in the town plaza. Military officials elsewhere also reported that Apaches came frequently (and peacefully) to sell their wares. In Janos in the late-1750s, for example, they described repeated visits from Apache women, who entered the fort carrying wooden crosses and asked to sell firewood to the soldiers.[339]

Glancing across the Greater Rio Grande in the 1760s, it seems possible to imagine an alternate future in which Spaniards continued to develop new ranches and settlements, trading peacefully with Apaches who had found shelter from Comanches through interaction with, but not submission to, the Spanish empire. After all, reports of Apache attacks on Rio Grande missions had faded as these communities began to "go around on horseback" dealing with Mescalero Apache visitors. Spaniards noted occasional raids on their free-roaming cattle, but concluded that the damage "was not as bad as in the past." In the meantime, as Sara Ortelli as shown, some Spanish elites engaged in contraband trade and livestock rustling of their own under the cover of Indians' alleged "murders and robberies." If Mescalero and Lipan Apaches found it increasingly difficult to hunt buffalo

[339] "1762 Vando proclamado para que sus havitadores no vendan ni cambien semillas, ni armas...a los apaches," Cd. Juarez Municipal Archives, MF 513 pt. 2, r. 7, paging 2, fr. 212-220; For Janos see "Diario de novedades," January 1757 to November 1758, Janos Microfilm Collection, University of Texas at El Paso, Reel #6.

on the plains—facing devastating attacks by the Comanches at times when they did—to the south they had found a zone of safety and built a diversified subsistence economy that merged occasional raids with agriculture, hunting, gathering, and trade with mission Indian communities. While some Spaniards would later claim that war with the Apaches began in 1748, in fact there is little contemporary evidence that "war" was either underway or imminent in the 1750s or early 1760s south of the Rio Grande.[340]

The False Clarity of "Apache" Raids and the Emergence of War

The spark that ultimately set off war between Spaniards and Apaches was not the occasional mule herd stolen by three or four Apache men, but the decision to punish Apaches for a much broader livestock rustling economy that multiple groups—Native and Hispanic alike—had long been involved in. Spaniards' shifting approach to small-scale raids in Nueva Vizcaya reflected in part a renewed imperial attention to the Northern frontier and a renewed sanction for violence against non-Christian Indians like the Apache. Forty years after Pedro Rivera had toured the Northern frontier and reformed the military garrisons, the Crown commissioned another expedition to explore the Northern domains and prepare new military regulations. The Marques de Rubi's mission

[340] For primary source claims that war began in 1748 see "Junta de Guerra y Hacienda," 2 April 1772, AGN-PI 132; "Sobre la Junta de Guerra celebrada en Chihuahua," 29 June 1778, AGI-Guadalajara 276. For historians similar conceptualizations see for example, Susan Deeds, "Colonial Chihuahua: Peoples and frontiers in flux," in *New Views of Borderlands History*, ed. Jackson, Robert H. (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1998), p. 34; Óscar Alatriste, *Desarollo de la industria y la comunidad minera de Hidalgo del Parral durante la segunda mitad del siglo XVIII (1765-1810)* (Mexico, D.F. Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México, 1983), p. 27; Gerhard, *La Frontera*, 20, 41; Michael Swann, *Tierra Adentro: Settlement and Society in Colonial* Durango (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1982), 71; William L. Merrill, "Cultural Creativity and Raiding Bands in Eighteenth Century Northern New Spain," in *Violence, Resistance, and Survival in the Americas*, ed. William Taylor and Franklin Pease (Washington, D.C. Smithsonian Institution Press, 1994), 126; Jones, *Nueva Vizcaya*, 125; Elizabeth John, *Storms brewed in other men's worlds : the confrontation of Indians, Spanish, and French in the Southwest, 1540-1795*, 2nd ed. (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1996), 273; William Griffen, "Aspectos de las relaciones entre indios y europeos en el norte de México," in *El contacto entre los españoles e indígenas en el norte de la Nueva España*, ed. Campbell Ysla (Chihuahua: Universidad Autónoma de Ciudad Juárez, 1992), 53.

embodied the broader hopes of Carlos III and his officials that professional management, economic reform, and a streamlined bureaucracy might produce greater royal control over Spain's American kingdoms and generate a greater stream of revenues to the treasury. These "Bourbon reforms" as they are commonly known, included a renewed focus on imperial defenses that reflected startling recent events, as the English occupation of Havana in 1762 had revealed the vulnerability of one of the empire's prize ports and wealthiest islands. In much the same vein, continued reports of Native violence north of the Rio Grande, especially in Texas and New Mexico, raised questions about the vulnerability of Northern New Spain to a land attack from imperial competitors to the north and east.[341]

Rubi and his men demonstrated little interest in parsing the ambiguities of livestock rustling and Indian raids. The expedition's engineer, Nicolás LaFora prepared the official diary of the expedition and drew detailed maps that described with scientific precision the entrances of the "enemy Indians" and their frequent attacks. He described abandoned haciendas, declining mining output, and blamed both entirely on Apaches. If Rivera had seen "barbarian Indians" as cattle rustlers that could nonetheless be converted to Christianity, Rubi and LaFora saw them as inconvertible barbarians, cannibals that tore fetuses from women's wombs.[342]

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[341] For Rubi's visit see Lawrence Kinnaird, *The Frontiers of New Spain: Nicolás de LaFora's Description, 1766-1768* (Berkeley: The Quivira Society, 1958); Nicolás LaFora, *Presidios Internos: Relacion del Viaje Que Hizo a los Presidios Internos situados en la Frontera de la America Septentrional Pertenciente al Rey de España*, ed. Vito Alessio Robles (Mexico, D.F. Editorial Pedro Robredo, 1939). On the Bourbon reforms, see Agustín Guimerá, *El reformismo borbónico : una visión interdisciplinar* (Madrid: Consejo Superior de Investigaciónes Científicas, 1996); Susan Deans-Smith, *Bureaucrats, planters, and workers: the making of the tobacco monopoly in Bourbon Mexico*, 1st ed. (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1992); Linda Arnold, *Bureaucracy and bureaucrats in Mexico City, 1742-1835* (Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 1988); for reform measures and colonial frontiers see Weber, *Bárbaros*, esp. 72.

[342] On distinctions between Rubi and Rivera I draw here upon Weber, *The Spanish Frontier*, 204-212. In the 1570s, the term "conquest" had been replaced by "pacification," reflecting Spain's theoretical emphasis

The expeditions' recommendations, promulgated provisionally in Mexico in 1771 and then officially instituted by Carlos III the following year, unsurprisingly emphasized military solutions over negotiation or diplomacy. While the 1729 regulations informed by Rivera had emphasized the formation of peace agreements with enemy Indians—in fact Indians who asked for peace had to be granted it—the Regulations of 1772 deviated strikingly from past precedent by authorizing an offensive war against non-Christian Indians. If they wrote about completely "exterminating Apaches and other intractable tribes," Rubi and his advisors also recognized that even a "continuous offensive war" alone might not achieve their aims. LaFora, for example, advocated taking Apache women and children prisoner to decrease their population and called for Spain to attempt to control only those regions that could "be called the dominion and true possession of the king." They had witnessed first hand on their tour that Spain's "true possessions" were quite limited north of the Rio Grande outside of Santa Fe and San Antonio. The focus, in other words, should be on maintaining control only over regions south of the Rio Grande.[343]

Migratory Apaches represented a small minority of a much larger Native and Hispanic population in Nueva Vizcaya and Coahuila. If Rubi and his expedition blamed them for all manner of troubles, local officials had often explained that it was "Indios de pueblo"—who contributed most to the lack of security in the Northern provinces. In the 1750s and 1760s, friars, governors, and presidio captains had reported that Sumas, Tarahumaras, Julimeños, were raiding as "*ladrones de casa*"—thieves within the house.

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on peaceful expansion, and while the circumoluction evident in "defensive" attacks on Native groups must be noted, the 1772 Regulations nonetheless marked a new sanction for warfare against Indians. I follow Robles' edited Spanish-language publication of LaFora's narrative in this discussion, LaFora, *Presidio Internos*, [hereafter cited as "LaFora Narrative, p. #].

[343] LaFora Narrative, 277-280.

While they often blamed Apaches for having “perverted” these Christians Indians, they also reported on observing a much larger trading economy along the Rio Grande that illustrated that mission Indians needed little convincing to join with Apaches when it was mutually beneficial. If some local officials wanted to end the loss of livestock, they found themselves facing legal constraints such as the lack of witnesses and what they described as “the delicate matter” of dealing with Indians living in missions.[344]

As “unconverted” outsiders, Apaches represented an easier target than either missionized Native groups or local Spanish elites. Some military commanders shared Rubi and LaFora's bellicose sentiment, and even before offensive war had been formally approved, expeditions had begun to track and attack Apaches in their own rancherias. In fact, the signs of Indian raids and abandoned Apache camps that Rubi and LaFora observed during their tour reflected in part some of the early symptoms of an ongoing escalation of violence as Spanish campaigns to "punish" Apache raids had led to Apache revenge, fueling further Spanish punitive expeditions.[345]

Military campaigns in the summer and fall of 1765 reflected early signs of a shift in Apache-Spanish relations. Alferez Joseph Patricio Luzero was sent in pursuit of Apaches who had allegedly raided ranches near El Paso, even as presidio captains there had long noted that Suma and Cholome Indians were the more frequent perpetrators of

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[344] Such concerns had a longer history. See D.n Ygnacio Francisco de Barrutia to Viceroy 29 April 1729, AGN-PI 154. In 1754, for example, a meeting of the principal citizens of Chihuahua presented a joint statement warning that the Apaches threatened to "complete break the obedience of the Tarahumaras," See AGI-Guadalajara 194: “romper totalmente la obediencia los Taraumares, Nacion dilatadissima, y que con la sublevasion de esta provincia quede expuesto a perderse el reino todo.” Both Ortelli and Anderson discusses Spanish confusion over ethnic identity and individuals "passing" as Apache in Nueva Vizcaya and Coahuila, see Ortelli, *Trama de una Guerra,* especially 113-134; Anderson, *The Indian Southwest,* 114-115. On the “delicate” issue of prosecuting mission Indians see V.e Assensio del Raso and Leonardo Ramirez to Joséph de Castilla y Theran, 12, 13, and 14 November 1769, AGN-PI 231.

[345] For late-1760s and early-1770s campaigns see AGN-Historia 20, AGN-PI Vols. 22, 42, 69, 82, 97, 102, 103, 128, 132, 154, 231.

such actions.[346] Luzero commanded 104 militiamen, 114 Indian auxiliaries and twenty-one soldiers. In September, the party of more than two hundred men came across an Apache rancheria of twenty-three men, women, and children in the Sierra of Sacramento. Outnumbered nearly ten to one, the Apaches had little chance to escape; six were killed and seventeen taken captive. Lucero distributed the spoils of this battle to the militiamen and Indian scouts: buffalo hides, antlers, clothing, saddles, bows and arrows, corn, and other items. The mules and horses they found seemed to confirm that the attack was justified, as they were found to carry various brands: “some from this presidio, others from New Mexico, others from further into Nueva Vizcaya, and some without a brand." As Luzero explained his logic, he knew Apaches had stolen these animals because "they don't buy them or raise them."[347]

This campaign shed light onto the Apache world beyond the Spanish sphere, revealing that Mescalero Apaches and Comanches continued their longstanding skirmishes north of the Rio Grande. Within the Apache camp, soldiers found two scalps that one of the Apache prisoners explained they had taken from the Comanches in recent battles. It may have been as much out of fear of Comanche attack, as of future Spanish attacks, that in ensuing days one Apache woman fled to El Paso with her two children, asking to remain and requesting baptism. If Apaches had in fact been responsible for perceived increases in raiding near El Paso, the loss of livestock to the Comanches may have been a motivating factor. It is also possible that Apaches had acquired branded

[346] See AGI-Guadalajara, Legajos 191 and 194 for documents on Suma and Cholome raiding in the mid-1700s.

[347] "Carpeta, Año de 1765, Correspondencia con el Teniente Governador, y Capitan del Presidio del Pueblo del Paso del Norte D. Pedro la fuente," in AGN-PI 102, fr. 49: "De mulas y caballos se encontraron 16 empie entre las quales se reconocieron Barias marcas, unas de este Prec.o otras de lo Ynterior de este Reyno, y de el de la Nueba Viscaya y otras sin marca..."; "ellos ni las compran ni las crian..."

livestock through existing trade networks with mission Indians, a possibility Lucero discounted in claiming that Apaches "don't buy them."[348]

War's self-propelling logic is evident in further campaigns in the late-1760s to contain alleged Apache raids. Finding branded animals during attacks on Apache camps served as evidence that justified further violence. Apache guilt was asserted, even when repeated reports had suggested that Mission Indians might be involved. In fact, given that many herds roamed relatively freely in the countryside, there was often no eyewitness to a given raid.[349]

Reports about Indian raids most frequently refer to the perpetrators using the phrases "the enemy Indians," "the barbarians," or some other general category. The presidio captain of La Bahia explained in 1769, for example, that area residents feared that Apaches had been spying on their herds. When one foreman had come upon two Indians stealing corn from his employer's fields, and fired upon them "thinking they were Apache," he discovered that they were in fact men from the local mission. A 1769 attack on a man driving his cowherd from Texas to Coahuila further elucidated the problem of attributing attacks solely to "Apaches." Headed south into Coahuila from the Presidio of la Bahia, Joseph Antonio Carrera had been attacked by a group of "naked" Indians. Firing arrows upon him, "from which he miraculously escaped unharmed," he meandered from mountain to mountain fleeing the Indians until he arrived in Santa Rosa "without even a hat." After officials sent men to investigate, they traced the tracks of the raiders not to Apache encampments in the mountains, but into the mission of San Francisco de

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[348] Ibid. On Apache-Comanche relations and the escalation of violence in the 1760s see Hämäläinen, *Comanche Empire,* 61; See also Anderson, *The Indian Southwest*, 120-129.

[349] Ibid. On non-Apache livestock rustling see Ortelli, *Trama de Una Guerra,* especially 139-164. For a microhistorical study of interethnic raiding bands in Nueva Vizcaya see Merrill, "Cultural Creativity."

Bizarrón. Two days later, Indians from this mission were seen in nearby towns with loads of butchered meat, which only provided further evidence that they had rustled the cows of Joseph Antonio. Whether Apaches were involved in any way in Julimeño raiding activities in the fall of 1769, both groups had in the past exploited the fact that Spaniards had a difficult time telling them apart.[350]

In Nueva Vizcaya, similar concerns about "*ladrones de casa*," boiled over into an inquisition-like investigation between 1773 and 1775. The investigation began with the apprehension of one "suspicious" Tarahumara man, and from testimony generated through torture and coercion the Chief Magistrate of Chihuahua, Pedro Queipo de Llano, amassed lists of dozens of suspects of treason and apprehended hundreds of Tarahumara and *casta* men, women, and children in the process. Though the circumstances of the production of these records certainly shaped the information contained within them, the remarkably resonant testimony collected from distinct witnesses provides useful information about both Tarahumara-Apache relations and the Spanish response to them, illustrating how late-18th century warfare was not simply a binary reflection of Spanish-Apache relations.[351]

It was in March 1773 that a Tarahumara man was apprehended near the Pueblo of Guadalupe under suspicion that he had participated in a recent string of murders and thefts in area ranches. After six lashes, he confessed to the Chihuahua magistrate that he had been involved in homicides that had taken place the past November, and that for the

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[350] V.e Assensio del Raso and Leonardo Ramirez to Joséph de Castilla y Theran, 12, 13, and 14 November 1769, AGN-PI 231: "le salio una punta de yndios todos en cueros…le tiraron barrios flechasos de los que milagrosamente se escapo y salio huyendo de entre ellos dejando todo quanto traia por delante en poder de dhos yndios, y extrabiando caminos por que dice lo seguian presurosos, llego aqui hasta sin sombrero..."

[351] The documents surrounding the 1773 investigation are found in AGN-PI Vols. 42, 43, and 132. A 1783-1787 investigation that involved many of the same individuals is contained in AGI-Guadalajara, Legajos 284 and 285. See also Merrill, "Cultural Creativity."

past two years he had been turning mules and horses into Apaches along with five other men. In March, Magistrate Llano explained to the Governor of Nueva Vizcaya, José Fayni, the implications of this revelation. He noted that local residents had long been convinced that the success of Apache raids must be explained by "secret intelligence and collusion" with the Tarahumaras, especially from the many who deserted their pueblos without approval from their priest or minister. Of course “vagabondage” as Spanish officials explained it derogatorily, was by no means unique to the Tarahumaras. Elsewhere in colonial Mexico, and indeed in Spanish America more broadly, unskilled workers commonly moved from job to job. What *was* unique to the Nueva Vizcaya context, was the presence of an un-subjugated Native population—the Apache—and the beginnings of war. As Governor Fayni explained the implications of Llano's investigations to the viceroy, desertion had become synonymous with leaving to “kill and rob like bandits committing bloody crimes under the name of the declared public enemy the Apache.”[352]

As Llanos apprehended the accused, and the accused identified more suspects, he gathered nearly 100 men and women in custody within a few weeks of the beginning of the investigation. The testimony of the apprehended painted a picture of a large interethnic community that sent out raiding parties from their mountain camps. Headed by a man named Calaxtrin, identified by one witness as an Apache, but by others simply

[352] José Fayni, Governor of Nueva Vizcaya, to Viceroy Antonio Maria Bucareli y Ursua, 20 March 1773, AGN-PI 132. Though this letter is written by Fayni, he is summarizing the reports sent to him by Llano, the *corregidor* of Chihuahua: "Yndios Tarahumares, inclinadissimos al Robo, y faciles de cometer infinidad de Delictos, y separarse de sus reducciones, sin embargo de continuadas providencias, por mi partte extendidas, para que se castiguen exemplamentte, los que Decertaren sus Pueblos sin voleta de su Cura o Ministro, que explique los fines y el tiempo de su separacion, por desterrar de ellos la voluntariedad y arvitrio de vivir por muchos años, emboscados en los campos, y abrigados de las sierras de que salen a matar y rovar como vandidos disfrazando sus sangrientas criminalidades, con el nombre del public declarado enemigo Apache..."

as an Indian, this community was described as varying in size from several hundred to a thousand, and included individuals from diverse castes and backgrounds: blacks, Indians, mestizos, and a few Spaniards. First and foremost, however, was the large presence of Tarahumaras from mission pueblos. By June, Llanos had taken fifty-eight confessions and discovered 203 accomplices. He claimed that no less than thirty-five Tarahumara pueblos were implicated. He had also uncovered rumors that various Tarahumara towns were going to join to "the end with the Spaniards." In other words, the situation that governors and military officers like Joseph de Berroterán had long warned against—Apaches turning the Tarahumaras and other Native subjects against the Spaniards—now seemed a reality.[353]

Larger political aims may have motivated some members of the Calaxtrin raiding band. But if some mentioned "ending with all the Spaniards," other witnesses centered their grievances on labor demands. They wanted not to kill all Spaniards, but to end with the haciendas where they had been employed. The Calaxtrin band, as William Merrill has explained, demonstrated immense cultural creativity. Drawing upon Christianity, peyote use, and revolutionary ideology, they built long-lasting mountain communities that survived, and were in the end perhaps invigorated by, Llano's investigations.[354]

Apaches made this existence possible by providing both needed trade goods and discursive cover. Raiding for mules and horses supplied their own needs for meat and

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[353] Llano to Viceroy Bucareli, 20 April 1773, AGN PI 42: "estaban comvocados barios Pueblos de la Tharahumara para acabar con los españoles." Though I reviewed these documents independently, I have benefitted from the analysis of William Merrill, who has examined this same investigation in a somewhat different context. See Merrill, "Cultural Creativity."

[354] The best discussion of the day-to-day life and trading practices of the raiding bands is contained in testimony of the accused in AGN PI 132: "Expediente formado sob.re la colucion y secreta inteligencia de los Yndios Tarahumares con los Apaches, y exesos que cometieron en las inmediaciones de la Villa de Chiguagua."

transport, but such items were also what Apache wanted to purchase, in exchange for arrows, hides, blankets, and clothing. These exchanges occurred at desert and mountain springs where the Tarahumaras would maintain the herds until the rains came, and the Apache arrived to take them north. For years, the Calaxtrin band (and likely others) was able to maintain itself because of a confusion of attribution. Because they received arrows from the Apache, and dressed in skins that the Apaches had given them, their actions had almost always been attributed to the latter.[355]

Llano's investigations, especially in the beginning, were cast as a startling revelation: the real culprits behind an "infinity of excesses, " Fayni noted in commending Llano's efforts, had been proven to be the Tarahumaras. "Rarely" it now seemed, had it been the Apaches. As Llano explained the implications: "our forces will make little progress even if we finish with the whole Apacheria, because the thief will still be in the house. After all, the Apaches haven't taken even one horse or mule, that wasn't turned into them by the Tarahumaras."[356]

In the end, however, Llano's hunt for Tarahumara traitors met an abrupt end. By late-April, a month after it had begun, the city council of Chihuahua met and decided to order a halt to his investigation. His apprehension of dozens of suspects had caused "a terrified panic" in the Tarahumara pueblos, and in the interests of "calming them down" the council decided not to continue the investigation. Instead, Llano was to proceed against only the principal headmen, because to do otherwise would risk needing the force of arms and produce logistical challenges. In sum, if officials believed they had

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[355] Ibid.

[356] Ibid., Llano to Fayni, 23 March 1773: "pues seria mui poco lo que adelantarian las Armas, aunque acabasen con toda la Apacheria quedandonos el Ladron dentro de Casa, pues es constantte no se han lelvado los Apaches mulada, ni cavallada alguna, de las que llevan Declaradas, que no haya sido entregada por los Tarahumares."

discovered an Apache-Tarahumara alliance that threatened to "end with all the Spaniards," they realized that their own investigations into this alliance might be what sent the Tarahumara pueblos into rebellion.[357]

Proceeding against the alleged leaders of the gang proved far from an easy solution either, however, as Llano ran up against the challenge of proving cases for which he had little evidence other than coerced testimony. Some questioned whether he had been overzealous, and Llano himself noted that "the fear of punishment makes [the suspects] say unimaginable things." Of the two hundred individuals apprehended in the spring of 1773 under suspicion of cooperating with Apaches, some died in prison in Chihuahua, while others labored in public works projects from which they were able to escape. In fact, ten years later another mass inquisition into Apache-Tarahumara relations took place, at the height of which more than 900 Tarahumaras were again apprehended. In these later investigations, witnesses explained how for the past twenty years they had been dealing with Apaches, who had come to stay with them in their houses "with the same security as in their own rancherias."[358]

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[357] Ibid. This decision was affirmed in Mexico by Fiscal Areche in July 1773, whose point-of-view was seconded by the viceroy. As Areche noted, "en atencion a que el numero de los Yndios arrestadas es ya tan conciderable, y que siendo como es tan General la cedicion no es facil la captura a todos los conprehendidos, ni se puede castigar a quantos abraza el delicto, se acomoden desde luego a lo que se practica en semejanttes casos, que es arrestar y procesar a los mas principales Cavesillas, para que Descargado el golpe sobre ellos de la Justicia, se aterrorizen los demas Delinquentes, y que en este concepto se les continuen sus causas a los que ya estan presos, y se suspendan en el arresto de los otros."

[358] Ibid.: "por q.e el temor del Castigo, les hará decir cosas que ni han soñado, sobre que, y de su inconstante natural tengo bien larga experiencia." The investigations from the 1780s are found in AGI-Guadalajara Legajos 284-286. This second investigation was remarkably similar to the first, if on a larger scale. Officials recognized that past efforts had failed, and that in fact the problem of Apache-Tarahumara collusion had grown worse. Llano's earlier, failed investigation had perhaps attracted even more Spanish subjects to a liminal life. In March of 1783, a mulato was apprehended under suspicion of crime and sent to Arispe to be questioned. Granted a pardon from death if he confessed, he explained that he was a spy for the "many gangs of Yndios Taraomares, Topios, y Tepehuanes, mulatos coyotes mestizos y de otras castas de Gente ociosa, perdida, y vagamunda" that were encamped in the Sierra de Barajas and its surroundings. "Joined and in collusion" with the Apaches who engaged in their "incessant campaigns of death and robbery in this province." A raid had occurred and the footprints of one of the raiders had been followed to

Llano's "discovery" that Tarahumara and Hispanic laborers may have committed raids and homicides attributed to the Apache did not change the course of ongoing military campaigns in the 1770s and 1780s, however. In fact, Spanish officials drew indiscriminately upon histories of raiding to justify further military action against Apaches. In war councils, military officers like Hugo O'Connor contended that war had begun in 1748, and in the years since Apaches alone had committed more than 4,000 murders, stolen thousands of livestock, and caused more than 11 million pesos in losses to the regional economy.[359]

Unsurprisingly, targeting Apaches for their role in a multi-ethnic trading economy fueled further violence. While Apaches had frequently faced onslaughts from Comanches and had sought "some place where they could live in safety," Apache relations with the Spanish sphere south of the Rio Grande had *not* been characterized by unending cycles of war before the late-1760s. A number of Spanish officials themselves commented that the violence of the late-1760s and early-1770s was unprecedented. Magistrate Llano had

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the Pueblo of Guadalupe—the same pueblo implicated in the raiding bands discovered in 1773. Francisco Luis's shoes "were the same as the tracks" found leaving the raiding site, and in his hut they had found 24 bloodied arrows.

As in the past, witnesses described exchanging horses and mules for hides and arrows, but they went into more detail about their alliance and trade with the Apaches. This had begun, they remember, about 20 years ago, when they had forged relations with Apaches by allowing them to come and stay in their houses "with the same security as if it was their own rancherias." Many of the same individuals were implicated in these later bands: "Por no haverseles impuesto entonces el merecido castigo y haver conseguido livertarse de la Prision." José Antonio Reyes, for example, one of the main accused in the 1773 events, was apprehended in March of 1784. By November of 1784, 900 Tarahumaras had been apprehended, and almost exactly as before, these mass apprehensions had generated a panic in the pueblos. This time, however, key leaders of the raiding bands were executed, quartered, and their dismembered bodies displayed as a warning not to join with the Apaches. Some languished in prison into 1787, when twenty-one were still facing charges.

[359] Junta de Guerra y Hacienda, PI 132: "mas de quatro mil personas de todas clases, y sexos, y que la perdida, que sea sufrido aquella Provincia ascendia a quella Provincia ascendia en Octubre de setenta, y uno a mas de onze millones de pesos." O'Connor was not alone in citing such figures, noting that they were proven "by documents" in the archives. Historians have usually taken Spanish statistics on Apache raids had face value. A closer examination at reported raids, however, reveals that in fact it was often unclear who had committed raids, and attribution to "Apache" should not be taken at face value.

noted in 1770 that while Nueva Vizcaya had suffered "some disturbances" in the last twenty years, "never had it arrived to the extreme that we are experiencing today." Two years later, military officials met in a council of war in which they explained that the region was experiencing attacks "like never before seen."[360]

By the early 1770s, such descriptions of desolation were not hyperbole, as Nueva Vizcaya haciendas and ranches experienced repeated massacres. An attack on a ranch a league and a half from Santa Eulalia in February 1770 is representative, shedding light on what Spanish residents meant when they lamented violence "like they had never seen before." On 7 February 1770, a boy arrived at the house of Don Juan Joseph Barrandegui with the news that his Ranch, a league and a half from Santa Eulalia, had suffered a horrific attack. Sending a party of men to investigate, local officials discovered that eighteen residents of the rancho were dead, and many head of cattle had been found killed as well. Muleteers were commissioned to bring the dead on mules with a military escort of seven Yaqui Indians and other men of arms. The bodies arrived on the night of the 8th to be buried. Juan Joseph de Lemus described his feelings upon witnessing the bodies arrive. "What horror!" he said, explaining how he first saw the body of Ramon Gonzalez, a mulato foreman, stabbed in the chest four times, his genitals mutilated. He had been told that Gonzalez was found face down with arrows in his back. The other thirteen bodies filed in one by one: first came three Tarahumara laborers, Francisco, Joseph, and Miguel, only one of whom had been left with any clothing. The crowd noted

[360] Juan Joséph de Lemus a S.or D.n Pedro Antonio Queipo de Llano, 10 February 1770, AGN-PI 42: "pues aunque de Veinte años ha estado padeciendo y tolerando esta Jurisdiccion tan combatida y destituida de remedio nunca han llegado a el estremo que en el dia se experimenta de tener impedidos todos los caminos por donde transitan y se conducen Vastimentos y Viveres para la provicion de estos Vezindarios…" See also for example 1772 Junta de Guerra, PI 132, which refers to "attacks like never seen before"—"atacques como nunca visto hasta aquel año."

"with greatest compassion," the body of a Spanish widow, Ana Andrea Ortega, who had been stabbed in the chest three times, "her womb destroyed and filled with beans, her shame parts penetrated by a bow." Then came the bodies of nine children, the oldest appearing to be about seven years old, the others younger, including a baby of three or fourth months. These children had not only been stabbed, but had suffered burns, likely because the house they were inside of had been set on fire.[361]

No one, other than the perpetrators, had survived to recount what had happened during this massacre at the Rancho of el Portrero. But local residents did not need an eyewitness to make determinations for themselves. This massacre proved that "these cruel Barbarians want nothing less than to extinguish with the entire Spanish nation, not sparing woman or child." The events at the rancho corroborated the wider sense that a new era of violence was upon them. Lemus explained how everyone had commented on the "destruction," "the harm committed." Besides the bodies of the dead, the party of men sent to investigate described how "all they had found in the area was destruction": dead cattle, chickens, dogs, and cats. Observers noted that if the attackers had simply wanted to steal, they could have tied people up, rather than kill them. "Terror" was the word repeated most frequently now, as mine and hacienda workers had begun to "leave for other parts." As Lemus summarized, "the citizenry remains completely terrorized…knowing that the Indian enemy might attack again night or day." Lemus reminded his superiors that the mines of his jurisdiction, if they could not be worked, threatened a "great loss" to the crown, "given that it is on mining that the royal interests

[361] Juan Joséph de Lemus a S.or D.n Pedro Antonio Queipo de Llano, 10 February 1770, AGN-PI 42: "Rejistramos con la maior compassion el cuerpo de Hana, Andrea Ortega española Viuda de Antonio Bega, pasado su Cuerpo por los Pechos con tres Lanzadas, destrozado el Bientre, y dentro le echaron frijoles por las Partes mas Vergonzosas le metieron un Arco Dejando su ultrajado cuerpo Desnudo."

of his majesty, and the commerce of this citizenry depend."[362]

Table 1: Select Attacks on Spanish Settlements, 1769-1770[363]

Location	Distance from Chihuahua	Persons Killed	Notes
San Jeronimo	7 Leagues	49	10 Captives Taken
Nombre de Dios	1 League	6	Captives Taken Also
Hacienda de San Lucas		18	
Pasture near Chihuahua	1.5 Leagues	18	
Hacienda del Maiorasgo de Valero		30	
Pasture of the Dominguez		19	
Durasno	Near Old Presidio of Conchos	30	
Janos		16	500 Horses Taken
Hacienda de San Antonio de la Jabonera		19	

On the one hand, Llano's later investigations suggest that Tarahumaras or interethnic raiding bands may have been responsible for at least some of the reported massacres in the early-1700s. At the same time, however, the destruction reported by observers, who noted that few animals were taken, also fits strikingly with Apache understandings of war versus raiding. While a raid was taken to acquire horses, mules, or other resources from outsiders—"to search out enemy property," as the Apache term

[362] Ibid.: "estos iniquous crueles Barbaros no tiran ya a mas que estinguir en el todo nuestra Nacion española no perdonando sexo ni edad que no maten..."; "ha quedado sumamente atemorizado este Real, y su Vezindario por que haviendo quedado este Portrero Yermo, y despoblado tan immediato todos temen sirva de Rochela [ara los Yndios enemigos desde donde con mucha facilidad podran asalatarnos de dia, o de noche..."; "la mineria...es de donde pende todo el orden y aumento de Reales intereces de Su Magestad, comercio, y veicndad de este Real, y esa Villa..."

[363] This chart contains a chronological list of accounts as described in 1772 War Council, in AGN-PI 132,

translates into English—raiding parties aimed to avoid encounters with the enemy, and rituals associated with raiding were directed towards concealment and thwarting pursuit. The purpose of war parties, in contrast, was to avenge Apachean causalities by killing the enemy and destroying their camps. Revenge represented an ethical commitment to retaliate for slain relatives, "a religious act that bound a man to the larger complex of Apache values and ideals." Rituals in advance of war parties thus centered on demonstrating the heroic acts that warriors intended to perform, and once on the warpath men spoke a special ritual language with its own vocabulary.[364]

The early years of war would be devastating for both sides. If the ultimate uncertainty of attributing massacres to Apaches, Tarahumaras, or interethnic raiding bands weighed on the minds of some magistrates like Queipo de Llano, for military officers it mattered little. As Spanish forces and their Native allies captured or killed hundreds of Apaches, they calculated that between 1771 and 1776, Apaches had killed more than 1,500 people, took more than 150 captives, and had forced the abandonment of more than a hundred ranches and haciendas.[365]

Conclusion

It was only after war began in the late-1760s that Spaniards reinterpreted past relations with Apaches. While even in recent years Mescalero and Lipan Apaches had been trading with local residents and then "keeping to themselves in the mountains," in councils of war and meetings of the principle citizens of Chihuahua City, Apaches now

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[364] On Apache ideas of revenge see Opler, *Apache Lifeway*, 370-375; see also *Handbook of North American Indians*, Vol. 10 (Washington: Smithsonian Institution, 1978); quote from William B. Griffen, *Apaches at War & Peace: The Janos Presidio, 1750-1858* (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1988), p. 11.

[365] Delay, *War of a Thousand Deserts*, 12.

became "the most vicious, inhumane, idolatrous" enemy. One crown attorney in Mexico City, advising the viceroy about the situation in Northern New Spain, argued that Apaches' "perverse customs and inclinations" alone warranted Spanish efforts to conquer them and "take charge of their governance." José Antonio Areche warned, however, that war was not something to be taken lightly, as "all men confess, that war is a terrible danger." It disturbed the common order of things, "confusing friendship and kinship...as commerce leaves, cities are destroyed, the arts abandoned."[366]

Areche's warning was unusually fitting to the unfolding warfare in the Greater Rio Grande. Even as Spaniards targeted an enemy they could blame for all manners of troubles—fluctuating mining revenues, stagnant populations, banditry, homicides, and cattle rustling—they had discovered that the enemy was as much internal, "domestic," as it was external. It was not just Tarahumaras and other Natives living in mission pueblos that had "invited Apaches into their homes." In the fall of 1773, officials received reports that citizens of El Paso had been harboring Apache Indians. Ordered to turn in "any and all Apaches present in their households," local residents brought forward nine Apache boys and fifteen Apache women. Officials also apprehended three individuals, Marcos Nasalteco, an Indian woman named Gertrudis, and her daughter Juana, who they charged with "giving lodging" to the enemy and escorted south with the Apaches to Chihuahua City.

If, as Areche explained, "God's friend is he whom God's enemy kills," God's friends seemed increasingly few and far between. In sum, the certainty with which

[366] José Antonio Areche to Vicreoy, 6 September 1774, AGN-PI 154: …"Todos los hombres confiesan que es terrible daño el de la guerra; con ella se descompone el orden y armonia de la republica: la Religion se muda: la Justicia se perturva: Las leyes obedecen: La amistad y parentezco se confunde: Las artes se abandonan: El Comercio se retira: Las Ciudades se destruyen, y la sociedad se altera…"

O'Connor and others described Apaches unending murders and robberies—"4,000 deaths" and "millions of pesos in losses"—reflected an after-the-fact reinterpretation of social relations that had been much more fluid, and far less destructive, than contemporary observers now acknowledged.[367]

[367] Ibid.: "Amigo de Dios es quien enemigo de Dios mata."

Chapter 5
"To Put the Sea In-Between": The Apache Middle Passage to Cuba, 1770-1816

In October 1805, two Apache men petitioned the viceroy of New Spain for their freedom. With the aid of a Spanish notary, Carlos and Manuel explained that they had worked in the ports of Veracruz and Havana for the past twenty-two years alongside convict laborers and enslaved Africans. Citing their good behavior, baptism into the Catholic faith, old age, and the fact that they had not committed any crime, they asked to be allowed some rest for what remained of their lives. "We suffer," they explained, "only because the Almighty chose to raise us among heathens." Six months later, the viceroy had still not answered their petition and they continued to labor in exile.[368]

Carlos and Manuel's petition introduces a much broader history of captivity and displacement. Between 1770 and 1816, at least three thousand Native captives from the North American West lived through a similar saga. Given the fragmentary nature of the source record—documents sometimes list only the number of captives who arrived in central Mexico or omit numbers altogether—I estimate that the total number of displaced Native men and women from across New Spain's Northern frontier during this period ranged between three and five thousand.[369] For some, captivity was rooted in warfare, as

[368] Carlos and Manuel, "Mecos," to Viceroy José de Iturrigaray, 14 October 1805, AGN-IV Caja 5908, Expediente 50. While the file contains several petitions from these two Indian men and documents investigating their history, there is no evidence in the file that they were in fact freed. Original quote: "Confiesan, para mas explicar su dolor que no han cometido delito civil, ni criminal, y asi solo padecen porhaver querido el todo Poderoso criarlos entre Gentiles…"

[369] References to convoys in 1784, 1787, 1800, 1801, 1804, and 1809, for example, contain no precise count of captives. For convoys listing only the number arrived, see appendix, where I have listed this data using the term "at least." It seems likely that extant figures are low by at least one-third, which would suggest a range from 3,300-4,400. For another discussion of the source material and its challenges see Mark Santiago, *The Jar of Severed Hands: Spanish Deportation of Apache Prisoners of War, 1770-1810* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 2011), especially 201-202. Santiago's work was not published in time to discuss in-depth in this dissertation, though it should be noted his figures do not include evidence from convoys displacing non-Apachean groups.

Spaniards and their Native allies attacked the camps of enemy Apaches who had allegedly raided the livestock of their neighbors. For other groups, it was initiated by criminal proceedings in Spanish courts that sought to try Native subjects for "collusion" with the Apache or desertion from their mission pueblos. While the crown declared banishment "to places from which they may never return" to be the fate of "all the Apache nation," the line between Indian "traitors" under Spanish rule and Apache Indians who resisted Spanish sovereignty was far from clear, and hundreds of Native captives from non-Apachean groups joined men like Carlos and Manuel in facing imprisonment or forced labor in exile.[370]

While a broad range of Native groups faced banishment from Northern New Spain during the 1770s and 1780s, this chapter focuses especially on the experience of Apachean captives sent away from Nueva Vizcaya. The expatriation of Native captives deemed to be especially dangerous or rebellious was not a new phenomenon. In contrast to the discrete forced removal campaigns charted in previous chapters, however, the displacement of Apachean captives in the late-1700s was far more systematic and characterized by standardized procedures of transport that reflected a newly bureaucratized age.[371]

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[370] The relationship between mission Indians and migratory Apachean groups is discussed in the previous chapter of this dissertation. By 1801, the Spanish monarch had declared that all Apache Indian prisoners of war, including children, were to be sent to Havana and never allowed to return to their homelands. See AGN-Reales Cedulas, vol. 188, exp. 169. For example of officials citing this decrees see AGN-PI, Vol. 208, f. 490. For court proceedings leading to exile in Nuevo Leon and Nuevo Santander see AGN-PI, Vol. 146, f. 254-270; AGN-PI, Vol. 26, f. 289-291; AGN-PI, Vol. 74.

[371] On age of reform see Linda Arnold, *Bureaucracy and bureaucrats in Mexico City, 1742-1835* (Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 1988), David Weber, *Bárbaros : Spaniards and their savages in the Age of Enlightenment* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2005), Susan Deans-Smith, *Bureaucrats, Planters, and Workers: The Making of the Tobacco Monopoly in Bourbon Mexico* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1992), Richard L. Garner, *Economic Growth and Change in Bourbon Mexico* (Gainesville: University of Florida Press, 1993), and Ignacio del Río, *La Aplicación Regional De Las Reformas Borbónicas En Nueva España: Sonora y Sinaloa, 1768-1787* (Mexico, Serie de Historia Novohispana 1995). For standard

The chapter begins by considering why Spaniards decided to start sending away Apache prisoners of war, though it is striking that they discussed the issue relatively little in correspondence. In part, I argue that this relative silence reflected the fact that sending away especially "rebellious" Indians both as punishment and to prevent their return was a generally accepted practice by the late-eighteenth century. In this respect, it is striking that when military commanders did discuss their motivations, they referenced past actions like the forced removal of the Tobosos in order to argue that the same should be done to Apaches.[372]

Debates between Spanish administrators tell only so much about captives' experience, status, and ultimate destinations, however. The central aim of this chapter is to elucidate the experience of Natives displaced from the Greater Rio Grande. Ironically, by throwing themselves to the ground and refusing to march, or by orchestrating harrowing mass escapes, Apache men and women helped fuel Spanish efforts to "put the sea in-between" them and their homelands, as one Spanish governor explained the practice. While some Apaches forged new lives in the households of Havana residents who petitioned to receive them, others employed the same strategies of guerilla warfare they had honed in the Southwest Borderlands, escaping into the countryside, raiding livestock, and pillaging farms. Transporting Apache captives to Cuba did not, in the end, produce the "submission to Christian instruction" that Spanish officials had hoped.[373]

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procedure for conductor of captive convoys see "Ynstrucion para el govierno de los oficiales que an de resevir, y conducir la collera de mecos," (5 June 1780), AGN-IV, Caja 2788, Exp. 38.

[372] Hugo O'Conor to Viceroy D. Antonio Bucareli y Ursua, 8 March 1774 in AGN-PI 154; For other discussions of why Indians should be sent away see AGN-PI, Vol. 204, esp. f. 474; AGN-PI, Vol. 146, f. 171-199 and f. 254-270; AGN-IV, Caja 2425, Exp. 17.

[373] On Christian instruction as secondary aim of displacement see especially AGN-PI, Vol. 146, f. 152; AGN-Archivo Historico de Hacienda, Vol. 571, Exp 1; AGN-PI 155, f. 61-86. On "put the sea in-between" see Carrion to Unzaga y Ameraga, 30 April 1784, AGI-Cuba 1335: "desprecio de la vida," "poniendoles agua de por medio."

Map 5: Origin and Ultimate Destination of Displaced Native Captives, 1770-1816[374]

The Debate over Captive Fates

After the Marques de Rubi's tour of the Northern Provinces and his recommendations that Apaches be pursued in their own camps began to be pursued in the late-1760s and early-1770s, an old question gained renewed focus. The regulations of 1772, which followed Rubi's ideas, drew upon past history in mandating that Indian prisoners of war be sent to Mexico City for the viceroy to decide their fate. Military commanders in Nueva Vizcaya surrounding provinces, however, did not always concur with this recommendation, and varied between arguing that Apache captives should not be sent away at all, on the one hand, to arguing that they needed to be sent to islands

[374] Drawn from references cited in appendix. Base map of Mexico from: <http://mapasdemexico.org/maps/caps2.html> (Accessed by author on September 2, 2009).

overseas to truly be secure, on the other.[375]

Such arguments reflected the continued limits on Spanish power in the Greater Rio Grande. In military planning, Spaniards envisioned driving Apaches back north across the Rio Grande, where they would be "forced into the jaws of the [Comanche]," or they hoped that the exile of Apache women and children would "scare" them into submission and force them to finally stay put in fixed settlements. Even as official Spanish policy vacillated over time between bellicose "war by blood and fire" and more conciliatory "peace through purchase," the general practice of Spanish forces remained roughly similar: facing elusive, mobile Apaches, Spaniards employed every means at their disposal in trying to conquer a formidable enemy.[376]

The administrative reorganization of the northern provinces like Nueva Vizcaya in the 1770s gave new power to military officers in determining the fate of Apache captives. In 1776, the new position of "commandant general" reflected the replacement of governors with a single civil-military authority that would report, at least in theory, directly to the council of the Indies in Spain, though in practice they continued to consult with the viceroy of New Spain. Even before the 1776 reorganization, however, the appointment of one military commander in charge of frontier military forces in the early 1770s had presaged the broader aim to bring colonial frontiers under direct imperial

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[375] On Rubi visit and Regulations of 1772 see Lawrence Kinnaird, *The Frontiers of New Spain: Nicolás de LaFora's Description, 1766-1768* (Berkeley: The Quivira Society, 1958), Nicolás LaFora, *Presidios Internos: Relacion del Viaje Que Hizo a los Presidios Internos situados en la Frontera de la America Septentrional Pertenciente al Rey de España*, ed. Vito Alessio Robles (Mexico, D.F. Editorial Pedro Robredo, 1939), David Weber, *The Spanish frontier in North America* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1992), 204-212.

[376] On Apache-Comanche relations and Spanish aim to incite Comanche violence on Apachean groups see "Sobre la Junta de Guerra celebrada en Chihuahua, 1778," [29 June 1778], AGI-Guadalajara 276; SANM II, Reel 12, Fr. 32-34; SANM II, Reel 12, Fr 670; SANM II, Reel 13, Fr. 111. See also Matthew Babcock, "Turning Apaches into Spaniards: North America's Forgotten Indian Reservations" (Ph.D. Dissertation, Southern Methodist University, 2008), especially Ch. 1; Hämäläinen, *The Comanche Empire*, especially Ch. 3.

control.[377]

In the fall of 1770, Bernardo de Galvez arrived in Nueva Vizcaya during the early years of war with new ideas for military strategy. He immediately focused attention on the fate of Apache captives. Though he was aware of the standing order to send Native prisoners of war to Mexico contained in the 1729 presidio regulations, he explained that he was going to keep them under his control in the North for now. In explaining this decision, he sent along to the viceroy a detailed military campaign diary in which he highlighted the loyal and useful service of an Apache captive in his forces' entrée into Mescalero Apache camps in present-day South Texas. Highlighting a common theme for military men discussing Apache military service in the future, he told the story of how, during the campaign, this Apache had been captured "by his own people," but that he had managed to escape and return to the Spanish camp. If some Spaniards marveled at the idea of Apaches "fighting their own countrymen," others understood that Apachean groups, while at times recognizing alliance based on kinship relations, were often as divided by enmity and competition as outsiders.[378]

While campaigns between 1770 and 1772 produced Apache casualties and generated stunning reprisals, Galvez's combination of force, diplomacy and Apache military service did not bring war to a close. His replacement, Hugo O'Connor pursued both attacks on Apache camps and the exile of Apache captives to Mexico. In his 1776 *informe* to the viceroy, he claimed that such efforts had helped begin to turn war in Spaniards favor after 1772. As he explained his overarching aim, he noted that he sought

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[377] Weber, *The Spanish Frontier*, 220-225.

[378] Bernardo de Galvez toViceroy Marques de Croix, 7 January 1771, AGN-PI 97. On "fighting their own countrymen," see José Cortés, Memorias sobre las provincias del norte de Nueva España, 1799, in Elizabeth A. H. John and John Wheat, eds. and trans., Views from the Apache Frontier (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1989), 32.

not only "the much desired punishment of the enemy, but also their displacement from our lands, sending them back across to the other side of the Rio Grande." He hoped to accomplish Apache displacement "from Spanish lands," in part, by sending Apache prisoners of war away to prevent their return north. If he destined captives sent way in *colleras* or chain gangs of prisoners in 1773, and 1775, for the viceroy to decide their fate, O'Connor hoped to convince royal officials to send them further away than Mexico City. He explained his view first by referencing past history. "When [the Tobosos] infested these frontiers," O'Connor noted, "it was necessary for the infamous Don Joséf Berroteran…to exterminate them, both by killing them in battle and by sending them [away] as prisoners." Through such measures, O'Connor explained, Berroterán had brought peace to the region "for many years."[379]

If O'Connor believed that such actions were extreme—he explained "he would not use the same means with the Apache without permission"— exile was the only hope to achieve a lasting victory, in his mind. "If fear of death obliges them to settle in towns," he explained, "as soon as the troops withdraw…they will return to the mountains and return to their past customs of robbing with even greater animosity." It is striking that he viewed displacement to Mexico City as inadequate as well. "Even if they are sent to workshops in the capital," he noted, "Apache are so warlike, the men as well as the women, can easily return to their homelands." O'Connor's recommendation thus echoed the past arguments of Nueva Vizcayans regarding the Tobosos: "only by transporting

[379] Hugo O'Conor to Viceroy, 8 March 1774, AGN-PI 154: "Quando infestavan estas Fronteras los Cocoyomes, Acoclames, y Sisimbres, fue necesario que el famoso Partidario D. Joséf Berroteran Capitan del Presidio de Conchos los exterminase, ya dandoles muerte en la campaña, y ya embiando los Prisioneros a esa Capital con lo q.e se consiguió tranquilizar por muchos años el Paiz." For references to Indian convoys in these years see appendix.

them to windward island in small groups," O'Connor explained, "will we ever see these frontiers free of these enemies."[380]

If the viceroy and his advisors initially rejected the idea of sending Apaches to the Caribbean, it was not long before the weight of evidence came to support O'Connor's claims. The idea that even women could break out of jails and return home was manifest by Apache captives' determination to do just that, as groups of women escaped from the jail in Saltillo in 1773 and Chihuahua City in 1776. By the 1780s, soldiers were in fact conducting captives beyond Mexico City to the Gulf Coast and embarking them in ships to the Caribbean. Attention to the journey of these captives sheds light on why officials ultimately sanctioned sending them so far away, what the journey was like for displaced captives, and how their ultimate fates relate to broader histories of Native American captivity and slavery in colonial North America and the Caribbean.[381]

The Journey South

Between 1776 and 1816, convoys carrying Indian prisoners departed from across the Northern frontier of New Spain nearly every year, and sometimes as often as three or four times per year. The size and makeup of convoys illustrates both the violence of military campaigns and the capabilities (and limitations) of the Spanish military forces. Though the size of convoys varied, between 80 and 100 Indians usually comprised each

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[380] Ibid.: Si el miedo de perecer les obliga a reducirse a Pueblos, apenas veran retiradas las tropas de la expedicion y las veteranas quando ya havran vuelto a las sierras y a exercitar con mas encono sus antiguas costumbres robos, y maldades…"; "Si se remiten en Colelras a esa Capital y se reparten en Poblaciones aunque sean divididas y en obrages, son tan campistas asi los hombres como las mugeres que insenciblemente y sin mucha retardacion sabrán regresarse a sus Madrigueras de manera, que solo transportandolos a las Yslas de Barlovento en pequeñas divisiones podremos ver estas fronteras libres de semejantes enemigos."

[381] José Antonio Areche, *Fiscal*, to Vicreoy, 6 September 1774, AGN-PI 154. On women's escapes see Felis Fran.co Pacheco, Saltillo, to Viceroy 27 July 1773, AGN-PI 23; D.n Juan de Ugalde to Viceroy, Santiago de la Monclova, 25 January 1778, AGI-Guadalajara 275.

shipment. Based on censuses of convoys, Native groups affected include Coahuiltecan groups from the Northeast; Chiricahua, Lipan, Mescalero, and Gila Apaches from the central frontier; and Seris from the far west. Of convoys where a gender breakdown is extant, 56% of displaced Indians were women, 27% men, and 16% children. The gender imbalance illustrates both that fact that adult Indian men were more likely to fight to the death in battle and that Spaniards were less likely, but not entirely unwilling, to kill Indian women and children in military campaigns.[382]

Indians either marched on foot or rode mules on the seventy or more day journey south to Mexico City. Practice varied from case to case. In some instances, all Natives rode, usually two to each mule; in other cases only the sick or elderly rode, while the others marched.[383] Officials warned the convoy escort—usually numbering between twenty and thirty soldiers—that all Indian men were to be handcuffed and watched carefully, given that they are "all adept tricksters" who could "commit crimes sparked by their ferocity and barbarity."[384] Women often traveled unshackled on the journey south to Mexico City, but the procedure of transport was designed to prevent their escape as well. When convoys stopped for the night in the countryside, for example, soldiers separated Native men and women and formed a circle around them. On occasions when they stopped at roadside inns, soldiers not only separated men and women, but also locked

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[382] These statistics are drawn from a running tally of all convoy censuses I have discovered; see appendix for complete list of references.

[383] On mule and foot travel see for example AGN-PI Vol. 74, f. 202-234 and AGN-PI, Vol. 56, f. 74, which notes the example of 96 Indians riding on 48 mules. For a detailed diary of the journey south see AGN-PI, Vol. 155, f. 305. On shackles and handcuffs see AGN-PI, Vol. 238 f. 397 and f. 408-409; Carceles y Presidios, Vol. 6, Exp. 3.

[384] For quotes concerning Indian character see AGN-PI Vol. 204, f. 62—" Ellos son mui astutos y saben engañar con aparente mansedumbre; cuya advertencia hará V.S. al referido Coman.te para que proceda siempre con la mayor desconfianza," and (referring to Indian escapees from the convoys), Indiferente de Guerra, Vol. 77, f. 7—"dichos Apaches no solo cometen los excesos de su ferocidad y barbarie en el transito para sus territorios, sino que son despues para los nuestros los mas implacables, inhumanos, terribles enemigos, por el mayor rencor y conocimientos que adquieren."

them in guarded and candlelit rooms.[385]

Indians were commonly fed chili and tortillas in the morning, stew with beef and tortillas at midday and beans and tortillas at night. The only variation on this diet appears to have been to replace tortillas with bread.[386] Though officials mandated that Natives always be given sufficient food and water, evidence exists that both may have been lacking at times. One veteran of the convoys explained that, as they traveled south, curious onlookers came from all parts to gawk at the Indians on the march and the mules carrying the sick. He explained that the Indians would approach these curious onlookers to beg them, likely through signs, for food and water.[387]

After more than two months of travel, convoys arrived in the capital. Here, Natives were again imprisoned, awaiting the next chain gang to depart for the port of Veracruz. Men were usually sent to the royal jail (La Acordada), while women were sent to the poor house (Hospicio de Pobres) or the collection house (Casa de Recojidas). As in the North, space in confinement was at a premium. What exacerbated this problem further was the fact that the majority of Indian prisoners were women and children, and there was little space allocated for them in the jail. Sent to places like the collection house, Indian women were confined alongside thirty or forty prostitutes that authorities routinely picked up and deposited there. Given that the Indian women were cramped in close quarters with strangers, it is perhaps unsurprising that the house director complained that, "being so quarrelsome," they not only picked fights with the prostitutes,

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[385] On military escort size and experience see AGN-PI, Vol. 179 f. 159; AGN-PI, Vol. 156, f. 58; AGN-IV, Caja 3364, Exp. 33.
[386] On food and supplies see AGN-PI vol. 130, Exp. 4; Carceles y Presidios, Vol. 6, Exp. 3; AGN-PI Vol. 146, f. 162; AGN-PI Vol. 238, f. 285.
[387] AGN-IV, Caja 2788, Exp. 38

but also quarreled among each other.[388]

While the royal treasury paid the costs of Indian displacement, the sums the treasury allocated were often insufficient, especially for confinement in Mexico City awaiting shipment to Veracruz. Directors of institutions like the royal jail and poorhouse complained about the cost of maintaining the Indians; the royal treasury provided the paltry sum of one or two reales a day. And though the treasury allocated funds for one change of clothing for each Indian, the funds were either insufficient or Indians refused the clothing provided. Certificates of baptism and death often note the "nakedness" of Indian men and women alike.[389]

If Indians sometimes rode on muleback from the North to the capital, they always marched on foot on the 250-mile journey from Mexico City to the coast. Concern for security on this leg of the journey was heightened. Soldiers chained Indian men and women two by two, with one shackled to the chain that bound together the whole group.[390]

These chain gangs bound for Veracruz traveled eight to twelve miles a day (four to six leagues) across rugged terrain. Soldiers described the attitude of Indians on the

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[388] On imprisonment in Mexico City see especially AGN-PI, Vol. 155, f. 97; AGN-PI, Vol. 208, f. 550. The description by the director of the Casa de Recojidas in AGN-PI Vol. 155, f. 97 is worth quoting at length: "La Casa de Recojidas tiene poca estension por lo que apenas es suficiente p.a treinta o quarenta Mugeres prostituidas que es lo menos que regularmente suele haver, por lo que el lugar que ocupan las Mecas hace falta, y en la carcel es mui estrecha la pieza dedicada para la prision de Mugeres. A las expresadas Mecas como queda insinuado se les aviste con su diario de real y medio por cuenta de la Real Hacienda, cuyo gravamen es preciso que siguen las que en el dia existen , siendo dificil darles salida, por estar bui broncas y haver algunas entre ellas que se han desertado, y les han buelto a prender tambien por que haviendose notado que havian trabajado para quitar una ventana con la idea de hacer fuga, se registraron, y se les hallo como ocho o diez cuchillos, sin haver podido averiguar si estaban todas comprehendidas en la maniobra que hicieron."

[389] AGN-PI, Vol. 208 f. 545, for example, notes that "despite the fact that the royal treasury sends one real (unit of currency) per day and one change of clothes per year, the cost of feeding and clothing them excedes this amount, resulting in great strain on the funds of the poor house." On nakedness see AGN-PI, Vol. 208, f. 525, f. 545, and f. 557.

[390] On route between Mexico City and Veracruz see, for example, AGN-PI, Vol. 238, f. 285. On shackles see AGN-Presidios y Carceles vol. 6, exp. 11, f. 170.

march as "die first, walk tomorrow." Natives sometimes threw themselves to the ground and refused to march any further. After beating an Indian with a rod, for example, one soldier managed to get him to walk another ½ mile, until "seeing his resistance, and insistence on throwing himself to the ground," he had to put him on muleback.[391]

Chain gang conductors frequently described similar actions of resistance. On one occasion, three or four Indians starting throwing themselves to the ground en route to Veracruz. The conductor explained that he could tell that one of them "did it with such ostentation that I knew his resistance was rooted not in exhaustion, but in furor." In fact, the Indian man inclined his head to the ground as he fell eight or nine times, and any one of these impacts would have cracked his skull, "but for the fortune that we were traveling through land with soft, loamy soil."[392]

When the chain gang arrived on the coast, Natives again faced confinement. Because Spaniards complained that native names were virtually impossible to determine—one official explained that even those with Christian names "claim to be Peter today and then John tomorrow"—they assigned most prisoners numbers. Commonly referred to as a group by the term "meco," which derived from the disparaging term "chichimeco" long applied to nomadic Indians from the North, individual Indians who did not carry Christian names might be referred to as "Meco

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[391] AGN-Presidios y Carceles, vol. 6, exp. 11, f. 172: "dandole de palos… pudo conseguir que anduviera otro quarto de legua, pero biendo su resistencia, e insistiendo en tirarse al suelo, y que los amenasas no alcansavan, informado por señas de los mismos Yndios que su resistencia Nasia de la imposivilidad de hallarse enfermo, providenció tomar un bagage menor en el camino, condusiendolo en el, hasta la referidad venta, con este exemplar a las dos leguas hizo otro lo mismo…" On die first, walk tomorow attitude ("ellos havian resuelto morir antes que caminar el siguiente dia") see f. 205-206.

[392] "Notó que unos tres, o cuatro Yndios se venian tirando en el suelo, y particularmente uno de ellos con tal ostinacion que se conosia que su resistencia no era de imposibilidad, sino de furor, por que a su bista se tiró con el mayor esfuerso, y fortaleza inclinando la caveza al suelo sobre ocho o diez ocasiones, que qualquiera de estos atentados si huviera sido en suelo firme…se huviera roto la caveza, pero la fortuna de haver encontrado un suelo blando y humedo le preservó de esta desgracia, See Ibid., f. 173-204.

number 3" or "Meca number 134." They were housed in the castle of San Juan de Ulua until the next ship was available to carry them on to Cuba.[393]

Death

Not all Natives journeyed the entire distance from the Borderlands to Cuba. Imprisonment, more than the march itself, led to deaths. In fact, Spaniards often commented on the dangers of confining a large number of humans to a small place while feeding them unfamiliar foods. Indian fatalities, stated one Spanish official, could be explained in large part "by the inevitable corruption of a place where many people are confined for some period of time, by the sadness of losing their liberty, and by changes in their diet."[394]

Confinement to prisons in the Borderlands, Mexico City, and Veracruz contributed to the severity of smallpox epidemics and "putrid fevers," likely caused by cholera. Officials at the royal jail and poor house meticulously documented sicknesses and made decisions about which Indians were fit to continue the march, and which would remain in confinement. In February 1798, for example, the medic at the poor house ordered that Meca No. 502 and Meca No. 508 be kept behind and not sent onto Veracruz. He explained that No. 502 had a fever and No. 508 was coughing up blood, and neither was fit to continue, because the exercise of the march would "overcook their blood" and

[393] AGN-PI, Vol. 123, f. 55: "…de cuios nombres como tan variables, por que el que oy es Pedro, mañana es Juan, no se ha podido hazer lista formal; ni tampoco conseguir noticia cierta de los que sean baptizados…" On use of numbers for prisoners see AGN-PI vol. 208, f. 525, for example.

[394] AGN-PI, Vol. 155, f. 231: "Este accidente [Indian deaths] proviene en su mayor parte de la corrupción inevitable en un lugar donde existen algun tiempo muchas personas encerradas, y de la tristeza de que se apoderan sus animos con la perdida de su livertad, influiendo tambien el mismo efecto la variación de alimentos."

worsen their illnesses.[395]

On other occasions, the decision about moving sick Indians appears to have been rooted more in whether an illness was deemed contagious than in the consequences to an individual Indian's health. A number of women in Veracruz awaiting transport to Cuba had fallen ill with "putrid fevers" in January of 1797, for example. The governor decided that they should continue to their destination, because the boat captain had consulted with a doctor who explained that these fevers were not contagious, "but result from the change of country, nakedness, and many other causes." Surveying the women, the boat captain noted that "these Indians are full of miseries because they are virtually naked, and the only clothes they do have are made of wool, which traps their sweats and causes all kinds of illnesses, and especially fevers, as a result."[396]

Changes in diet led to deaths attributed to scurvy and diarrhea. In addition to smallpox and fevers, doctors noted that scurvy "was an illness to which this nation is especially susceptible." Most displaced Natives were semi-nomadic or nomadic peoples accustomed to a diet that included fruits and vegetables that they cultivated or gathered. The tortillas, beans, and meat they received from convoy conductors lacked key nutrients that would have prevented scurvy's onset.[397]

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[395] AGN-PI, Vol. 208, f. 525: "Acaba de poner esta noticia caieron enfermas dos Mecas el N.o 502, con calentura y el n.o 508 echando sangre por la boca y como están todas tan gruesas no hai que fiar por la sangre requemada de la Caminata q.e traen.." On Smallpox epidemics and decisions about whether to transport infected Indians see AGN-IV, Caja 5676, Exp. 66.

[396] AGN-PI, Vol. 208, f. 580: "haviendome informado p.r el Medico q.e las asiste le pregunté…de q.e enfermedades padecen y me dixo q.e de calineturas putridas y q.e de esa enfermedad havian fallecido quatro de ellas; y haviendole preguntado q.e si reconocia q.e podia ser enfermedad contagiosa, me dixo q.e no, q.e sus enfermedades provenian de la mutacion de Paiz, de la desnudez q.e padecian y de otras muchas cauza." The boat captain, who surveyed the Indians before disembarking with them for Cuba, noted that: "llenas de miseria p.r hallarse desnudas y la pocaropa que tienen, ser de lana y tenerla entrapada con los sudores, y no tener con q.e mudarse: esto puede ser causa de muchas enfermedades y singularm.te los calenturas."

[397] See AGN-PI, Vol. 155, f. 415 for quote on scurvy being an especially common illness: "venian [los

Though Spaniards cited "the sadness of losing their liberty" as another cause of death, it is more difficult to explain or measure. Several instances of suicide are extant in convoy documents. In December 1789, the conductor of a convoy bound from Chihuahua to Mexico City noted that as they were readying the mules in the morning a sergeant came across an old Indian woman who had slit her own throat. Investigating the matter, he discovered from the other Indians that "for days she had wanted to kill herself, but that they had stopped her." On another occasion, Spanish soldiers encircled Natives who had escaped from a convoy, but rather than give themselves up, the men threw themselves off a nearby cliff, falling to their deaths.[398]

Escapes

If deaths thinned the number of Natives who arrived in the Caribbean, so too did escapes. In fact, the specter of Indian escapes may have weighed on the minds of the conductors of the convoys. They were repeatedly told about past escapes that had occurred and the dire consequences that would ensue if these "barbarian" Indians got free.[399]

Just before Christmas 1796, for example, Francisco Gonzalez approached the town of Jalapa escorting a convoy of Indian prisoners bound for the Caribbean coast. The mayor reported that Gonzalez came bearing injuries he had received during a violent

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indios] contagiadas de escorbuto, enfermedad a que regularmente está sugeta esta nación, segun aseguran los medicos y cirujanos For more on scurvy deaths see also AGN-IV, Caja 4848, Exp. 24.

[398] On Indian woman's suicide see AGN-PI, Vol. 155, f. 305: "estando aparejando las mulas para marchar me dio parte el Sarg.to que una Yndia vieja se havia degollado sola, y habiendome informado de las demas supe que hacia dias, que se queria matar, y que ellos no la habian dejado por cuio motivo se le quitaron las oregas, y di parte con ellas al S.or Comand.te General…" On Indians who threw themselves off the cliff see Juan José Valverde to Vicreoy Branciforte, 17 February 1797 in AGN-Indiferente de Guerra, Vol. 77: "q.e dos mui mal eridos se presipitasen a una barranca, de manera q.e suponiendose estos muertos p.r hir el uno traspasado p.r el Pecho de vala, y el otro dos vezes p.r el estomago de Rayoneta…"

[399] See official instructions on how to treat and conduct Indian convoys in AGN-IV, Caja 2788, Exp. 38 for emphasis on preventing escapes.

escape at a nearby roadside inn. Around midnight, Native men had sounded the war cry, trampled the guard at the door of their quarters, stolen his gun, and rushed out into the main hall of the inn. The rest of the troop took up arms to prevent their escape to the mountains, but the Apache men resisted by lashing out with jagged shards of stone that they had torn from the walls.[400]

Though Spanish bayonets injured many Natives, eighteen managed to slip out into the night. Dozens of Spanish soldiers and militiamen set off on a long distance pursuit of the escapees that led to the eventual recapture of twelve of them. Gonzalez, meanwhile, was imprisoned and court-martialed for his negligence in failing to prevent the escape. Ironically, he spent more than sixteen months in the same castle in Veracruz where Indian prisoners were held awaiting transport to Cuba.[401]

Such escapes were not uncommon. More than 250 Indians escaped from convoys and prisons in Central Mexico and the Caribbean during the late-18th century, of which slightly over 100 are documented to have been recaptured.[402] Escapes commonly occurred either early in the morning when at least some soldiers were sleeping, or at dinnertime, when Indians hands were freed in order for them to eat. Faulty construction of the handcuffs was a factor facilitating such escapes. Iron handcuffs were rough, heavy, and unpolished, slicing into the prisoners' wrists and causing significant pain and suffering, but they also tended to be too wide in width, and Indians proved able to slip out of them.[403]

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[400] AGN-Indiferente de Guerra, Vol. 77, f. 8-9.

[401] Ibid. This volume is unfortunately largely unnumbered, but Gonzalez's sentence can be found near the end of the bound volume and dated 2 April 1798: "que sufra dos meses de Prision en el Castillo de S.n Juan de Ulua, con cuio arresto y el de un año y quatro meses que ha sufrido en el mismo destino."

[402] See "Escapes" in appendix for further references.

[403] On handcuffs see AGN-Carceles y Presidios, Vol. 6, exp. 3; AGN-PI, vol. 238, f. 397 and 408-9.

Escapes appear to have been especially common in the forested mountains on the descent to the coast. Perhaps soldiers in Northern New Spain, who were more familiar with Natives, tended to be more watchful. Or perhaps Indians, having already endured months of imprisonment and a long journey south, were willing to take greater risks to secure their freedom.

The "sadness from losing their liberty" that Spaniards saw in Indian actions reveals itself in the determination of Indians to return to their homelands against the odds. When twenty-seven men attempted to escape in August 1801, for example, Spanish soldiers were immediately aided by local residents to contain them. The Indians continued to fight fiercely, however, dislodging stones from the walls to lash out and throw at their captors. In the end, the soldiers shot and killed twenty-three of them.[404]

On another occasion in March 1792, twelve men attempted an escape at dinnertime while camped in the countryside on the road south to Mexico City. Despite warnings that soldiers would use deadly force if they did not calm down, the Indians persisted in lashing out. The officer in charge gave soldiers permission to meet violence with violence: after shooting and killing the Natives, they mutilated their bodies. First removing their ears to take to the viceroy, they later had to return to cut off the Indians' decaying right hands, since the ears had been left outside and wild animals had eaten them.[405]

It was not only men that attempted and succeeded in escaping. Just after midnight in February 1799, a group of Indian women sat silently in the dark inside their quarters. Outside the door, the guard wondered why the light had gone out but decided it must be

[404] AGN-Presidios y Carceles, Vol. 6, exp. 11, f. 164-243.
[405] AGN-PI, Vol. 142, f. 329.

because of the strong north winds. In the dark the women were slipping out of their shackles. After a shout—"The Indians are trying to escape!"—the soldiers on night watch all dashed to the men's quarters. Meanwhile, more than fifty women and a little boy escaped into the night. Struggling to secure the Indian men who also had slipped out of their handcuffs, the soldiers gave chase to the fugitive women too late, catching up to only one lone straggler who clung to a tree on the mountainside. As the soldiers surrounded her, she bombarded them with rocks until one of them sliced her wrist with his machete.[406]

Indians attempted dangerous escapes once they arrived at their destinations as well. On the Caribbean coast, officials noted that Indian men would throw themselves from the seaside castle of San Juan de Ulua into the water. Not only had officials witnessed them in the act, but they had found drowned Indian men washed up on the shore.[407] Despite hopes that Natives would resign themselves to labor after being shipped across the sea, they continued to attempt escapes. When a shipment of prisoners arrived in Havana in December 1802 for example, six immediately deserted. Though the governor managed to recapture several of them, he reported that two other "fierce Indians" were still on the loose in the countryside committing "atrocities" alongside several runaway mulatto slaves. Their story, which introduced this dissertation, will be explored in greater depth below.[408]

Some Natives succeeded in their efforts to return home. By the mid-1780s,

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[406] AGN-Presidios y Carceles, vol. 6, exp. 3. By April more than 20 Indian women had been recaptured. See AGN-IV, Caja 4817, Exp. 50.

[407] On Indians throwing themselves into the sea, see AGN-PI, Vol 155, f. 61-86.

[408] AGN-PI, Vol 238, f. 475: "si se hace comparación con los extragos que dos Yndios feroces de la misma nacion han causado hace tiempo y estan causando en el territorio de la nueva Poblacion de Philipina 60 leguas a sotavento de esta plaza donde hasta ahora no ha podidio lograrse exterminarlos [o] aprehenderlos…de que resulta continuar sus atrocidades."

escapees from the Caribbean coast had shown up back in Nuevo Santander in Northeastern New Spain. In more than ten letters between 1782 and 1785, the governor of the province pleaded with the viceroy that he make sure the convoys were secure. He explained that these escapees "were the fiercest and most inhumane of enemies." Not only did they themselves commit violent acts of retribution, but the governor alleged that they spread their feeling of vengeance to previously peaceful Native groups, recruited allies to their cause, and thus circumvented the purpose of expatriation in the first place.[409]

Some were sent south more than once. In April 1796, for example, El Verde and Disoqué faced exile from their homelands near Tucson to the Caribbean coast, after they had already journeyed hundreds of miles in their escape from a chain gang of Apache captives near Mexico City. Traveling at night along the road back north, they had subsisted on horsemeat and corn gathered from local haciendas until they arrived at the camp of the Apache headman El Vivora. Newly allied with the Spanish, El Vivora had turned the men in promptly to military officials at the nearby fort of Janos. "I didn't understand why," El Verde explained, "when we hadn't done any harm." El Verde's testimony to officials in Janos sheds more light on what had been a string of bad luck. He explained that he had escaped chain gangs bound for central Mexico not once, but twice, walking and riding nearly 4,000 miles in two years time.[410]

In the end, these escapes generated a response. Military officials investigated

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[409] For quote see AGN-Indiferente de Guerra, Vol. 77, f.7: "los mas implacables inhumanos, terribles enemigos." For discussion of Indians returning to their homelands see especially AGN-PI, Vol. 123, f. 126.

[410] "Declaraciones tomadas a dos Apaches que se huyeron de las Colleras," [Statements taken from two Apaches that escaped from the chaingangs] Roque de Medina to Commandant General of Interior Provinces, 8 June 1796, AGN-PI, Vol. 238, f. 448.

handcuffs, the quarters of roadside inns, and made recommendations about how to improve the security of both. Moreover, at least three convoy conductors, including Gonzalez, were arrested, imprisoned, and court-martialed when escapes did occur. Though two of the three were cleared of wrongdoing, Gonzalez was found solely responsible for the escape of the Indians in his chain gang and sentenced to sixteen months in prison. The push to punish Gonzalez may have emerged from the unusually severe plundering of the Apaches that had escaped. They had stolen dozens of horses and other livestock, set fire to ranches and homes, injured and killed Spaniards on the road north, and had allegedly cannibalized several children. Natives clearly were not passive victims of Spanish efforts to exile them.[411]

Labor

Despite the violence, disease, crowded prisons, and escapes that characterized the journey south, a surprising number of Natives survived to labor in Central Mexico and the Caribbean. In fact, of those convoys where both the original number and the number who arrived in Mexico City are known, approximately 70% survived their imprisonment and march south. If this survival rate is applied to the total number known to have been displaced, it suggests that at least 2,400 Indians arrived in convoys to Central Mexico in the final decades of the colonial period. While extant records are more fragmentary for the journey to the Caribbean, at least 60% of Indian captives marched out of Mexico City arrived on the coast, and at least 400 of these men and women are known to have arrived in the Caribbean, though additional research in Cuban archives may prove this final

[411] The three tried in court martials were Juan de Dios Cos, D. Pedro Paez, and Gonzalez. See AGN-Presidios y Carceles, Vol. 6, exp. 11, f. 164-243; AGN-Indiferente de Guerra vol. 77; and AGN-Carceles y Presidios, Vol. 6, exp. 3, respectively.

figure to be low.[412]

Natives who survived long-term imprisonment and the arduous journey labored in distinct settings based on their age and gender. Children were often distributed to the homes of citizens, sometimes en route, and often upon arrival to Mexico City. In many respects the fate of these children resembled that of Indian captives distributed in frontier regions as rewards to soldiers who had served in military campaigns. Some were adopted into Spanish families, became Catholic and integrated themselves into colonial society. Others attempted to escape and return north to their homelands.[413]

Adult prisoners' fates often broke down on gendered lines. Women were distributed as household servants in Mexico City, Veracruz, or Havana. Men were generally assigned to labor alongside convicts and African slaves on port and castle fortifications in the Caribbean, though both men and women were on other occasions distributed to lime kilns or tobacco fields, and some men labored in households in Cuba. Over time it became more rare for either men or women to be distributed in New Spain itself, as escapes generated greater adherence to the mandate that all Indians be sent to Havana. By 1798, royal decrees affirmed that all Natives, regardless of age and gender, were to be sent there, where the gendered division of labor was to be continued: women and children as household servants, men for manual labor.[414]

Given that the majority of displaced Indians were women and children, household labor was the most common task assigned to the Indian prisoners of war. Petitions for household labor highlight the scarcity or poor quality of slave and free labor in the

[412] Statistics calculated from charts in appendix. A research trip to the national archives in Cuba will hopefully allow me to expand upon the information presented here in my final book manuscript.
[413] For discussions of children and their fate see AGN-PI, Vol. 155, f. 86, 90, 229, and 235.
[414] For royal decrees at the turn of the 19th century see AGN-Reales Cedulas, vol. 188, exp. 169. For example of officials citing this decress see AGN-PI vol. 208, f. 490.

Caribbean basin. In 1781, for example, Don Miguel Lasso de la Vega petitioned for six of the Indians that had recently arrived in Veracruz from Northern New Spain. In his letter to the viceroy, he stressed that "it is well known how lacking servants are in this city."[415] An 1802 petition was even more explicit. Diego Garcia Panes wrote to the viceroy noting that his wife and daughter had asked him to request two Indian girls from a recently arrived convoy. He explained that "servants in this city are so scarce and of so poor quality, whether slave or free, that decent families like mine have simply had to go without." Panes went on to note that the present scarcity of laborers was worse than he had seen in his forty years as a citizen of Veracruz.[416]

In Mexico City during the 1770s and 1780s, Indians had also been granted to particular households through a petition process, though citizens were not always satisfied with the results. In 1778 the Viceroy noted that "having experienced the poor service of the Indian women and the ease with which they escape, there are not currently any households that want to receive them."[417] Despite moments of dissatisfaction, however, the redistribution of Indian women and children in the capital continued. This is evidenced by labor petitions like the one from Santiago Hampier in 1789, who was subsequently granted an Indian woman and a boy "no older than 7."[418]

Glimpses of what these Indians' lives were like can be gleaned from the documentary record. In April 1792 three Indian boys escaped from their assignment to

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[415] AGN-PI, Vol. 147, f. 119: "siendo tan sabida la falta de sirvientes en esta ciudad suplico a V.E. que siendo de su superior agrado…concederme seis de los Mecos venidos ultimamente a esta ciudad."

[416] AGN-IV, Caja 4502, Exp. 28: "en realidad está tan mala y tan revajada la servidumbre de criadas y criados en esta Plaza tanto de Esclavos como de livres que las familias desentes como la mia, se ven constituidas a careser de la cervidumbre presisa, lo que no he visto anteriormente en mas de 40 años que conosco la Veracruz."

[417] AGN-PI, Vol. 146, f. 414: "por averse experimentado el mal servicio de las Mecas, su genio indocil, y la facilidad con que se huien no se encuentran en el dia casas en que quieran recivirlas…"

[418] AGN-PI, Vol. 156, f. 1-15.

the kitchen of the royal palace in Mexico City, stealing a horse and carrying tools and supplies from the kitchen with them. When they were captured, they explained that they had escaped because workers in the kitchen constantly teased and bothered them. One man in particular bumped them on the head and told them to go back to where they had come from. Needless to say Spanish officials were not pleased that the boys had attempted to do just that.[419]

Native labor was not limited to household tasks, however. In the spring of 1782, for example, 101 Indian men, women, and children set off from Mexico City, and the viceroy noted that since it was well known that the tobacco planters in Orizaba and Cordova were experiencing a lack of workers, the Indians should be taken through these towns so that they might fill this need. As in the case of household labor, the results for tobacco cultivators were mixed. Eighteen Indians were distributed in Cordova in March of 1782, but by January 1783, only four remained because "their bad character motivates them to desert." This news motivated the viceroy to order that all the Indians distributed to tobacco planters be sent on to Veracruz.[420]

In Orizaba, however, it appears that labor distribution had been more successful. Sixty-nine Indians had been left with tobacco planters in March of 1782, and while by November of 1783 many of the men had escaped, the women and children remained. According to the mayor, all these Indians testified to the great pain and conflict it would cause them to be separated from their masters, "given the good treatment they have received and the fact that many have been baptized." Though such testimony must be read with a grain of salt, it at least suggests that their labor had been useful enough that

[419] AGN-IV, Caja 1383, Exp. 3.

[420] AGN-Alcaldes Mayores, Vol. 5, f. 5-6v, 19, 242-244, 246-247; AGN-Alcaldes Mayores vol. 9, f. 162-165: “su mala inclinación les motiba a la deserción.”

citizens of Orizaba did not want them to be removed and sent on to Veracruz.[421]

By the 1790s, almost all Indian prisoners who arrived in Mexico City, with the exception of the youngest children, were sent on to Veracruz and Havana, Cuba where they performed a variety of tasks commonly assigned to African slaves. The experience of Natives from the Rio Grande in the Caribbean Basin in these years warrants closer examination.

Arrival in Cuba

In the twenty or so years after the first boat carrying Apache prisoners of war arrived in the port of Havana in 1784, the arrival of "mecos," as these captives were commonly known outside the Greater Rio Grande, became a remarkably familiar occurrence. Local residents petitioned to receive a man or woman in their household, institutions asked to receive groups in their service, and local priests noted their presence in parish registers. But when the brigantine "General Galvez" and the packet boat "Oliba-blanca" arrived in March of that first year, carrying 18 Indian women and 33 Indian men, the governor of Havana sent a missive to his counterpart in Veracruz to explain he had received no news about these Indians, where they had come from, or what he should do with them. Moreover, he was deeply concerned about the presence of these "unbelievers" in his jurisdiction, given their "fierce and indomitable" character.[422]

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[421] AGN-Alcaldes Mayores, Vol. 4, f. 90; vol. 8, f. 185-186: "todos generalmente manifiestan con las mas vivas demostraciones el dolor y sentimiento queles causa la separación de sus amos, ya por el buen porte y tratemiento que han experimentado en sus casas y ya como agradecidos a la ynstruccion que han adquerido en los dogmas, y misterios de nuestra religion y santa fe…muchos de ellos han recivido ya el Santo Bauptismo."

[422] Unzaga y Ameraga, Governor of Havana, to Carrion, Governor of Veracruz, 14 April 1784, AGI-Cuba 1335: "por su carácer fiero e indomable."

Illustration 3: Late-18th century Casta Painting of "Meca" and "Meco"[423]

The Governor of Veracruz responded by noting how Apache escapes had fueled efforts to find a secure location. They had "such disregard for life" that they often threw themselves into the water from the castle of San Juan de Ulua with their chains still attached, as twelve had recently done. Given that the military commanders of the Northern provinces believed that such escapees fomented resistance to Spanish rule on the frontier, he noted that there had been no choice but to "put water in between them [and their homelands]."[424] The same would be done with both women and men given

[423] The term "Meco" derived from the term "Chichimeco" long applied to migratory Indians who were deemed "uncivilized" or especially "barbarous." Image from Joaquín Antonio de Basarás's "Origen, costumbres, y estado presente de mexicanos y philipinos" (1763) as reproduced in Ilona Katzew, *Casta Painting: Images of Race in Eighteenth-Century Mexico* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2005), p. 169.

[424] Carrion to Unzaga y Ameraga, 30 April 1784, AGI-Cuba 1335: "desprecio de la vida," "poniendoles agua de por medio."

reports that even the women were not secure in the homes where he had sent them for their education and Christian instruction. The viceroy thus had decided to send them to Cuba to prevent their escape and return to their country by placing them in "decent homes, where they might be taken care of and educated." In March, May and August of 1784, shipments of Apache prisoners arrived in Havana and captives were distributed to individual homes. Households in Havana had welcomed Indian women and children's labor. In June, the governor noted that local citizens "solicited them with eager desire." He had distributed the captives within days to families who had requested them.[425]

Native captives occasionally arrived later in the 1780s, usually among shipments of convict laborers. It is not always clear that these records distinguished between Apache Indians and other Native and Spanish criminals, complicating efforts to identify precisely how many Natives from the North arrived in Cuba. But records provide more detailed info in the 1790s, allowing for insight into how officials distributed captive laborers and who received them. "Mecos" arrived in Havana in various shipments throughout 1790 and 1791, as evidenced by extant petitions that show how local residents received such Indians for domestic service.[426]

Upon arrival, captives were housed at La Cabaña or at the quarters of the royal slaves. Distribution was orchestrated by these "slaves of his majesty," members of the black artillery company. Residents received "mecas" and "mecos" by noting that they

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[425] On viceroy's decisions see AGN-Archivo Historico de Hacienda, Caja 1083, Exp 8; On shipments arriving in Havana see Unzaga y Ameraga to Viceroy of Mexico, 14 May 1784, AGI-Cuba 1335: "en efecto quedan ya todos empleados en estos terminos, pues estos Vecinos los solicitan con empeño…"

[426] On problem of distinguishing between Native captives and convict laborers see for example Don Pedro Corbalan, Intendant of Veracruz to Captain General of Cuba, 5 June 1790, AGI-Cuba 1429. He notes simply that he is sending along 159 convicts—118 destined for the royal arsenal and 41 for the plaza. Petitions within this same volume clarify that some of these "convicts" destined for the plaza were Native prisoners of war.

would feed and clothe the given captive, teach them Catholic doctrines, baptize them, and "raise them well." Such petitions echoed the rhetoric of Spanish officials and navigated within the precepts of royal decrees. Under these terms, for example, Doña Petrona Velazco noted that she had received word that various "mecas" had arrived from Veracruz, and she hoped that the governor of Havana would grant her one. Similarly, Juan Manuel del Pilar, received an Indian man under similar terms, promising to instruct him and baptize him "within three months," and to turn in certifications of his baptism from the parish priests. He also promised to dress him, feed him, and notify the governor if he died or if "after trying him out," he "did not accommodate him well" and he needed to return him. It is clear that many petitioners had some social ties to those who shipped or imprisoned the captives. Thus, a boat captain might petition to receive an Indian woman, or the sergeant of the royal artillery, or the captain of the Pardo militia. All of these individuals would have come across the captives as part of their duties.[427]

Not only did the company of royal slaves deliver Apache captives to residents, but they picked them up when, as Juan Manuel del Pilar suggested, Apache captives "did not [always] suit" their masters. Doña Clara Maria de Sierra noted in 1791, for example, that she had received an Indian woman a month ago, put effort into her instruction, but "it had not been possible," because of her "perverse inclination." Don Francisco Bequet and Don Juan Marqueti also returned their Indians and asked to be given others. Reports about captives' "perverse inclination" may have related to residents' difficulties in communicating with their new servants, or the fact that they we unaccustomed or

[427] Ibid.: "se obliga a vestirla, alimentarla, enseñarle la doctrina bautisarla y ultimam.te darle la major ciranza"; "dando p.te en case que muera o profugue, o de bolverlo si no me acomoda despues de experimentarlo." On the "slaves of his majesty" see Maria Elena Diaz, *The Virgin, the King, and the Royal Slaves of El Cobre: Negotiating Freedom in Colonial Cuba, 1670-1780* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2000).

unwilling to provide the labor that a Spanish *don* or *doña* expected. On the other hand, however, it may have reflected the strikingly high numbers of these captives who were elderly. In fact, some captives remained imprisoned precisely because of their "disfigured appearance and age."[428]

The fact that some captives did "not suit" their masters raises questions about what Havana residents knew about their Indian captives, what labor they expected, and how they interpreted captives' legal and social status. While most petitions stuck strictly to the legal jargon of "education, Christianization, and good treatment," on rare occasions a petitioner fell out of this jargon and explained other motives. In March 1797, for example, Domingo Correa, a supervisor of public works projects, explained that "he did not have a slave for the service of his family, because of the small salary he received and the fact that slaves were so expensive." Having received word of the arrival of Indian women recently, he hoped that the governor of Havana would be willing to "grant him one of said slaves, and he would maintain her and instruct her in the Christian doctrine." Correa had his supervisor write a note testifying to his good conduct, and he was granted an Indian woman for his service.[429]

Havana residents had little familiarity with Native personal servants, the historical tradition of *repartimiento* or *encomienda*, or interaction with Native people. It is thus not surprising that they might have interpreted their status through the lens of African-

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[428] On Indians not distributed because of age or "disfigure" see AGI-Cuba 1716: "Quedan en casa blanca treze los que nadie los apeteze por su mala figura, y carga de años"; "Queda una mui vieja en Casa Blanca." For "perverse inclination" see AGI-Cuba 1516A: "aun que se ha heforsado a su enseñansa, no hacido posible poderla persuadir, p.r ser de perversa indole…"

[429] Domingo Correa to Governor of Havana, 16 March 1797, AGI-Cuba 1516A: "que no teniendo esclava p.a el servicio de su familia, por el corto sueldo que disfruta y estar sumamente caras, dhas esclavas, y teniendo noticia de que en S.n Ysidro se allan depositadas alg.s Yndias Mecas por tanto Supp.ca a v.e. se digne conzederle una de dhas esclavas, a la que mantendra, y enseñara en la doctrina cristiana…"

American slavery. Black slaves were "expensive," but to a middle or low rank military man or laborer, the possibility of receiving a free domestic slave must have been tantalizing. Such was the case even with a relatively well-off women like Doña Joséfa de Castro, the wife of an attorney, who explained that she was sick, had children, and that her husband was absent. She regrettably did not have the means to support a "negra." She thus requested a "meca" who she heard had recently arrived among others in February of 1802. The same was true for Brigadier Vicente Nieto, who explained to the governor of Habana that he was a widower and had a daughter. He thus needed a servant to assist him, but could not afford one. Since he had heard that "there was a party of Indian women in Casa blanca," he asked to receive one under the "customary" terms, suggesting his familiarity with these kinds of distributions in the past.[430]

When individuals upheld their promises to send certifications of death, they hinted both at the continued impact of disease on displaced Apaches and how they understood them in relation to the broader social landscape of Havana. In January 1791 for example, Juan Manuel del Pilar submitted news that his Indian captive, Maria Vicenta, had experienced a "violent convulsion of blood," and that he had brought in three doctors and an apothecary to care for her, "sparing no costs to contribute to her cure." But in the end she had died and he had buried her outside the Havana cathedral. Others submitted similar notes, from parish priests who had recorded the deaths of Apache captives in the ledgers of "*Pardos y Negros*," reflecting the small Native

[430] Havana residents' familiarity with both "mecos" and what they called "huachinangos"—A Nahua term referring to Natives from Mexico—suggests that they may have had more knowledge of Native laborers than I suggest here. This issue will be a focus of my research in the future. Maria Joséfa de Castro to Governor of Havana, 11 February 1802, AGI-Cuba 1716: "D.a Joséfa de Castro Esposa del Licenciado D.n Rafael Binelo con el devido respecto hace presente a V.S. hallarse enferma, con hijos, y el Marido ausente, y sin proporcion de sostener una negra q.e le es indispensable p.a su servicio…"; S.or Brigadir D.n Vicente Nieto to Governor Havana, 11 February 1802, AGI-Cuba 1716: "Hace presente a V.S. ser biudo, de cuyo matrim.o le quedó una Niña p.a la cual necesita de una criada q.e le asista…"

population of Cuba and perhaps their association with enslaved laborers.[431]

If men and women alike were distributed to households under such terms, a number of men also labored alongside convict laborers and African slaves in Cuba's fortification projects. Apaches helped maintain and expand the very sites where they had been imprisoned in route to Cuba. The Spanish sought to build or expand fortresses like the Castle of San Juan de Ulua and La Cabana in Havana as part of reform efforts beginning in the 1760s, especially after the English occupation of Havana during the Seven Years War. The supervisors of the ports and fortifications kept detailed records of convicts and prisoners of war who had deserted their posts that reveal the presence of Apache laborers. Such desertions were common. In October 1798, for instance, 16 men deserted the fortifications, including 2 "Mecos"—"José number 1" and José Antonio, who fled Casablanca on the 30th of that month. José "number one" may have been the same "Meco #1" who arrived in Havana aboard the Fragata de Guera O in November 1797.[432]

Such escapes illustrate that if some captives gained enough knowledge of the Spanish legal sphere to petition for their freedom—recall Carlos and Manuel 's 1805 petition to the viceroy—others sought redress through other means. The story of the Apache-led palenque, or runaway slave gang, with which I began this dissertation, illustrates this point especially vividly, and is worth examining in greater depth. Recall the reports flooding into the Havana town council in the fall of 1802 about El Chico and El Grande and their slave companions. While many captives were distributed to

[431] Juan Manuel del Pilar y Manzano to Governor of Havana, 28 January 1791, AGI-Cuba 1429: "Fue acometida de un violento escorbuto de sangre…no habiendo excusado gastos para contribuir a su alivio…"
[432] "Relación de los Precidiarios que han desertado de las obras de Fortificación" [Relation of the Convict Laborers who have deserted from the fortification projects], 21 November 1797, AGI-Cuba 1516B.

individual households, as I have explained, El Chico and El Grande—like other men—had been sent to labor alongside slaves of African descent in Cuba's shipyards, castles, and fortification projects, helping to maintain and expand the very sites where they had been imprisoned en route to Cuba. It is from such projects that they escaped. Whether they escaped with coworkers of African descent or met up with the other members of their *palenque* later is unclear from extant records. Whether El Chico and El Grande spoke Spanish, and how they communicated with their companions also remains a mystery, but they were clearly able to find some commonality in their endeavors to escape bondage and carve out an alternative life raiding in the countryside.[433]

This *palenque* consisted of seven men: at least two Apaches, two men who reportedly "looked like Indians," and three men described as "black and mulatto slaves." They joined together on raids to steal cattle, break into homes, and set fire to vineyards and fields, though on some occasions the Apaches were sighted alone. Captain Gavilan and his twenty men who tracked them had several skirmishes with the group, and reported that the *palenque* fired upon them with bows and arrows. Apaches would have had no problem manufacturing these, their weapons of choice, suggesting one crucial contribution they may have made to the gang at large. In the end, it is unclear whether these men had some larger aim or plan, other than retribution and survival. On the day Gavilan's party killed El Grande, local residents reported that the other fugitives had attacked an hacienda, killed six dogs, and broken into a house to steal clothing and furniture. They had also entered the local church in their rampage, breaking off the hand of a statue of the virgin of Guadalupe while defiling the holy water. Though Gavilan's

[433] For documents regarding the Apache-led "palenque" see AGI-Cuba 1720. See also AGN-PI, Vol. 238, f. 475.

expedition continued even after he had shipped the head of El Grande to Havana to claim his 2,500 peso reward, there is no record that the other members of the *palenque* were ever apprehended.[434]

In response to this *palenque*, and reports of other Apache escapes, the Havana council fired off a petition to the Spanish crown demanding that no more of these *Indios feroces*—ferocious Indians, as they called them—be sent to Cuba from Mexico, unless they were children. Though shipments did slow after 1803, royal officials did not entirely heed the Havana council's demands, as it was not until 1816 that the last shipment of Apaches before Mexican independence occurred. By that time, soldiers and militiamen had transported between three and five thousand Apache Indians and members of neighboring groups away from the Greater Rio Grande, and at least 400 men and women had arrived in Havana. Some died quickly of tropical diseases, their deaths recorded in the parish records of free and enslaved Africans. Others like El Grande and El Chico escaped and pursued a life of livestock rustling that echoed in some ways their past life raiding ranches in the Borderlands. Some captive men and women lived on in Havana households, had children, and forged new lives within Cuban society. In 1782, the governor of Havana had enthusiastically envisioned just this possibility. He imagined that large numbers of Apaches might form a separate neighborhood in Havana from which they could provide useful labor to their Spanish neighbors. Though no such neighborhood developed, it is fascinating that by the mid-1800s the term "meco" itself had taken on new connotations. As a 19th century dictionary of the Spanish royal academy noted, meco had come to mean either "a savage Indian" or something that has "the color red mixed

[434] Ibid.

with black." Whether the arrival of Native peoples to the Caribbean and their interactions with free and enslaved Africans fueled in any way this shifting meaning poses a tantalizing, if perhaps unanswerable question. But certainly it should be noted that Apaches were not alone in experiencing displacement to the Caribbean, as this was a fate shared by indigenous groups from New England, New France, Southeastern North America, Central America, and South America as well.[435]

Conclusion

On the one hand, this history of Apaches exiled to the Caribbean highlights change over time from the fate of Native war captives in the sixteenth and seventeenth century. Once "ransomed" from other Native groups by New Mexican merchants and carried south to New Spain to sell for sizeable sums, Apaches were now captured and transported under the direction of Spanish administrators who issued regulations for how they should be treated during the journey, what they should be fed, and where they should be taken. Many faced long-term incarceration in jails in Chihuahua City and Mexico City, reflecting broader trends in practices of criminal punishment in the

[435] On Indians imprisoned in Mexico City longterm awaiting transport between 1807-1810, see AGN-IV, Caja 3357, Exp 9 and AGN-PI, Vol. 208, f. 545-593. On the difficulty of transport in Independence war era see AGN-PI, Vol. 238, f. 267-299; P.I. Vol. 208, f. 548. Definitions of "Meco" in 1887 *Real Academia Española* accessed by author online at < http://buscon.rae.es/ntlle/SrvltGUISalirNtlle> (5 February 2011): "Dícese de ciertos animales, cuando tienen color bermejo con mezcla de negro. Indio salvaje." On Apache neighborhood in Havana see Governor Diego Joséf Navarro cited in Luis Unzaga y Ameraga to Viceroy, 20 Sept 1783, AGN-Archivo Historico de Hacienda, Vol. 1083, Exp. 38: "y con el tiempo, juntandose algun numero destinarseles sitio en q.e hiciesen Poblaciones capaces de rendir al Rey y al Publico las ventajas y conveniencias que en esos Payses; juzgando ademas doficil la desercion de ellos y el regreso a sus territorios." Unzaga y Ameraga expressed the counterargument: Indians were far too vicious and dangerous and might even set the sugar fields on fire. On Native displacement to the Caribbean see especially Allan Gallay *The Indian Slave Trade: the rise of the English Empire in the American South* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2002), German Romero Vargas, *Las sociedades del atlántico de nicaragua en los siglos xvii y xviii* (Managua : Fondo de Promoción Cultural-Banic, 1995), Moises Gonzalez Navarro, *Raza y tierra. La guerra de castas y el henequen* (Mexico, El Colegio de Mexico, 1974), Carlos Menendez, *Historia del infame y vergonzoso comercio de indios vendidos a los esclavistas de Cuba por los politicos yucatecos, de 1848 hasta 1861* (Merida, Talleres Graficos de la Revista de Yucatan, 1923).

eighteenth century. In central Mexico and the Caribbean, officials distributed those captives who survived to masters who paid nothing for them other than promising to feed and clothe them, instruct them in Christianity, and "treat them well." If such fates stretch conventional understandings of "slavery," it is striking that captives' fates in exile reveal that slavery may have remained an important means through which individuals understood Apache labor in particular contexts. In a slave society like Cuba, residents drew upon familiar referents in petitioning to receive an Apache "slave" or by recording their deaths and baptisms in the ledgers of "pardos and negros."[436]

Comparing this Apache experience to that of other categories of captives suggests new insights into the history of comparative slavery in colonial North America. By the time Native captives arrived in the Caribbean, for example, they had—from the Spanish perspective—largely been stripped of their specific ethnic identity, like many enslaved Africans arriving from the Atlantic crossing. In Veracruz and Havana, Spanish residents and officials called them not "Apaches" but "mecos," a term that derived from the disparaging term "chichimeco" long applied to allegedly "savage" or "uncivilized" Indians. Recall that Spaniards assigned most captives numbers, thus individual Apaches became "Meco number 3" or "Meca number 134."[437]

Both the practice of exiling Apaches and assigning them a new identity fit with scholars' identification of "natal alienation" as a characteristic element of slavery across time and place. But Native experiences also diverged from traditional definitions of slavery, and the experience of enslaved Africans in the Americas more specifically. In other contexts, as we have seen, Apaches had been sold in slave markets for a price, but

[436] On eighteenth century shifts in ideologies of criminal punishment see Foucault, *Discipline and Punish*.
[437] See note 392 above on Spanish "renaming" of Native captives.

in this case they were held in a public square to await distribution to public works projects or individual households for domestic service via a petition process. According to Spanish officials, Apaches were "prisoners of war" that would be lent out to local residents at no cost to them other than the expenses they made in food and clothing. Havana residents often echoed the official motives of Christianization, civilization, and protection in their petitions to receive captives. Typical was Juan Manuel del Pilar, who received an Indian man in 1791 by promising to instruct him and baptize him "within three months," and to turn in certifications of his baptism from the parish priests.[438]

The official status of Apaches as what we might call "captives of the crown," however, cannot in and of itself explain their lived experiences in Cuba. Another comparison is useful in this regard. Royal officials sent both English men captured in inter-imperial warfare and Hispanic criminals sentenced to forced labor to Havana, but they were neither "lent out" to individual households nor was their status permanent—they remained in captivity only until the English and Spanish negotiated routine exchanges of prisoners or in the case of convicts, until they had served their criminal sentences. Apaches, in contrast, were by royal decree, "sent to places from which they may never return."[439]

The case of a group of Apaches tried for the murder of an African slave in 1803

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[438] On natal alienation as a defining characteristic of slavery see Orlando Patterson, *Slavery and Social Death: A Comparative Study* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1985). For recent critiques that have emphasized that "social death" was an existential problem more than a lived condition see Stephanie E. Smallwood, *Saltwater Slavery: A Middle Passage from Africa to American Diaspora* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2007), and Vincent Brown, *The Reaper's Garden: Death and Power in the World of Atlantic Slavery* (Harvard University Press, 2008). On Apaches slaves sold in markets see Chs. 1-2 above. On Juan Manuel del Pilar see note 426 above.

[439] AGN-Reales Cedulas, Vol. 125, exp. 47: "[que] les ponga y destine en parage en donde no puedan volver jamas a su Pais, para evitar por este medio sus robos, y mayores Daños." For comparison to other categories of labor I draw from Ruth Pike, "Penal Servitude in the Spanish Empire: Presidio Labor in the Eighteenth Century," *Hispanic American Historical Review* 58, no. 1 (1978): 21-40.

and 1804 provides a vivid illustration of what set Apache captives apart from prisoners of war or convict laborers: the permanence of their status. While a judge initially sentenced Rafael, Cle, and Bitaque to a public execution for their crime, he ultimately commuted capital punishment and sentenced the men to terms of forced labor, apparently oblivious to the fact that all these men already faced permanent labor in exile. In a startling turn of events, one of the accused, Rafael, was sentenced by the court to ten years at the castle of San Juan de Ulua in Veracruz. When Cuban officials tried to send him there, the governor of Veracruz had to remind officials in Havana that by royal decree Apaches were never allowed to return to Mexico, given the risk that they might escape and make it back home. Banished from the Rio Grande, forced to labor in Havana, tried for the murder of an African slave, Rafael now had no place in either Cuba or New Spain. The only place for him was elsewhere; it was recommended that he be sent to Puerto Rico.[440]

In the end, it is the very ambiguities and complexities of the history of the Apache exile to Cuba that make it a useful vantage point from which to view the history of slavery. Apaches' status as captives controlled by the Spanish crown, and yet permanently exiled and associated with enslaved persons, are illustrative of the diverse experiences of captivity and forced labor that emerged in early modern societies in the Americas. In this case, it was imperial interests in territorial security and sovereignty, more than markets in human labor, which fueled the capture and forced migration of Native captives to the Caribbean.

Once enslaved and sold for a price, now exiled at the expense of the Spanish state, Native captives from the Greater Rio Grande negotiated shifting circumstances of

[440] AGI-Cuba 1716.

captivity with the same indomitable persistence, as they orchestrated escapes, threw themselves to the ground and refused to march, leaped into the sea in Veracruz, and banded with African slaves in raiding parties in the Cuban countryside. Their families and neighbors who remained in the Greater Rio Grande adapted to a world in which displacement from kin and homeland was an omnipresent threat. Reflecting and reinforcing long-standing divisions among Apachean groups, Spaniards began to draw upon Apache men's military service to track and capture neighboring Apachean groups in the 1780s and 1790s. Eventually, such alliances helped bring an end to the worst warfare by the early-1800s. Relative peace came at a great cost, however, including the diaspora of hundreds of Native men, women, and children to central Mexico and the Caribbean.[441]

[441] I am suggesting a somewhat less rosy portrait of the "relative peace" of the late-colonial era than that presented in some recent scholarship. See especially Brian DeLay, *War of a Thousand Deserts: Indian Raids and the U.S.-Mexican War* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2010), Matthew Babcock, "Turning Apaches into Spaniards: North America's Forgotten Indian Reservations" (Ph.D. Dissertation, Southern Methodist University, 2008).

Epilogue:
A Mosaic of Captivity in The Greater Rio Grande

Across the North American West in the 1780s and 1790s, Natives and Spaniards negotiated alliances that brought about what scholars have termed "an imperfect peace" to close the colonial era. Initially, negotiations built upon an agreement between some Native and Hispanic groups to fight Apaches, as in the case of the 1786 accord between New Mexicans and Comanches. In the coming years, however, some Apachean groups also entered into alliance with Spaniards in the Greater Rio Grande. In contrast to the Comanche case, which reflected a new willingness among Spaniards to negotiate with powerful Native groups as sovereign nations, peace arrangements with Apaches echoed older aims of bringing migratory Indians into fixed places of residence. The "peace settlements" or "*establecimientos de paz*" for Apaches would be directed by soldiers rather than missionaries, however. If some of these peace settlements were short lived, those that endured did not turn into Indian "towns" or lead Apaches to give up their migratory lifestyles. Apaches used these arrangements as zones of refuge to avoid Spanish and Comanche punitive expeditions and petition for the return of imprisoned kin, even as most families also returned to previous hunting, gathering, and trading practices.[442]

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[442] Matthew Babcock, "Turning Apaches into Spaniards: North America's Forgotten Indian Reservations" (Ph.D. Dissertation, Southern Methodist University, 2008), Brian DeLay, *War of a Thousand Deserts: Indian raids and the U.S.-Mexican War* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2010), esp. prologue; Juliana Barr, *Peace came in the form of a woman : Indians and Spaniards in the Texas borderlands* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2007), ch. 6; Pekka Hämäläinen, *The Comanche Empire* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2009), ch. 3. I have benefitted immensely from conversations with Matthew Babcock about the "peace establishments," though our views on these arrangements diverge somewhat. In particular, I believe that extant rations lists clearly indicate that Apaches continued to be highly mobile and practice seasonal migrations that make it difficult to characterize Spanish-Apache agreements as "reservations" or "settlements." For ration list evidence see, for example, Janos Collection, F20, S4 (1812); F21, S3I (1815); F23, S2I (1818); Janos F25B, S2 (1823-1824).

The Apache peace zones were built upon the specter of captivity and exile, as convoys of prisoners of war bound for Mexico and beyond travelled south year after year. In fact, Spanish military commanders employed the threatened exile of kin as a strategy to coerce Apache men into laying down their arms. When Apache men offered alliance, Spanish officials sealed this alliance by releasing relatives to them that they otherwise would have sent away in convoys bound for Mexico and Veracruz.[443] Between 1786 and 1793—a period in which Spaniards exiled more than 700 Apachean captives—eight peace zones came into existence, from Tucson in present-day Arizona in the west to Presidio del Norte in present-day Texas in the east.[444]

Violence and captivity remained fixtures of life in the Greater Rio Grande, as military campaigns and the exile of Apachean captives continued into the early-1800s. Some Apache men joined in this process, serving as "auxiliaries" or scouts and guides for Spanish forces. Such military service provided a means for Apache men to continue the traditional work of men within their culture and receive symbols of wealth and status like captives and livestock as compensation. It also provided them with standing to petition for the return of imprisoned or displaced kin. If Spaniards who marveled at Apaches "fighting their own countrymen" underestimated the degree of division among Apachean

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[443] One of the first Apache groups to enter long-term alliance with Spaniards at a military fort was the clan headed by El Compá. The Janos regiment took his wife captive in 1788 along with several other close kin. To redeem them, El Compá agreed to aid the Spanish, first at Bacoachi and then at Janos. Correspondence between Janos commander Antonio Cordero and Chihuahua City in December 1790 provides further evidence of the tactic of taking and threatening to deport captives to leverage Apaches to make peace at Janos. Cordero explained that in a recent raid, troops had captured the wife, sons, and other relatives of an Apache named Gimiguisen. Cordero suggested that this "disgrace" would likely make Gimiguisen think hard about soliciting peace. See Ugarte, Valle de San Buenaventura, to Cordero, September 18, 1788: Janos Collection, F5, S2; Cordero, Janos, to Casanova, 4 December 1790: Janos Collection, F6A, S1; Cordero, Janos, to Nava, 1 July 1791: Janos Colleciton, F7, S1; Nava, Chihuahua, to Janos Commander, 7 June 1791: Janos Collection, F7, S1.

[444] For 700 Apachean captives exiled in this period, see Appendix, on eight Apache peace zones see Babcock, "Turning Apaches into Spaniards," 7.

groups, the strategic choices of Mescalero and Chiricahua Apaches to aid the Spanish were not inconsequential either. One Spanish military commander spoke of having to assuage the concerns of an Apache who "worried about what other Apaches thought of him."[445]

Old customs died hard for Spanish soldiers too, whose own desires, and understandings of manhood, were not so distinct from that of Apaches. In the mid-1790s, soldiers repeatedly petitioned to receive Indian children they had captured in battle. In March of 1794, for example, the Commandant General in Chihuahua City, Pedro de Nava, explained that the little Apache girls that Sergeant Nicolás Madrid and Mariano Varela had chosen could be left to them, and that other soldiers that had been on the latest campaign should be given the same opportunity, "to select a little Indian girl, to their satisfaction." In September, Nava again approved that infant girls could be left to soldiers that had chosen them, "as long as they agreed to nurture and educate them."[446] The granting of captive children to soldiers continued into the early-1800s. By the end of 1804, for example, 35 year-old Lieutenant José Maria Doporto had served in the Greater Rio Grande for nineteen years. Doporto had been on ten campaigns against the Apaches, and had distinguished himself by killing thirteen enemies, taking fifty-two Apache prisoners, and liberating a Spanish captive.[447] Doporto's military service had also brought Native captives into his household, in this case two female servants and a little Indian

[445] On Apache military service see Babcock, "Turning Apaches into Spaniards"; José Cortés, Memorias sobre las provincias del norte de Nueva España, 1799, in Elizabeth A. H. John and John Wheat, eds. and trans., Views from the Apache Frontier (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1989), especially 32; Paul Conrad, "Bárbaros into Soldiers: Violence, Reciprocity, and Identity on New Spain's Northern Frontier," (Unpublished Masters Report, University of Texas at Austin, 2007). For Apache man "worrying what others thought of him" see Juan José Compa, Carcay, to Varela, 1 May 1833; Varela to Compa, 1 May 1833: Janos Microfilm Collection, University of Texas at El Paso, Reel #25.

[446] Nava, Chihuahua, to Casanova, 20 March 1794, and 23 Sept 1794: Janos Collection, F10, S1.

[447] "El Segundo Teniente D. Joséph Do-Porto," 31 December 1804, Janos Collection, F17, S2.

girl. Young recruits also received Apaches as compensation. Cadet Eduardo Garcia, a 19-year-old new recruit to the army, had already been on three campaigns by 1804. His household now consisted of himself and a little Indian boy. By 1804, in fact, 10% of the population of the presidio of Janos was comprised of Indian "orphans" or "*criados*."[448]

The life of one such orphaned Apache encapsulates the diverse fates that captives faced in the Greater Rio Grande in these years. Born amidst a devastating war, this boy had witnessed soldiers transport his kin away towards Mexico in a *collera* as a child. They had left him behind at the presidio of San Elzeario, however, reflecting the fact that it was not uncommon for children or the sick to be distributed among local residents rather than face long-distance exile. A Spanish resident of San Elzeario, Mariano Montes, had later purchased the boy for the price of a horse and baptized him, giving him the name "José Antonio." As José got older, however, he had abandoned his master and traveled from job to job, working as a cowboy or muleteer, or whatever task kept him from going hungry.[449]

It was as a "*peón*" for a mortuary house that José Antonio Montes traveled to Mexico City and presented himself before the viceroy of New Spain in January 1816 with two Indian women. He asked to be named the headman or "*capitán*" of the Gileño Apaches, or any of the Apache groups currently at peace near one of the presidios of the frontier. Though the viceroy presented him with gifts—a suit, hat, and fifteen pesos—he sent Montes back north to Chihuahua City to meet with officials there, explaining that "he had no idea which Apache divisions were at peace and whether this Indian was

[448] "Padron que manifiesta el numero de Tropa, Imbalidos, y Vecinos de este Puesto," Janos, 31 December 1804: F17, S2 and "El Cadete D. Eduardo Garcia," 31 December 1804: F17, S2.
[449] Montes' case is contained in AGN-PI 239, f. 14-21

sincere."[450]

As he had done in Mexico City, Montes arrived in front of the Commandant General in Chihuahua City, Antonio Garcia de Aexada, with his two female companions and asked again to be granted a title of leadership among any Apache group allied with the Spanish. Garcia investigated Montes' past life, reporting on his sale into servitude, his "vagabond life" after fleeing his master, and further evidence of his generally "debauched" lifestyle. The presence of Montes' two "wives" in particular had raised suspicions, and Garcia reported that the younger of the two was an Apache girl who had been left in Chihuahua when a *collera* had past through en route to Mexico. In Garcia's analysis, she had "not desired to subject herself to a civilized life," however, and had found a fitting partner in Montes. Garcia described the other woman as "an old lady" that Montes had acquired in "*tierra afuera*" or central New Spain. This woman had fled from the house where officials had placed her, and though Garcia seemed incredulous, she had described her former master as a resident of Veracruz, the port city where Apache captives were housed before being embarked to Havana.[451]

With his investigations complete, the Commandant General confiscated the clothes that the viceroy had given Montes and threw him and his companions in jail, explaining that "these three corrupt Apaches could never be useful except in confinement." Concluding that "under no condition could he leave them in liberty," he ordered that they be sent south in the next convoy to depart for Mexico. In fact, this

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[450] Viceroy, Mexico, to Comandant General, 7 January 1816, AGN-PI 239: "me ha presentado Indio Jose Ant.o Montes expresando ser de la Parcialidad Gileña y haber venido en el ultimo comboy con el objeto de conocerme y solicitar sele nombre Caudillo o Capitan de los de su Parcialidad e qualquiera de los Preciidos de la frontera; pero como ignoro si los habrá de p.z en alguno de ellos y la conducta y sinceridad de este Yndio, he mandado que se le dé pasaporte para que se presente al Comand.te de las armas de Chihuahua.."

[451] Antonio Garcia de Aexada, Chihuahua, 16 April 1816, AGN-PI 239: "tampoco quiso sugetarse a la Vida Civil…"

spring 1816 *collera* was the last documented convoy of Apache captives before Mexican Independence. In light of the transportation difficulties posed by skirmishes between rebels and loyalists, the convoy was routed not through Mexico City and Veracruz, but to the northern port of Altamira, from which a total of thirty-five Apache captives, including Montes and his two "wives" were embarked to Havana.[452]

José Antonio Montes' life provides a fitting conclusion to the analysis of violence, captivity, and slavery charted in the chapters above. Born in Gila Apache camps in the mountains of the Greater Rio Grande, he had been captured in war as a child and sold into "temporal slavery" at a military post while his family continued a long journey to Mexico and perhaps even Cuba. Laboring in odd tasks, Montes seems to have hoped for some better life. Having become aware of the benefits some Apache men had gained through alliance with Spaniards during the 1790s and early 1800s, he sought after the title "*capitán*," which could include a salary from the Spanish treasury. If Montes was something of a conman, by seeking recognition as a Gila Apache leader he unwittingly distinguished his ultimate fate from that of a petty criminal within Spanish society. With no trial, and no clear crime committed, he faced imprisonment and overseas exile for his "bad customs."[453]

In the end, Montes' story highlights the indefinite divide between victims and villains in the violent colonial past of North America. Whether orphan, slave, peon, conman, or exiled captive, Montes was a man trying to negotiate life in a world that often seemed to have it out for him. As distant as this world may seem at first glance—a

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[452] Ibid.: "de ningun modo puede dejarseles en libertad, pues siendo los tres Apaches viciados ya en la relacion y malas costumbres, jamas podrean ser utiles sino en un enciero." On 1816 collera see AGN-PI Vol. 227 f. 226-249.

[453] AGN-PI 239, f. 15. On benefits of title of "capitán" and broader context of peace agreements see Babcock, "Turning Apaches into Spaniards," esp. 78; Griffen, *Apaches at War & Peace*.

borderless North American West of captors and captives, chain gangs and slave auctions—upon closer inspection it reveals itself to be not so foreign at all. In different forms, the underlying moral questions remain with us, as global powers continue to deploy practices of violence, captivity, and forced migration in the name of civilization, security, and prosperity.

Appendix

Table 2: Convoys of Indian Captives Leaving the North American West for Central Mexico, 1770-1816

Date	Province of Origin	Number Departing	Number Arrived	Men	Women	Children	Group
1773	Texas[454]	15			12	3	Apache
1773	New Mexico[455]	23					Apache
1775	Nueva Vizcaya[456]	At least 93					Apache
1776	Nueva Vizcaya[457]	At least 104					Apache
1777	Nueva Vizcaya[458]	159	109				Apache
1778	Nuevo Santander[459]	36	24				Coahuiltecan
1778	Coahuila[460]	20	15				Coahuiltecan
1778	Nuevo Santander[461]	54	28				Coahuiltecan
1778	Nueva Vizcaya[462]	At least 24					Apache
1780	Nuevo Santander[463]	121		32	46	43	Coahuiltecan
1780	Nuevo Santander[464]	49	47	16	24	9	Coahuiltecan
1781	Nuevo Santander[465]	101	62	58	40	3	Coahuiltecan
1781	Nuevo Santander[466]	38					Coahuiltecan
1781	Nuevo Santander[467]	97					Coahuiltecan
1782	Nuevo Santander[468]	33	33				Coahuiltecan
1782	Nuevo Santander[469]	128	85	47	32	34	Coahuiltecan

[454] AGN-PI, Vol. 22.
[455] AGN-PI, Vol. 102.
[456] AGN-PI, Vol. 43; AGI-Guadalajara 458.
[457] Santiago, *Jar of Severed Hands*, 46-47.
[458] AGN-IV Caja 3540, Exp. 26.
[459] AGN-PI, Vol. 146.
[460] AGN-PI, Vol. 146.
[461] AGN-PI, Vol. 74, f. 299.
[462] AGI-Guadalajara 275.
[463] AGN-PI, Vol. 74, f. 269.
[464] AGN-PI, Vol. 74, f. 289.
[465] AGN-PI, Vol. 147, f. 160.
[466] AGN-PI, Vol. 147, f. 107.
[467] AGN-PI, Vol. 146, f. 164.
[468] AGN-PI, Vol. 147, f. 159.
[469] AGN-PI, Vol. 64, f. 178.

Date	Province of Origin	Number Departing	Number Arrived	Men	Women	Children	Group
1783	Nuevo Santander[470]	79	75	34	27	6	Coahuiltecan
1783	Coahuila[471]	40		12	25	3	Mescalero Apaches
1783	Coahuila[472]	28					Mescalero Apaches and Comanches
1783	Nuevo Santander[473]	69					Coahuiltecan
1783	Nueva Vizcaya[474]	145	47				Mescalero Apaches
1784	Sonora[475]	"A large chunk"					Seris
1784	Nuevo Santander[476]	At least 17	17				Coahuiltecan
1787	Sonora[477]	At least 3	3				Apaches
1787	Sonora[478]	At least 54	36				Apaches
1787	Nuevo Santander[479]	20					Coahuiltecan
1788	Nueva Vizcaya[480]	90	61	5	43	29	Apaches
1788	Sonora[481]	118	71				Gileño Apaches
1788	Coahuila[482]	15			13	2	Mescalero Apaches
1789	Nueva Vizcaya[483]	96	73				Apaches
1789	Nueva Vizcaya[484]	250	92				Apaches
1790	Nueva Vizcaya[485]	At least 33	33		33		"Mecas"
1791	Nueva Vizcaya[486]	74	64	7	34	33	Apaches

[470] AGN-PI, Vol. 147, f. 241.
[471] AGN-PI, Vol. 24, part II, f. 290.
[472] AGI-Guadalajara 285.
[473] AGN-PI, Vol. 64, f. 238.
[474] Max L. Moorhead, "Spanish Deportation of Hostile Apaches," p. 211-212.
[475] AGN-PI vol. 258, f. 382-389.
[476] AGN-PI vol. 123, f. 55.
[477] AGN-IV Caja 1796, exp. 5.
[478] AGN-IV Caja 1796, exp. 5.
[479] P.I vol. 58, f. 1-14.
[480] AGN-PI vol. 130, exp. 4
[481] Moorhead, p. 213-216.
[482] AGN-PI vol. 58, f. 1-14
[483] Moorhead, p. 214.
[484] AGN-PI vol. 155, f. 229.
[485] AGN-PI vol. 155, f. 97.
[486] AGN-PI vol. 142, f. 493.

Date	Province of Origin	Number Departing	Number Arrived	Men	Women	Children	Group
1792	Nueva Vizcaya[487]	82	67	17	48	17	Apaches
1793	Nueva Vizcaya[488]	16	13	3	3	10	Seris, Apaches
1793	Nueva Vizcaya[489]	52					Apaches
1794	Nueva Vizcaya[490]	83	81	27	56		Apaches
1794	Nueva Vizcaya[491]	95		18	72	5	Apaches
1797	Nueva Vizcaya[492]	71	70	13	57	1	Apaches
1798	Coahuila[493]	56	29				Apaches
1798	Nueva Vizcaya[494]	98	96	25	69	4	Apaches
1801	Nueva Vizcaya[495]	86	83	25	58	3	Apaches
1802	Nueva Vizcaya[496]	87	84	At least 21	At least 63		
1802	Nayarit[497]	22					Huichol/Cora
1802	Nayarit[498]	177					Huichol/Cora
1803	Nueva Vizcaya[499]	82	80				Apaches
1806	Interior Provinces[500]	At least 16	16				Apaches
1808	Interior Provinces[501]	At least 33	33				Apaches
1816	Nueva Vizcaya[502]	35					Apaches
Totals		**At least 3,317**	**At least 1,627**	**360**	**755**	**205**	

[487] AGN-PI vol. 142, f. 322.
[488] AGN-IV Caja 4636, Exp. 27.
[489] AGN-PI, Vol. 60, f. 1-22.
[490] AGN-PI vol. 141, f. 148.
[491] AGN-PI vol. 238, f. 446.
[492] AGN-PI vol. 208, f. 482.
[493] AGN-IV Caja 4791, exp. 76.
[494] AGN-IV Caja 3364, exp. 17.
[495] AGN-IV Caja 3920, exp. 3.
[496] AGN-PI vol. 238, f. 328.
[497] Zavala, *Los Esclavos Indios,* p. 308.
[498] Ibid.
[499] AGN-PI vol. 238, f. 391.
[500] Exact location of departure unknown; correspondence notes that Indians arrived in Mexico City from the North on this date: AGN-PI vol. 208, f. 550.
[501] Ibid.
[502] Indians conducted to Cuba: AGN-IV Caja 6375, Exp. 22.

Table 3: Native Captives from the Greater Rio Grande transported from Veracruz to Havana

Month	Year	Total	Men	Women/ Children	Arrived	Source
March	1784	18	0	18	18	AGI-Cuba 1335
April	1784	33	33	0	33	AGI-Cuba 1335
April	1784	7	0	7	6	AGI-Cuba 1335
May	1784	6	0	6		AGI-Cuba 1358
June	1784	58	33	25	58	AGN-AHH 1083, Exp. 8
October	1784	3	0	2	2	AGI-Cuba, 1335, 1338
December	1785	2	2	0		AGN-CDA, Tomo 39, exp. 132, f. 313
June	1790	2			2	AGI-Cuba 1429
June	1790	41			41	AGI-Cuba 1429
June	1790	9	9	0	9	AGI-Cuba 1429
February	1791	10	0	10	10	AGI-Cuba 1516A
May	1791	5	0	5	5	AGI-Cuba 1516A
May	1794	3	3	0	3	AGI-Cuba 1516A
July	1794	9	9	0	9	AGI-Cuba 1516A
November	1796	89	30	59	89	AGI-Cuba 1473
March	1797	27	0	27	27	AGI-Cuba 1516A
July	1797	10	10	0	10	AGI-Cuba 1516A
November	1797		1		1	AGI-Cuba 1516B
June	1798	4	4	0	4	AGI-Cuba 1516A
October	1798	31	10	21		AGI-Cuba 1716
August	1799	41	14	27	39	AGI-Cuba 1716
August	1801	5		5	5	AGI-Cuba 1716
February	1802	26	5	21	26	AGI-Cuba 1716
August	1802	23	16	7	23	AGI-Cuba 1716

Month	Year	Total	Men	Women/ Children	Arrived	Source
October	1802	6	6		6	AGI-Cuba 1716
November	1804	39	8	31		AGN-PI, Vol. 238, f. 403-4
February	1810	15	15			AGN-PI, Vol. 238, f. 418
Spring	1810	21	0	21		AGN-PI, Vol. 238, f. 283; Vol. 201 f. 3-22
October	1816	35	19	16		AGN-PI, Vol. 227, f. 226-249
Totals		**578**	**227**	**308**	**At least 426**	

Table 4: Select Escapes of Native Captives from Prisons or Convoys, 1770-1810

Date	Location	Number Escaped	Number Recaptured	Notes
1778	Nueva Vizcaya[503]	14		Women scale wall of jail
1780	En route to Mexico[504]	55		
1782-1783	Veracruz[505]	8	8	Captives escape from Veracruz and return to Nuevo Santander where they are recaptured
1783	En Route to Mexico[506]	56	9	
1789	Mexico City[507]	2		Women escape from the "casa de recogidas."
1789	En route to Veracruz[508]	10		
1792	Mexico City[509]	1		Captive escapes from Private Home
1792	En Route to Mexico City[510]	12	12	Attempted escape leaves 12 dead, ears are removed
1796	En Route to Veracruz[511]	18	12	Escapees pursued for weeks journeying back north.

[503] AGI-Guadalajara, Legajo 175.
[504] AGN-IV, Caja 2788, Exp 38.
[505] AGN-PI, Vol. 123.
[506] AGI-Guadalajara, Legajo 284.
[507] AGN-PI, Vol. 155.
[508] AGN-PI, Vol. 155.
[509] AGN-IV, Caja 1383, Exp. 3.
[510] AGN-PI Vol. 142, f. 329.
[511] AGN-Indiferente de Guerra, Vol. 77.

Date	Location	Number Escaped	Number Recaptured	Notes
1797	En Route to Mexico City[512]	18	1	
1798	Havana, Cuba[513]	2		Two Apache men escape from Habana fortifications
1799	En Route to Veracruz[514]	52	29	Women and child escape from roadside inn
1801	En Route to Veracruz[515]	27	26	23 captives are killed in attempted escape
1802	Havana, Cuba[516]	6		6 Apache men escape in Havana
1810	Mexico City[517]	27	9	
Total		**308**	**At least 106**	

[512] AGN-PI Vol. 208 fr. 483; AGN-IV, Caja 3364, Exp. 33.

[513] AGI-Cuba, Legajo 1516B

[514] AGN-Carceles y Presidios, Vol. 6, exp. 3.

[515] AGN-Presidios y Carceles, Vol. 6, exp. 11.

[516] AGN-IV, Caja 66, Exp. 49.

[517] AGN-PI, Vol. 201, f. 3.

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- Indiferente de Guerra
- Indiferente Virreinal (IV)
- Reales Cedulas

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Manuscript Collections:
- Papeles de Cuba (Cuba)
- Guadalajara
- Mexico

Benson Latin American Collection: Austin, Texas
Microfilm Collections:
- Archivo de Hidalgo del Parral (AHP)
- Spanish Archives of New Mexico (SANM)
- Provincias Internas (PI)

Manuscript Collections:
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University of Texas at El Paso: El Paso, Texas
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